T.W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda, Part II
THE SOLVING OF DILEMMAS
55. Contradictory Statements as to the Buddha's Teacher
1. 'Venerable Nāgasena, this too has been said by the Blessed One:
"I have no teacher, and the man
Equal to me does not exist.
No rival to me can be found
In the whole world of gods and men."
'But on the other hand he said:
"Thus then, O brethren, Āḷāra Kālāma, when he was my teacher and I was his pupil, placed me on an equality with himself, and honoured me with exceeding great honour."
 'Now if the former of these statements be right, then the second must be wrong. But if the second be right, then the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.'
2. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are accurate. But when he spoke of Āḷāra Kālāma as his teacher, that was a statement made with reference to the fact of his having been his teacher while he (Gotama) was still a Bodisat and before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood; and there were five such teachers, O king, under whose tuition the Bodisat spent his time in various places--his teachers when he was still a Bodisat, before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood. And who were these five?
3. 'Those eight Brahmans who, just after the birth of the Bodisat, took note of the marks on his body -- Rāma, and Dhaga, and Lakkhaṇa, and Mantī, and Yañña, and Suyāma, and Subhoga, and Sudatta -- they who then made known his future glory, and marked him out as one to be carefully guarded-these were first his teachers.
 'And again, O king, the Brahman Sabbamitta of distinguished descent, who was of high lineage in the land of Udikka, a philologist and grammarian, well read in the six Vedaŋgas, whom Suddhodana the king, the Bodisat's father, sent for, and having poured out the water of dedication from a golden vase, handed over the boy to his charge, to be taught -- this was his second teacher.
'And again, O king, the god who raised the agitation in the Bodisat's heart, at the sound of whose speech the Bodisat, moved and anxious, that very moment went out from the world in his Great Renunciation -- this was his third teacher.
 'And again, O king, Āḷāra Kālāma--he was his fourth teacher.
'And again, O king, Uddaka the son of Rāma -- he was his fifth teacher.
'These, O king, are the five who were his teachers when he was still a Bodisat, before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood. But they were teachers in worldly wisdom. And in this Doctrine that is transcendental, in the penetrating into the wisdom of the omniscient ones--in that there is no one who is above the Tathāgata to teach him. Self-dependent for his knowledge is the Tathāgata, without a master, and that is why it was said by the Tathāgata:
"I have no teacher, and the man
Equal to me does not exist.
No rival to me can be found
In the whole world of gods and men."'
'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'
Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha's teachers
52. Why Must There Be Only One Buddha at a Time?
4. 'Venerable Nāgasena, this too was said by the Blessed One:
"This is an impossibility, an occurrence for which there can be no cause, that in one world two Arahat Buddhas supreme should arise at one and the same time -- such a thing can in no wise be."
'But, Nāgasena, when they are preaching, all the Tathāgatas preach (the Doctrine as to) the thirty-seven constituent elements of insight; when they are talking, it is of the Four Noble Truths that they talk; when they are instructing, it is in the three Trainings that they instruct; when they are teaching, it is the practice of zeal that they teach. If, Nāgasena, the preaching of all the Tathāgatas is one, and their talk of the same thing, and their training the same, and their teaching one, why then should not two Tathāgatas arise at the same time? Already by the appearance of one Buddha has this world become flooded with light. If there should be a second Buddha the world would be still more illuminated by the glory of them both. When they were exhorting two Tathāgatas would exhort at ease; when they were instructing two Tathāgatas would instruct at ease. Tell me the reason of this, that I may put away my doubt.'
 5. 'This world system, O king, is a one-Buddha-supporting world; that is, it can bear the virtue of only a single Tathāgata. If a second Tathāgata were to arise the world could not bear him, it would shake and tremble, it would bend, this way and that, it would disperse, scatter into pieces, dissolve, be utterly destroyed. just as a boat, O king, might be able to carry one passenger across. Then, when one man had got on board, it would be well trimmed and able to bear his weight. But if a second man were to come like to the first in age and caste and strength and size and stoutness of body and build of frame, and he too should get on board the boat--would that boat be able, O king, to carry them both?
'Certainly not, Sir! it would shake and tremble; it would bend, this way and that; it would break into pieces, be shattered, dissolved, and utterly destroyed; it would sink into the waves.'
'Just so, O king, with this world, if a second Tathāgata were to appear. Or suppose, O king, that a man had eaten as much food as he wanted, even so that he had filled himself with nourishment up to the throat, and he -- thus satiated, regaled, filled with good cheer, with no room left for more, drowsy and stiff as a stick one cannot bend--were again to eat as much food as he had eaten before--would such a man, O king, then be at ease?'
'Certainly not, Sir! If he were to eat again, but once more, he would die.'
 'Well, no more could this world bear a second Tathāgata, than that man could bear a second meal.'
6. 'But how is that, Nāgasena? Would the earth tremble at a too great weight of goodness?'
'Suppose, O king, there were two carts quite filled with precious things up to the top, and people were to take the things from the one cart and pile them up on the other, would that one be able to carry the weight of both?'
'Certainly not, Sir! The nave of its wheels would split, and the spokes would break, and the circumference would fall to pieces, and the axle-tree would break in twain.'
'But how is that, O king? Would the cart come to pieces owing to the too great weight of goods?'
'Yes, it would.'
7. 'Well, just so, O king, would the earth tremble owing to the too great weight of goodness. But that argument has been adduced to make the power of the Buddhas known. Hear another fitting reason why two Buddhas could not appear at the same  time. If, O king, two Buddhas were to arise together, then would disputes arise between their followers, and at the words: "Your Buddha, our Buddha," they would divide off into two parties--just as would the followers of two rival powerful ministers of state. This is the other reason, O king, why two Buddhas could not appear at the same time.
8. 'Hear a further reason, O king, why two Buddhas could not appear at the same time. If that were so, then the passage (of Scripture) that the Buddha is the chief would become false, and the passage that the Buddha takes precedence of all would become false, and the passage that the Buddha is the best of all would become false. And so all those passages where the Buddha is said to be the most excellent, the most exalted, the highest of all, the peerless one, without an equal, the matchless one, who hath neither counterpart nor rival--all would be proved false. Accept this reason too as in truth a reason why two Buddhas cannot arise at once.
9. 'But besides that, O king, this is a natural characteristic of the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, that one Buddha only should arise in the world. And why? By reason of the greatness of the virtue of the all-knowing Buddhas. Of other things also, whatever is mighty in the world is singular. The broad earth is great, O king, and it is only one. The ocean is mighty, and it is only one. Sineru, the king of the mountains, is great; and it is only one. Space is mighty, and it is only one. Sakka (the king of the gods) is great, and he is only one. Mara (the Evil One, Death) is great, and he is only one. Mahā-Brahmā is mighty, and he is only one.  A Tathāgata, an Arahat Buddha supreme, is great, and he is alone in the world. Wherever any one of these spring up, then there is no room for a second. And therefore, O king, is it that only one Tathāgata, an Arahat Buddha supreme, can appear at one time in the world.'
'Well has the puzzle, Nāgasena, been discussed by simile adduced and reason given. Even an unintelligent man on hearing this would be satisfied; how much rather one great in wisdom as myself. Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.
Here ends the dilemma as to why there should be only one Buddha at a time in the world
53. Why Should Gifts Be Given to the Order Rather Than to the Buddha?
"Give it, O Gotamā, to the Order. If the Order is presented by you with it, then will you have paid homage: thereby alike to the Order and to me."
'But what, Nāgasena? Is not the Tathāgata of  greater weight and importance, and more worthy of gifts than even the jewel treasure of the Order, that the Tathāgata should have told his aunt, when about to present him with a wrapper for the rainy season which she herself had carded and pressed and beaten and cut and woven, to give it to the Order! If, Nāgasena, the Tathāgata were really higher and greater and more excellent than the Order, then he would have known that a gift given to him would be most meritorious, and therefore would not have told her to give it to the Order. But inasmuch as the Tathāgata, Nāgasena, puts himself not in the way of gifts to himself, gives no occasion for such gifts, you see that he then told his aunt to give that wrapper rather to the Order.'
11. 'The quotation you make, O king, is correct, and the Blessed One did so direct his aunt's gifts. But that was not because an act of reverence paid to himself would bear no fruit, or because he was unworthy to receive gifts, but it was out of kindness and mercy that he, thinking: "Thus will the Order in times to come, when I am gone, be highly thought of;" magnified the excellence which the Order really had, in that he said: "Give it, O Gotamī, to the Order. If you present the Order with it, thus will you have paid homage alike to the Order and to me." Just as a father, O king, while he is yet alive, exalts in the midst of the assembly of ministers, soldiers, and royal messengers, of  sentries, body guards, and courtiers -- yea, in the presence of the king himself -- the virtues which his son really possesses, thinking: "If established here he will be honoured of the people in times to come;" so was it out of mercy and kindness that the Tathāgata, thinking: "Thus will the Order, in times to come, when I am gone, be highly thought of;" magnified the excellence which the Order really had, in that he said: "Give it, O Gotamī, to the Order. If you present the Order with it, thus will you have paid homage alike to the Order and to me."
12. 'And by the mere gift of a wrapper for the rainy season, the Order, O king, did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathāgata. just, O king, as when parents anoint their children with perfumes, rub them, bathe them, or shampoo them, does the son by that mere service of theirs become greater than, or superior to, his parents?'
'Certainly not, sir! Parents deal with their children as they will, whether the children like it or not. And therefore do they anoint them with perfumes, shampoo, or bathe them.'
'And just so, O king, the Order did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathāgata merely by the fact of that gift; and although the Tathāgata, whether the Order liked it or not, told his aunt to give the wrapper to the Order.
13. 'Or suppose, O king, some man should bring a complimentary present to a king, and the king should present that gift to some one else -- to a soldier or a  messenger, to a general or a chaplain, -- would that man become greater than, or superior to, the king, merely by the fact that it was he who got the present?'
'Certainly not, Sir! That man receives his wage from the king, from the king he gains his livelihood; it was the king who, having placed him in that office, gave him the present.'
'And just so, O king, the Order did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathāgata merely by the fact of that gift. The Order is, as it were, the hired servant of the Tathāgata, and gains its livelihood through the Tathāgata. And it was the Tathāgata who, having placed it in that position, caused the gift to be given it.
14. 'And further the Tathāgata, O king, thought thus: "The Order is by its very nature worthy of gifts. I will therefore have this thing, my property though it be, presented to it," and so he had the wrapper given to the Order. For the Tathāgata, O king, magnifies not the offering of gifts to himself, but rather to whomsoever in the world is worthy of having gifts presented to him. For this was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent Magghima Nikāya, in the religious discourse entitled Dhamma-dāyāda, when he was exalting the attainment of being content with little:
"He would become the first of my Bhikkhus, the most worthy of presents and of praise."
15. 'And there is not, O king, in the three worlds  any being whatever more worthy of gifts, greater or more exalted or better, than the Tathāgata. It is the Tathāgata who was greatest and highest and best. As it was said, O king, by Māṇava-gāmika the god, in the most excellent Samyutta Nikāya, as he stood before the Blessed One in the midst of the assembly of gods and men:
Of all the Rāgagaha hills Mount Vipula's acknowledged chief,
Of the Himalayas Mount White, of planetary orbs the sun,
The ocean of all waters, of constellations bright the moon --
In all the world of gods and men the Buddha's the acknowledged Lord!"
And those verses of Māṇava the god, O king, were well sung, not wrongly sung, well spoken, not wrongly spoken, and approved by the Blessed One. And was it not said by Sāriputta, the Commander of the faith:
"There is but one Confession, one true Faith,
One Adoration of clasped hands stretched forth
-- That paid to Him who routs the Evil One,
And helps us cross the ocean of our ills!"
 'And it was said by the Blessed One himself, the god over all gods:
"There is one being, O brethren, who is born into the world for the good and for the weal of the great multitudes, out of mercy to the world, for the advantage and the good and the weal of gods and men. And what is that being? A Tathāgata, an Arahat Buddha supreme."'
'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'
Here ends the dilemma as to the precedence of the Order over the Buddha
54. Is It More Advantageous to Be a Layman, Or to Enter the Order?
16. 'Venerable Nāgasena, it was said by the Blessed One:
"I would magnify, O brethren, the Supreme Attainment either in a layman or in a recluse. Whether he be a layman, O brethren, or a recluse, the man who has reached the Supreme Attainment  shall overcome all the difficulties inherent therein, shall win his way even to the excellent condition of Arahatship."
'Now, Nāgasena, if a layman, clad in white robes, enjoying the pleasures of sense, dwelling in a habitation encumbered with wife and children, making constant use of the sandal wood of Benares, of garlands and perfumes and unguents, accepting gold and silver, wearing a turban inlaid with jewels and gold, can, having reached the Supreme Attainment, win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatship--and if a recluse, with his shaven head and yellow robes, dependent for his livelihood on the alms of other men, perfectly fulfilling the fourfold code of morality, taking upon himself and carrying out the hundred and fifty precepts, conducting  himself according to the thirteen extra vows without omitting any one of them, can also, having reached the Supreme Attainment, win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatship -- then, Sir, what is the distinction between the layman and the recluse? Your austerity is without effect, your renunciation is useless, your observance of the precepts is barren, your taking of the extra vows is vain. What is the good of your therein heaping up woes to yourselves, if thus in comfort the condition of bliss can be reached?'
17. 'The words you ascribe to the Blessed One, O king, are rightly quoted. And that is even so. It is the man who has reached to the Supreme Attainment who bears the palm. If the recluse, O king, because he knows that he is a recluse, should neglect the Attainments, then is he far from the fruits of renunciation, far from Arahatship -- how much more if a layman, still wearing the habit of the world, should do so! But whether he be a layman, O king, or a recluse, he who attains to the supreme insight, to the supreme conduct of life, he too will win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatship.
18. 'But nevertheless, O king, it is the recluse who is the lord and master of the fruit of renunciation. And renunciation of the world, O king, is full of gain, many and immeasurable are its advantages, its profit can no man calculate. just, O king, as no man can put a measure, in wealth, on the  value of a wish-conferring gem, Saying: "Such and such is the price of the gem" -- just so, O king, is the renunciation of the world full of gain, many and immeasurable are its advantages, its profit can no man calculate--no more, O king, than he could count the number of the waves in the great ocean, and say: "So and so many are the waves in the sea!"
19. 'Whatsoever the recluse, O king, may have yet to do, all that doth he accomplish straightway, without delay. And why is that? The recluse, O king, is content with little, joyful in heart, detached from the world, apart from society, earnest in zeal, without a home, without a dwelling-place, righteous in conduct, in action without guile, skilled in duty and in the attainments--that is why whatsoever may lie before him yet to do, that can he accomplish straightway, without delay -- just as, the flight of your javelin, O king, is rapid because it is of pure metal, smooth, and burnished, and straight, and without a stain.'
'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'
Here ends the dilemma as to the recluse having no advantages over the layman
20. 'Venerable Nāgasena, when the Bodisat was practising austerity, then there was found no other exertion the like of his, no such power, no such battling against evil, no such putting to rout of the armies of the Evil One, no such abstinence in food, no such austerity of life. But finding no satisfaction in strife like that, he abandoned that idea, saying:
"Not even by this cruel asceticism am I reaching the peculiar faculty, beyond the power of man, arising from insight into the knowledge of that which is fit and noble. May there not be now some other way to wisdom?"
'But then, when weary of that path he had by another way attained to omniscience, he, on the other hand, thus again exhorted and instructed his disciple in that path (he had left, saying):
"Exert yourselves, be strong, and to the faith
The Buddhas taught devote yourselves with zeal.
As a strong elephant a house of reeds,
Shake down the armies of the Evil One.
 'Now what, Nāgasena, is the reason that the Tathāgata exhorted and led his disciples to that path which he had himself abandoned, which he loathed?'
21. 'Both then also, O king, and now too, that is still the only path. And it is along that path that the Bodisat attained to Buddhahood. Although the Bodisat, O king, exerting himself strenuously, reduced the food he took till he had decreased it to nothing at all, and by that disuse of food he became weak in mind, yet when he returned little by little to the use of solid food, it was by that path that before long he attained to Buddhahood. And that only has been the path along which all the Tathāgatas reached to the attainment of the insight of omniscience. Just as food is the support of all beings, as it is in dependence on food that all beings live at ease, just so is that the path of all the Tathāgatas to the attainment of the insight of omniscience. The fault was not, O king, in the exertion, was not in the power, not in the battle waged against evil, that the Tathāgata did not then, at once, attain to Buddhahood. But the fault was in the disuse of food, and the path itself (of austerity) was always ready for use.
22. 'Suppose, O king, that a man should follow a path in great haste, and by that haste his sides  should give way, or he should fall a cripple on the ground, unable to move, would there then be any fault, O king, in the broad earth that that man's sides had given way?'
'Certainly not, Sir! The great earth is always ready. How should it be in fault? The fault was in the man's own zeal which made him fail.'
'And just even so, O king, the fault was not in the exertion, not in the power, not in the battle waged against evil, that the Tathāgata did not then, at once, attain to Buddhahood. But the fault was in the disuse of food, and the path itself was always ready -- just as if a man should wear a robe, and never have it washed, the fault would not be in the water, which would always be ready for use, but in the man himself. That is why the Tathāgata exhorted and led his disciples along that very path. For that path, O king, is always ready, always right.'
'Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.'
Here ends the dilemma as to the path
56. The Backsliders
23. 'Venerable Nāgasena, this doctrine of the Tathāgatas is mighty, essentially true, precious, excellent, noble, peerless, pure and stainless, clear and faultless. It is not right to admit a layman who is merely a disciple into the Order. He should be instructed as a layman still, till he have attained to the Fruit of the First Path, and then be admitted. And why is this? When these men, still being evil, have been admitted into a religion so pure, they give it up, and return again to the lower state, and by their backsliding the people is led to think: "Vain must be this religion of the Samaṇa Gotama, which these men have given up." This is the reason for what I say.'
24. 'Suppose, O king, there were a bathing tank, full of pure clear cold water. And some man, dirty, covered with stains and mud, should come there, and without bathing in it should turn back again, still dirty as before. Now in that matter whom would the people blame, the dirty man, or the bathing tank?'
'The dirty man, Sir, would the people blame,  saying: "This fellow came to the bathing tank, and has gone back as dirty as before. How could the bathing tank, of itself, cleanse a man who did not care to bathe? What fault is there in the tank?"'
'Just so, O king, has the Tathāgata constructed a bathing tank full of the excellent waters of emancipation, -- the bath of the good law. Whosoever of conscious discerning beings are polluted with the stains of sin, they, bathing in it, can wash away all their sins. And if any one, having gone to that bathing tank of the good law, should not bathe in it, but turn back polluted as before, and return again to the lower state, it is him the people would blame, and say: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, cleanse him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?"
25. 'Or suppose, O king, that a man afflicted with dire disease should visit a physician skilled in diagnosis, knowing an efficacious and lasting method of cure, and that that man should then not let himself be treated, but go back again as ill as before. Now therein whom would the people blame, the sick man or the doctor?'
It is the sick man, Sir, they would blame, saying:
 "How could the physician, of himself, cure this man, who would not let himself be treated? What fault is there in the doctor?"'
'Just so, O king, has the Tathāgata deposited in the casket of his religion the ambrosial medicine (of Nirvāṇa) which is able to entirely suppress all the sickness of sin, thinking: "May all those of conscious sentient beings who are afflicted with the sickness of sin drink of this ambrosia, and so allay all their disease." And if any one, without drinking the ambrosia, should turn back again with the evil still within him, and return once more to the lower state, it is he whom the people will blame, saying: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, cure him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?"
26. 'Or suppose, O king, a starving man were to attend at a place where a mighty largesse of food given for charity was being distributed, and then should go away again, still starving, without eating anything. Whom then would the people blame, the starving man, or the feast of piety?'
'It is the starving man, Sir, they would blame, saying: "This fellow, though tormented with hunger, still when the feast of piety was provided for him, partook of nothing, and went back as hungry as before. How could the meal, of which he  would not eat, enter, of itself, into his mouth? What fault is there in the food? "'
'Just so, O king, has the Tathāgata placed the most excellent, good, auspicious, delicate ambrosial food, surpassing sweet, of the realisation of the impermanency of all things, into the casket of his religion, thinking: "May all those of conscious sentient beings who feel within them the torment of sin, whose hearts are deadened by cravings, feeding upon this food, allay every longing that they have for future life in any form, in any world." And if any one, without enjoying this food, should turn back, still dominated by his cravings, and return once more to the lower state, it is he whom the people will blame, saying: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, purify him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?"'
27. 'If the Tathāgata, O king, had let a householder be received into the Order only after he had been trained in the first stage of the Excellent Way, then would renunciation of the world no longer indeed be said to avail for the putting away of evil qualities, for purification of heart--then would there be no longer any use in renunciation. It would be as if a man were to have a bathing tank excavated  by the labour of hundreds (of workpeople), and were then to have a public announcement made: "Let no one who is dirty go down into this tank! Let only those whose dust and dirt have been washed away, who are purified and stainless, go down into this tank!" Now would that bath, O king, be of any use to those thus purified and stainless?
'Certainly not, Sir! The advantage they would have sought in going into the bath they would have already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the bath be to them then?'
'Just so, O king, had the Tathāgata ordained that only laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, then would the advantage they seek in it have been already gained. Of what use would the renunciation be to them then?
28. 'Or suppose, O king, that a physician, a true follower of the sages of old, one who carries (in his memory) the ancient traditions and verses, a practical man, skilled in diagnosis, and master of an efficacious and lasting system of treatment, who had collected (from medicinal herbs) a medicine able to cure every disease, were to have it announced: "Let none, Sirs, who are ill come to visit me! Let the  healthy and the strong visit me!" Now, would then, O king, those men free from illness and disease, healthy and jubilant, get what they wanted from that physician?'
'Certainly not, Sir! What men want from a physician, that would they have already obtained otherwise. What use would the physician be to them?'
'Just so, O king, had the Tathāgata ordained that only those laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, then would the advantages they seek in it have been already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the renunciation be to them then?
29. 'Or suppose, O king, that some had had many hundreds of dishes of boiled milk-rice prepared, and were to have it announced to those about him: 'Let not, Sirs, any hungry man approach to this feast of charity. Let those who have well fed, the satisfied, refreshed, and satiated, those who have regaled themselves, and are filled with good cheer,--let them come to the feast." Now would any advantage, O king, be derived from the feast by those men thus well fed, satisfied, refreshed, satiated, regaled, and filled with good cheer?'
'Certainly not, Sir! The very advantage they would seek in going to the feast, that would they have already attained elsewhere. What good would the feast be to them?'
'Just so, O king, had the Tathāgata, ordained that  only those laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, thus would the advantages they seek in it have been already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the renunciation be to them?
30. 'But notwithstanding that, O king, they who return to the lower state manifest thereby five immeasurably good qualities in the religion of the Conquerors. And what are the five? They show how glorious is the state (which those have reached who have entered the Order), how purified it is from every stain, how impossible it is for the sinful to dwell within it together (with the good), how difficult it is to realise (its glory), how many are the restraints to be observed within it.
31. 'And how do they show the mighty glory of that state? just, O king, as if a man, poor, and of low birth, without distinction, deficient in wisdom, were to come into possession of a great and mighty kingdom, it would not be long before he would be overthrown, utterly destroyed, and deprived of his glory. For he would be unable to support his dignity. And why so? Because of the greatness thereof. just so is it, O king, that whosoever are without distinction, have acquired no merit, and are devoid of wisdom, when they renounce the world according to the religion of the Conquerors, then, unable to bear that most excellent renunciation, overthrown, fallen, and deprived of their glory, they return to the lower state. For they are unable to  carry out the doctrine of the Conquerors. And why so? Because of the exalted nature of the condition which that doctrine brings about. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the mighty glory of that state.
32. 'And how do they show how purified that state is from every stain? just, O king, as water, when it has fallen upon a lotus, flows away, disperses, scatters, disappears, adheres not to it. And why so? Because of the lotus being pure from any spot. Just so, O king, when whosoever are deceitful, tricky, crafty, treacherous, holders of lawless opinions, have been admitted into the religion of the Conquerors, it is not long before they disperse, and scatter, and fall from that pure and stainless, clear and faultless, most high and excellent religion, and finding no standing-place in it, adhering no longer to it, they return to the lower state. And why so? Because the religion of the Conquerors has been purified from every stain. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the purity of that state from every stain.
33. 'And how do they show how impossible it is for the sinful to dwell within it together with the good? just, O king, as the great ocean does not tolerate the continuance in it of a dead corpse, but whatever corpse may be in the sea, that does it bring quickly to the shore, and cast it out on to the dry land. And why so? Because the ocean is  the abode of mighty creatures. Just so, O king, when whosoever are sinful, foolish, with their zeal evaporated, distressed, impure, and bad, have been admitted into the religion of the Conquerors, it is not long before they abandon that religion, and dwelling no longer in it--the abode of the mighty, the Arahats, purified, and free from the Great Evils -- they return to the lower state. And why so? Because it is impossible for the wicked to dwell in the religion of the Conquerors. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the impossibility of the sinful to abide within it together with the good.
34. 'And how do they show how difficult a state it is to grasp? just, O king, as archers who are clumsy, untrained, ignorant, and bereft of skill, are incapable of high feats of archery, such as hairsplitting, but miss the object, and shoot beyond the mark. And why so? Because of the fineness and minuteness of the horse-hair. Just so, O king, when foolish, stupid, imbecile, dull, slow-minded  fellows renounce the world according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, then they, unable to grasp the exquisitely fine and subtle distinctions of the Four Truths, missing them, going beyond them, turn back before long to the lower state. And why so? Because it is so difficult to penetrate into the finenesses and subtleties of the Truths. This is how they show forth the difficulty of its realisation.
35. 'And how do they show how many are the restraints to be observed within it? just, O king, as a man who had gone to a place where a mighty battle was going on, when, surrounded on all sides by the forces of the enemy, he sees the armed hosts crowding in upon him, will give way, turn back, and take to flight. And why so? Out of fear lest he should not be saved in the midst of so hot a fight. Just so, O king, when whosoever are wicked, unrestrained, shameless, foolish, full of ill-will, fickle, unsteady, mean and stupid, renounce the world under the system of the Conquerors, then they, unable to carry out the manifold precepts, give way, turn back, and take to flight, and so before long return to the lower state. And why so? Because of the multiform nature of the restraints to be observed in the religion of the Conquerors. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the manifoldness of the restraints to be observed.
 36. 'As on that best of flowering shrubs, O king, the double jasmine, there may be flowers that have been pierced by insects, and their tender stalks being cut to pieces, they may occasionally fall down. But by their having fallen is not the jasmine bush disgraced. For the flowers that still remain upon it pervade every direction with their exquisite perfume. Just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors, return again to the lower state, are, like jasmine flowers bitten by the insects and deprived of their colour and their smell, colourless as it were in their behaviour, and incapable of development. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame. For the members of the Order who remain in the religion pervade the world of gods and men with the exquisite perfume of their right conduct.
37. 'Among rice plants that are healthy and ruddy there may spring up a kind of rice plant called Karumbhaka, and that may occasionally fade. But by its fading are not the red rice plants disgraced. For those that remain become the food of kings. Just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they, like Karumbhaka plants among the red rice, may grow not, nor attain development, and may even occasionally relapse into the lower state. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame,  for the brethren that remain stedfast become fitted even for Arahatship.
38. 'On one side, O king, of a wish conferring gem a roughness may arise. But by the appearance of that roughness is not the gem disgraced. For the purity that remains in the gem fills the people with gladness. And just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they may be rough ones and fallen ones in the religion. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame, for the brethren who remain stedfast are the cause of joy springing up in the hearts of gods and men.
39. 'Even red sandal wood of the purest sort, O king, may become in some portion of it rotten and scentless. But thereby is not the sandal wood disgraced. For that portion which remains wholesome and sweet scatters and diffuses its perfume all around. And just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they, like the rotten part of the sandal wood, may be as it were thrown away in the religion. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame. For the brethren who remain stedfast pervade, with the sandal wood perfume of their right conduct, the world of gods and men.'
'Very good, Nāgasena! By one appropriate simile after another, by one correct analogy after another have you most excellently made clear the  faultlessness of the system of the Conquerors, and shown it free from blame. And even those who have lapsed make evident how excellent that system is.'
Here ends the dilemma as to those who have lapsed
57. Why Have Arahats No Power Over Their Bodies?
40. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your (members of the Order) say:
"There is one kind of pain only which an Arahat suffers, bodily pain, that is, and not mental."
'How is this, Nāgasena? The Arahat keeps his mind going by means of the body. Has the Arahat no lordship, no mastery, no power over the body?'
'No, he has not, O king.'
'That, Sir, is not right that over the body, by which he keeps his mind going, he should have neither lordship, nor mastery, nor power. Even a bird, Sir, is lord and master and ruler over the nest in which he dwells.'
41. 'There are these ten qualities, O king, inherent in the body, which run after it, as it were, and accompany it from existence to existence. And what are the ten? Cold and heat, hunger and thirst,  the necessity of voiding excreta, fatigue and sleepiness, old age, disease, and death. And in respect thereof, the Arahat is without lordship, without mastery, without power.'
'Venerable Nāgasena, what is the reason why the commands of the Arahat have no power over his body, neither has he any mastery over it? Tell me that.
'Just, O king, as whatever beings are dependent on the land, they all walk, and dwell, and carry on their business in dependence upon it. But do their commands have force, does their mastery extend over it?'
'Certainly not, Sir!'
'Just so, O king, the Arahat keeps his mind going through the body. And yet his commands have no authority over it, nor power.'
42. 'Venerable Nāgasena, why is it that the ordinary man suffers both bodily and mental pain?'
'By reason, O king, of the untrained state of his mind. just, O king, as an ox when trembling with starvation might be tied up with a weak and fragile and tiny rope of grass or creeper. But if the ox were excited then would he escape, dragging the fastening with him. Just so, O king, when pain comes upon him whose mind is untrained, then is his mind excited, and the mind so excited bends his body this way and that and makes it grovel on the ground,  and he, being thus untrained in mind, trembles and cries, and gives forth terrible  groans. This is why the ordinary man, O king, suffers pain as well in body as in mind.'
43. 'Then why, Sir, does the Arahat only suffer one kind of pain -- bodily, that is, and not mental?'
'The mind of the Arahat, O king, is trained, well practised, tamed, brought into subjection, and obedient, and it hearkens to his word. When affected with feelings of pain, he grasps firmly the idea of the impermanence of all things, so ties his mind as it were to the post of contemplation, and his mind, bound to the post of contemplation, remains unmoved, unshaken, becomes stedfast, wanders not--though his body the while may bend this way and that and roll in agony by the disturbing influence of the pain. This is why it is only one kind of pain that the Arahat suffers -- bodily pain, that is, and not mental.'
44., Venerable Nāgasena, that verily is a most marvellous thing that when the body is trembling the mind should not be shaken. Give me a reason for that.'
'Suppose, O king, there were a noble tree, mighty in trunk and branches and leaves. And when agitated by the force of the wind its branches should wave. Would the trunk also move
'Certainly not, Sir!'
'Well, O king, the mind of the Arahat is as the trunk of that noble tree.'
'Most wonderful, Nāgasena, and most strange!
 Never before have I seen a lamp of the law that burned thus brightly through all time.'
Here ends the dilemma as to the Arahat's power over his body
58. The Layman's Sin
45. 'Venerable Nāgasena, suppose a layman had been guilty of a Pārāgika offence, and some time after should enter the Order. And neither he himself should be aware that when still a layman he had so been guilty, nor should any one else inform him, saying: "When a layman you were guilty of such an offence." Now if he were to devote himself to the attainment of Arahatship, would he be able so to comprehend the Truth as to succeed in entering upon the Excellent Way?'
'No, O king, he would not.'
'But why not, Sir?'
'That, in him, which might have been the cause of his grasping the Truth has been, in him, destroyed. No comprehension can therefore take place.'
46. 'Venerable Nāgasena, your people say:
"To him who is aware (of an offence) there comes  remorse. When remorse has arisen there is an obstruction in the heart. To him whose heart is obstructed there is no comprehension of the Truth."
'Why should there then be no such comprehension to one not aware of his offence, feeling no remorse, remaining with a quiet heart. This dilemma touches on two irreconcilable statements. Think well before you solve it.'
47. 'Would selected seed, O king, successfully sown in a well-ploughed, well-watered, fertile soil, come to maturity?'
'But would the same seed grow on the surface of a thick slab of rock?'
'Of course not.'
'Why then should the same seed grow in the mud, and not on the rock?'
'Because on the rock the cause for its growth does not exist. Seeds cannot grow without a cause.'
'Just so, O king, the cause by reason of which his comprehension of the Truth (his conversion) might have been brought about, has been rooted out in him. Conversion cannot take place without a cause.'
48. '[Give me, Sir, another simile.']
'But what is the reason why they come to rest on the earth, when they will not stand in the air?'
'There is no cause in the air for their stability, and without a cause they will not stand.'
'Just so, O king, by that fault of his the cause for his conversion has been removed. And without a cause there can be no conversion. Now will fire, O king, burn in water in the same way as it will on land?'
'But why not?'
'Because in water the conditions precedent for burning do not exist. And there can be no burning without them.'
'Just so, O king, are the conditions precedent to conversion destroyed in him by that offence of his. And when the conditions which would bring it about are destroyed there can be no conversion.'
49. 'Venerable Nāgasena, think over this matter once more. I am not yet convinced about it. Persuade me by some reason how such obstruction can occur in the case of one not aware of his offence, and feeling therefore no remorse.'
'Just so, O king, is there an obstruction to his comprehension of the Truth, who, without being aware of it, has committed a sin. And would fire, O king, burn a man who walked into it unawares?'
'Well, just so in the case you put. Or would a venomous snake, if it bit a man without his knowing it, kill him?'
'Well, just so in the case you put. And is it not true that Samaṇa Kolañña, the king of Kaliŋga,--when surrounded by the seven treasures of a sovereign overlord he went mounted on his state elephant to pay a visit to his relatives,--was not able to pass the Tree of Wisdom, though he was not aware that it was there? Well, of the same kind is the reason why one who has committed an offence, even though he know it not, is nevertheless incapable of rising to the knowledge of the Truth.'
'Verily, Nāgasena, this must be the word of the Conqueror. To find any fault with it were vain. And this (explanation of yours) must be the meaning of it. I accept it as you say.'
Here ends the dilemma of the layman's sin
59. The Guilty Recluse
50. 'Venerable Nāgasena, what is the distinction, what the difference, between a layman who has done wrong, and a Samaṇa (member of the Order) who has done wrong? Will they both be reborn in like condition? Will the like retribution happen to both? Or is there any difference?'
'There are, O king, ten qualities which abound in the guilty Samaṇa, distinguishing him from the guilty layman. And besides that, in ten ways does the Samaṇa purify the gifts that may be given him.
51. 'And what are the ten qualities which abound in the guilty Samaṇa, distinguishing him from the guilty layman? The guilty Samaṇa, O king, is full of reverence for the Buddha, for the Law, for the Order, and for his fellow-disciples; he exerts himself in putting questions about, and in recitation of (the sacred texts); he is devoted to learning, though he has done wrong. Then, O king, the guilty one entering the assembly, enters it decently clad, he guards himself alike in body and mind through fear of rebuke, his mind is set upon exerting himself (towards the attainment of Arahatship), he is of the companionship of the brethren. And even, O king, if he does wrong he lives discreetly. just, O king, as a married woman sins only in secret and in privacy, so does the guilty Samaṇa walk discreetly in his wrongdoing. These are the ten qualities, O king, found in the guilty Samaṇa, distinguishing him from the guilty layman.
52. 'And what are the ten ways in which, besides,  he purifies a gift given to him? He purifies it in that he wears an invulnerable coat of mail; in that he is shorn in the fashion of the characteristic mark of renunciation used by the seers of old; in that he is one who is included in the multitude of the brethren; in that he has taken his refuge in the Buddha, the Law, and the Order; in that he dwells in a lonely spot suitable for the exertion (after Arahatship); in that he seeks after the treasure of the teaching of the Conquerors; in that he preaches the most excellent law (Dhamma); in that his final destiny is to be reborn in the island of truth; in that he is possessed of an honest belief that the Buddha is the chief of all beings; in that he has taken upon himself the keeping of the Uposatha day. These, O king, are the ten ways in which, besides, he purifies a gift given to him.
53. 'Even, O king, when thoroughly fallen, a guilty Samaṇa yet sanctifies the gifts of the supporters of the faith--just as water, however thick, will wash away slush and mud and dirt and stains--just as hot, and even boiling water will put a mighty blazing fire out--just as food, however nasty, will allay the faintness of hunger. For thus, O king, hath it been said by the god over all gods in the most excellent Magghima Nikāya in the chapter "On gifts":
 "Whene'er a good man, with believing heart,
Presents what he hath earned in righteousness
To th' unrighteous, -- in full confidence
On the great fruit to follow the good act --
Such gift is, by the giver, sanctified."'
'Most wonderful, Nāgasena, and most strange! We asked you a mere ordinary question, and you, expounding it with reasons and with similes, have filled, as it were, the hearer with the sweet taste of the nectar (of Nirvāṇa). just as a cook, or a cook's apprentice, taking a piece of ordinary nutmeg, will, treating it with various ingredients, prepare a dish for a king--so, Nāgasena, when we asked you an ordinary question, have you, expounding it with reasons and similes, filled the hearer with the sweet taste of the nectar of Nirvāṇa.'
Here ends the dilemma as to the guilty recluse
60. The Soul In Water
54. 'Venerable Nāgasena, this water when boiling over the fire gives forth many a sound, hissing and simmering. Is then, Nāgasena, the water alive? Is it shouting at play? or is it crying out at the torment inflicted on it?'
'It is not alive, O king, there is no soul or being in water. It is by reason of the greatness of the shock of the heat of the fire that it gives forth sounds, hissing and simmering.'
'Now, venerable Nāgasena, there are false teachers who on the ground that the water is alive reject the use of cold water, and warming the water feed themselves on tepid foods of various kinds.
'These men find fault with you and revile you, saying: "The Sakyaputtiya Samaṇas do injury to the souls of one function." Dispel, remove, get rid of this their censure and blame.'
55. 'The water is not alive, O king. Neither is there therein either soul or being. And it is the  great shock of the heat of the fire that makes it sound, hissing and simmering. It is like the water in holes in the ground, in ponds and pools and lakes, in reservoirs, in crevices and chasms, in wells, in low-lying places, and in lotus-tanks, which before the mighty onset of the hot winds is so deeply affected that it vanishes away. But does the water in that case, O king, give forth many a sound, hissing and simmering?'
'Certainly not, Sir.'
'But, if it were alive, the water would then also make some sound. Know therefore, O king, that there is no soul, neither being, in water; and that it is the greatness of the shock of the heat of the water that makes it give forth sounds.
56. 'And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. If water, O king, with grains of rice in it, is put in a vessel and covered up, but not placed over the fireplace, would it then give forth sound?'
'No, Sir. It would remain quiet and unmoved.'
'But if you were to put the same water, just as it is in the vessel, over a fireplace, and then light up the fire, would the water remain quiet and motionless?'
 'Certainly not, Sir. It would move and be agitated, become perturbed and all in commotion, waves would arise in it, it would rush up and down and in every direction , it would roll up and boil over, and a garland of foam would be formed above it.'
 'But why so, O king, when water in its ordinary state remains quiet and motionless?'
'It is because of the powerful impulse of the heat of the fire that the water, usually so still, gives forth many a sound, bubbling and hissing.'
'Then thereby know, O king, that there is no soul in water, neither being; and that it is the strong heat of the fire that causes it to make sounds.
57. 'And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. Is there not water to be found in every house put into water-pots with their mouths closed up?'
'Well, does that water move, is it agitated, perturbed, in commotion, does it form into waves, does it rush up and down and in every direction, does it roll up and roll over, is it covered with foam?'
'No! That water is in its ordinary state. It remains still and quiet.'
'But have you ever heard that all this is true of the water in the great ocean? and that rearing up it breaks against the strand with a mighty roar?'
'Yes, I have both heard of it, and have seen it myself--how the water in the great ocean lifts itself up a hundred, two hundred, cubits high, towards the sky.'
'But why, whereas water in its ordinary state remains motionless and still, does the water in the ocean both move and roar?'
'That is by reason of the mighty force of the  onset of the wind, whereas the water in the water-jars neither moves nor makes any noise, because nothing shakes it.'
'Well, the sounds given forth by boiling water are the result, in a similar way, of the great heat of the fire.'
58. 'Do not people cover over the dried-up mouth of a drum with dried cow-leather?'
'Yes, they do.'
'Well, is there any soul or being, O king, in a drum?'
'Certainly not, Sir.'
'Then how is it that a drum makes sounds?'
'By the action or effort of a woman or a man.'
'Well, just as that is why the drum sounds, so is it by the effect of the heat of the fire that the water sounds. And for this reason also you might know, O king, that there is no soul, neither being, in water; and that it is the heat of the fire which causes it to make sounds.
59. 'And I, too, O king, have something yet further to ask of you -- thus shall this puzzle be thoroughly threshed out. How is it? Is it true of every kind of vessel that water heated in it makes noises, or only of some kinds of vessels?'
'Not of all, Sir. Only of some.'
'But then you have yourself, O king, abandoned the position you took up. You have come over to my side-that there is no soul, neither being, in water. For only if it made noises in whatever  vessel it were heated could it be right to say that it had a soul. There cannot be two kinds of water -- that which speaks, as it were, which is alive, and that which does not speak, and does not live. If all water were alive, then that which the great elephants, when they are in rut, suck up in their trunks, and pour out over their towering frames, or putting into their mouths take right into their stomachs -- that water, too, when crushed flat between their teeth, would make a sound. And great ships, a hundred cubits long, heavily laden, full of hundreds of packages of goods, pass over the sea -- the water crushed by them, too, would make sounds. And mighty fish, leviathans with bodies hundreds of leagues long, since they dwell in the great ocean, immersed in the depths of it, must, so living in it, be constantly taking into their mouths and spouting out the ocean -- and that water, too, crushed between their gills or in their stomach, would make sounds. But as, even when tormented with the grinding and crushing of all such mighty things, the water gives no sound, therefore, O king, you may take it that there is no soul, neither being, in water.'
'Very good, Nāgasena! With fitting discrimination has the puzzle put to you been solved. just, Nāgasena, as a gem of inestimable value which had come into the hands of an able master goldsmith, clever and well trained, would meet with due appreciation, estimation, and praise-just as a rare pearl  at the hands of a dealer in pearls, a fine piece of woven stuff at the hands of a cloth merchant, or red sandal wood at the hands of a perfumer -- just so in that way has this puzzle put to you been solved with the discrimination it deserved.'
Here ends the dilemma as to the water-life
Here ends the Sixth Chapter
 This verse is found three times in the Piṭakas--in the Mahāvagga I, 6, 8, in the Ariya-pariyesana Sutta (Magghima Nikāya I, 171), and in the Aŋgulimāla Sutta (Magghima Nikāya, No. 86). It occurs with other stanzas of a similar tendency, and many of the lines in those stanzas are repeated, but with variations and in a different order, by the author of the Lalita Vistara (pp. 526, 527 of Rāgendra Lāl Mitra's edition). One verse is found there in two detached lines which run thus in the Sanskrit: --
Ākāryyo na hi me kaskit, sadriso me na vidyate
Sadevāsuragandharvvo nāsti me pratipudgalah.
Hīnaṭi-kumburē renders paṭipuggalo, not by 'rival,' but by superior.'
 Mr. Trenckner has pointed out that this quotation is found in two Suttas, Nos. 85 and 100 in the Magghima Nikāya.
 Hīnaṭi-kumburē reads Gātimantī. It may be noted that Hardy (Manual of Buddhism, p. 149), who omits Yañña, gives Gāti and Manta as two separate names, and spells the last two names Bhoga Sudanta.
 So also the Siɱhalese, p. 329. But the Gātaka Commentary (verse 270 at vol. i, p. 50) has kondañña.
 The Gātaka Introduction (loc. cit.) has Bhoga. The Siɱhalese has Subhoga.
 Hīnaṭi-kumburē agrees here with Hardy in reading Sudanta.
 This episode has not been traced in the Piṭakas. The Siɱhalese here gives also the detail of the one and two fingers, found in the Gātaka, and translated in my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. 72.
 In the North-West. See Gātaka I, 140, &c.
 Khaḷaŋgavantaɱ. These are phonetics, prosody, grammar, exegesis, astronomy, and ritual. I was wrong in taking Childers's interpretation of this word at 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. 72.
 This episode is also not in the Piṭakas. On oṇogeti see Mahāvagga I, 22, 18. Sabbamitra is given in the Thera Gāthā, I, 150, as the name of a Thera, and in the Divyāvadana, p. 420, as the name of Asoka's herald or court crier.
 There is nothing about any such devatā in the Piṭakas. Hīnaṭi-kumburē takes it to mean the god who took the outward appearance of the four visions-an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and a recluse. But in that story--which is not related in the Piṭakas of the Buddha, though it is referred to in connection with him at Buddhavaɱsa XXVI, p. 16--the god does not speak. The only god whose words are said, in any of the later Pāli legends, to have agitated the Bodisat's heart at that moment, was the Evil One himself; and that only in one version of the legend, the Pāli authority for which I cannot give. It is in Hardy's 'Manual,' p. 157, where the speech of the Evil One, placed at Gātaka I, 63 at a later time, is said to have been made at the moment of the Renunciation. Even if it be not a mere blunder of Hardy's to put it at that time, still it cannot be the speech referred to by our author. For the startling doctrine that the Evil One himself was one of the Bodisat's teachers would never have been smuggled in, as it were, by concealing the identity of the spirit referred to under the generic term of devatā, Now in the Fo-pan-hin-tsi-kin (Nanjio, No. 680), a Chinese work of the beginning of the seventh century A. D., we find in the sixteenth kwuen or chapter (if one may trust the abstract given in Beal's 'Romantic Legend,' p. 131) that a Devaputra named Tsao-ping is said to have spoken to the Bodisat at the moment of the Renunciation. It is scarcely open to doubt that our author had in his mind an earlier form of that episode. But if so it is the only proved case of his having Sanskrit, and not Pāli works, as his authority.
 Aŋguttara Nikāya I, 15, 10.
 These divisions of the seven 'Jewels of the Law' of Arahatship are set out in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 62-63.
 Adhisīla, adhikitta, and adhipaññā.
 Samupādikā, for which the Siɱhalese has sama bara wannīya, usūlana sulu wannīya.
 Dhāto; not in Childers, but see Gātaka II, 247, Mahāvagga VI, 25, 1, and below, IV, 6, 29.
 Literally 'mouth.' I presume a small uncovered bullock cart is meant, like that figured in Plate 57 in Cunningham's 'Bharhut Tope.' The chariot on the other hand is of the shape given in Plates 3, 34, 35 of Fergusson's 'Tree and Serpent Worship.' The usual form of the bullock cart has also a hood, or cover, as clearly shown in Fergusson's Plate No. 65, and Cunningham's Plate No. 34. But the one here referred to cannot have had the cover over it, for then the supposition that more goods were piled on to it, when full, would be an impossible one. I know of no other passage where the mukha, literally 'mouth,' of a cart is mentioned, and I may possibly be wrong in rendering it 'top.'
 This simile has already been used in the Vessantara Dilemma above, I, 173.
 Our author himself here confesses that his thoughts are more on edification than on logic.
 There is no general word in Pāli for aunt or uncle. There are separate expressions for each of the degrees of relationship expressed by those words in English-mother's brother, father's sister, &c.
 Vassika-sāṭikā. See the note at 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. ii, p. 225 (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvii).
 From the Ganta Sutta (Magghima Nikāya, No. 142). See Mr. Trenckner's note.
 The translation of these five technical terms of cloth-making is doubtful. The Siɱhalese (p. 335) has piñgana, sindina, pothita, kaṭina, wiyana.
 The Siɱhalese (p. 335) here gives at length the story of Pagāpatī's gift, at the time when Gotama returned, as the Buddha, to Kapilavatthu.
 On this list see above, p. 234 of the Pāli text (IV, 5, 36).
 On these words compare Aŋguttara Nikāya II, 4, 2.
 Akāmakaranīyā. Compare Vimāna Vatthu X, 6 and Dīgha Nikāya II, 46.
 The same simile has already occurred, vol. i, p. 220 (IV, 2, 22).
 Magghima Nikāya, vol. i, p. 13 (in Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pāli Text Society).
 This must have been composed after the moon god had become established in belief as the husband, or lord, of the Nakshatras, or lunar mansions. For it cannot, of course, be intended that the moon is itself a constellation.
 Saɱyutta, Nikāya III, 2, 10 (vol. i, p. 67 of the Pāli Text Society's edition).
 These phrases of approval are commonly used in the Piṭakas of words uttered by any one whose sayings would not, of themselves, carry weight. So in the Dīgha III, 1, 28 and in the Magghima I, 385.
 This verse has not yet been traced in the Piṭakas. In the Thera Gāthā we have a collection of verses ascribed to Sāriputta, but this is not one of them. The literal translation is: 'There is but one feeling of faith, but one taking of refuge, but one stretching forth of the hands; (with joined palms, in adoration -- that paid) to the Buddha, who puts to rout the armies of the Evil One, and is able to make (us) cross (the ocean of continual becomings).' The taking of refuge meant is the confession, the repetition of which characterises a man as a Buddhist -- 'I take my refuge in the Buddha, &c.'
 Aŋguttara Nikāya I, 13, 1.
 That is, of insight and of the: practice of right conduct.
 Samyutta Nikāya XLIV, 24, says Mr. Trenckner. The passage has not yet been reached in M. Léon Feer's edition for the Pāli Text Society. Hīnaṭi-kumburē (p. 341) renders ñāya by nirwāna.
 Literally 'a bed encumbered, &c.' See below, p. 348 of the Pāli text, where the question, as here, is whether such a layman can attain to the Nirvāṇa of Arahatship.
 So the Buddha says of himself (Aŋguttara Nikāya III, 38), that, in the days when he was a layman, he never used any sandal wood except that from Benares.
 I don't know what these four Sīlakkhandhas are. Morality is described in the Piṭakas as threefold, fivefold, or tenfold, according as the Sīlas, in three divisions (as translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' vol. xi of the 'Sacred Books of the East,' pp. 189-200), are referred to; or the first five, or the whole ten, of the moral precepts (the Buddhist Ten Commandments) set out in my 'Buddhism,' p. 160. This reference to four divisions of the moral code is foreign to the Piṭakas, at least as we yet know them.
 The Diyaddhesu sikkhāpada-satesu. It is clear from the Aŋguttara Nikāya III, 83 that the precepts referred to are those of the Pātimokkha (translated by me at the beginning of 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. xvii of the 'Sacred Books of the East'), notwithstanding the fact that the actual number of these rules is 227.
 The Dhutangas: see above, IV, 5, 10, and the enumeration below at the translation of p. 351 of the Pāli text.
 Nārāka. As Childers expresses a doubt as to the character of this weapon, I would refer to the Magghima I, 429, Gātaka III, 322, and Milinda, pp. 105, 418 (of Mr. Trenckner's text).
 See 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' pp. 90, 91; and Magghima Nikāya I, 240-246.
 Alamariya-dassana-ñāṇa-visesaɱ. I am not sure of the exact meaning of this compound. For alamariya the Siɱhalese has here (p. 343) sarvagñatā, and renders the whole 'do I arrive at a superhuman condition, at the distinctive faculty which is able to see into omniscience,' and on IV, 8, 21 it gives a slightly different but practically identical rendering, 'I shall not reach that superhuman condition which can distinguish or which suffices for insight into the supreme omniscience.'
 That is the wisdom of Buddhahood. The passage is from the Magghima Nikāya I, 246 (quoted also below, IV, 8, 21).
 This is a very famous stanza. It is put into the mouth of Abhibhū at Thera Gāthā, verse 256, and in the Samyutta Nikāya VI, 2, 4, §§ 18 and 23; and also, in its Sanskrit form, into the mouth of the Buddha at the Divyāvadana, p. 300, and into the mouth of the gods at ibid. p. 569. It is possibly another instance of our author having Sanskrit, and not Pāli, authorities in his mind, that he ascribes it here to the Buddha, and not to Abhibhū, the Elder.
 The Siɱhalese has here six pages of description of the austerities not found in the Pāli text.
 Pakkha-hato: should become like one whose two hands are ruined' says the Siɱhalese here (p. 349), but at p. 411 (on p. 276 of the Pāli) it translates the same term, 'whose hands and feet are broken.' It is literally 'should become side-destroyed,' and may mean paralysed.
 Tāvaṭakaɱ. I take this word, in the sense of 'mere,' as an accusative in agreement with gihim (see the use of the word at pp. 107, 115, 241 of the Pāli text), and not as an accusative of motion, 'into so great a sāsanaɱ.'
 That is till he be converted, till he has 'entered the stream.' See 'Buddhism,' p. 101.
 That is, of a layman.
 Taḷāka, which Childers wrongly renders 'pond, pool, lake.' It is always an artificial tank, reservoir. See Kullavagga X, 1, 6; Gātaka I, 239; Milinda, pp. 66, 81, 296.
 'Vimutti: of the nectar of the Nirvāṇa which is the highest fruit of Arahatship' is Hīnaṭi-kumburē's gloss.
 Roguppatti-kusalaɱ: 'skilled in the threefold origin of disease' says the Siɱhalese (p. 351). See also pp. 248, 272 of the Pāli text.
 The Siɱhalese (p. 352) inserts here 'Give me, Sir, I pray you, another simile,' and then goes on 'Then suppose, O king, &c.'
 Bhatta, perhaps rice, as the food par excellence.
 Kayāgata-sati: literally 'intentness of mind on (the truth relating to) bodies.'
 Kilesa-kilant-agghattā. Compare khātagghattaɱ, Gātaka I, 345.
 Stonemasons and sculptors are implied as well as navvies. Compare my note at 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 262.
 Sabhāva-isi-bhattiko. Compare Siva-bhattiko (Saivite) at Mahāvaɱsa, chapter 93, line 17. In rāga-bhattiko (above, p. 142 of the Pāli text) the connotation is different. The Siɱhalese (p. 353) repeats the phrase.
 Suta-manta-dharo, which the Siɱhalese repeats.
 Atakkiko: 'without the theories (vitarka) resorted to by those ignorant of the practice of medicine' says Hīnaṭi-kumburē.
 As Agātasattu is said to have done for Devadatta at Gātaka I, 186.
 See above, IV, 6, 5.
 Nibbisesa, not in Childers; but see, for instance, Gātaka II, 32.
 Paridhaɱsati. Compare below, IV, 7, 8 (p. 265 of the Pāli).
 Nikkantaka-pandara: literally 'thornless and yellow-white.' The second of these epithets of the religion (sāsana) is applied to it above, IV, 6, 23 (p. 250 of the Pāli). The Siɱhalese merely repeats them.
 On this curious belief see the note above on IV, 3, 39 (p. 187 of the Pāli).
 They are lust, dullness, delusion, and ignorance.
 Vālaggavedhaɱ, 'hair-splitting;' which is also used in the Piṭakas in the secondary sense we too have given to it.
 Eḷamūga, supposed to mean literally 'deaf and dumb;' but often (if not always) used in this secondary sense. See Gātaka I, 247, 248 (where both MSS. read elamūga), and Magghima Nikāya I, 20 (where Mr. Trenckner has an interesting note). In both places the fifth century commentators explain the word by lāla-nukha, 'drivelling,' supposing it to be derived from elā, saliva,' and mūkha, 'mouth.' This is certainly wrong, for the last part of the compound is mūka, dumb.' The fact is that the word was a puzzle, even then. The meaning assigned to it by both Pāli and Sanskrit lexicographers of 'deaf and dumb' has not yet been confirmed by a single passage either in Pāli or Sanskrit. And as eḍa, 'sheep,' is common in both, in its longer form of eḍaka, eḷaka, the compound probably meant originally 'as dumb as a sheep,' which would be a quite satisfactory basis for the secondary sense of 'imbecile,' in which alone it can be traced in Pāli. For the Sanskrit form eḍamūka Böhtlingk-Roth give only lexicographers as authority. So elā, 'saliva,' is in Pāli only a lexicographer's word, and may have been invented to explain eḷamūga, and aneḷagalā vākā, as at Sumaŋgala, p. 282.
 Pākata. Hīnaṭi-kumburē says (p. 356) pāpakalāwū, which suggests a different reading.
 Vassikā. So also above, IV, 3, 32 (p. 183 of the Pāli).
 A yellowish white kāwalu sort' says Hīnaṭi-kumburē, and Clough renders kāwalu by 'a species of panic grass' (panicum glaucum). The word has only been found in this passage.
 Kakkasaɱ. The Siɱhalese (p. 357) has left out this clause, evidently by mistake only.
 This passage has not yet been traced in the Piṭakas. An almost identical phrase has already been quoted, as said by the Buddha himself, at II, 1, 4 (p. 44 of the Pāli).
 Bhave-bhave anuparivattanti. See IV, 4, 41 (p. 204 Of the Pāli).
 Parikupati, not in Childers; but see above, IV, 1, 38 (p. 118 of the Pāli).
 Tasati. Mr. Trenckner points out (p. 431) that two MSS read rasati and one sarati. The Siɱhalese rendering (p. 359), bhaya wanneya, confirms the reading he has adopted.
 The Siɱhalese (p. 360) has four lines here that are not in the Pāli.
 This, for a member of the Order, would be either unchastity, theft, murder, or putting forward false claims to extraordinary holiness. See 'Vinaya Texts,' part i, pp. 3-5. But Hīnaṭi-kumburē takes the word Pārāgika here in the sense of matricide, parricide, injuring a Bo Tree, murder of an Arahat, wounding a Tathāgata, or rape of a nun.
 Tathattāya. Rahat phala piṇisa pilipadane wī nam, says the Siɱhalese (p. 361).
 This passage has not yet been traced in the Piṭakas.
 Sāradaɱ bīgam. 'Seed which will give sāra.' It has nothing to do with sāradaɱ, autumn.' See Saɱyutta Nikāya XXII, 24.
 Added from the Siɱhalese (p. 362). It is not in the Pāli.
 Lakuṭa, not in Childers. But see below (p. 301 of the Pāli text). It is probably the same Dravidian word as appears in the Sanskrit dictionaries as laguda.
 There is a curious confusion about this word. It is found in post-Buddhistic Sanskrit in the sense of a particular sort of strong poison, and in this sense it occurs also in the Gātaka Commentary I, 271; III, 103; and in the Tela-kaṭāha-gāthā, verse 82. In none of these passages is the nature of the poison at all explained; it is taken for granted as a well-known powerful poison. But above (p. 122 of the Pāli), and at Gātaka I, 47, 48, it is used in the sense of kolāhala, 'noise' (compare the Sanskrit halahalā, used as a cry or call). In this sense it is probably a mere imitation of the supposed sound. In the sense of poison its derivation is doubtful.
 This must be the incident referred to at Gātaka IV, 232, though the name of the king is given (on the previous page) simply as Kāliŋgo and not as Samaṇa-kolañño.
 'The threefold robes, the Arahad-dhaga, for the suppression of all evil, worn by all the Buddhas' adds the Siɱhalese (p. 364). Compare above, vol. i, p. 190.
 The Rishis; 'who were gaining the Swarga-moksha' adds the Siɱhalese. (It was before the days of Arahatship.)
 Dhamma-dīpa, that is to reach Arahatship, Nirvāṇa. Compare the Gātaka stanza, IV, 121, verse 3.
 The Dakkhiṇā Vibhaŋga, No. 12 in the Vibhaŋga Vagga, No. 142 in the whole Nikāya.
 Amata-madhuraɱ savanūpagaɱ akāsi. Hīnaṭi-kumburē (p. 365) understands this differently, and has apparently read amataɱ madhuraɱ. For he translates 'filled the hearer with the taste of Nirvāṇa, and adorned the least of the people with the ear-ring of Arahatship.' It is difficult to see where he finds 'the least of the people,' and there is no authority for rendering savanūpagaɱ by 'ear-ring.' Amata as an epithet of the state of mind called by Western writers Nirvāṇa (which is only one of many names applied in the Buddhist books themselves to Arahatship) has nothing to do with immortality. As this wrong notion of the use of the word has led to much confusion, I have considered in an appendix all the passages in which the epithet occurs.
 Kikkiṭāyati kiṭikiṭāyati. The English words entirely fail in representing the sound of these striking words (in which the k is pronounced as ch). They recur Mahāvagga VI, 26, 7 and Puggala Paññatti 3, 14.
 Vekaṭika-vekaṭikam. Hīnaṭi-kumburē renders this by huṇu-huṇuyeɱ, and huṇu is the Pāli uṇha. But the expression may be compared with vikaṭa, filth' (used for food), at Mahāvagga VI, 14, 6. On the belief of the Gains in the 'waterlife,' see the Āyāraŋga Sutta I, 1, 3 (in vol. xxii of the S. B. E., p. 5).
 Ekindriyaɱ gīvaɱ. The belief in such a soul is to be understood as held by the teachers referred to, not by Buddhists. Hīnaṭi-kumburē's translation implies that the one function meant is prāṇa. Compare the heretical opinions described in the Dīgha II, 20, and 26.
 This list recurs in almost identical terms below, p. 296 (of the Pāli text). See also above, II, 1, 10, (vol. 1, p. 55).
 Vātātapa, not 'heat and wind' as Böhtlingk-Roth understand it in their rendering of vātātapika. See Vinaya Texts,' III, 159 and Samyutta XXII, 12.
 Uddhane. This word is always rendered 'oven' in the dictionaries. But I doubt whether there were ovens at all, in our sense, in those times, and in any case, the word certainly means a fireplace made of bits of brick between which the wood for the fire is laid. We must imagine the bricks to be laid, as a general rule, in a triangle. I have often seen both Siɱhalese peasants, and Tamils from the Madras Presidency, boiling their rice in the open over such extemporised fireplaces in pots either placed on the bricks, or more usually suspended from three sticks meeting above the centre of the space between the bricks. That this, and this only, is the sense in which the word is used in Pāli is clear from a comparison of the passages in which it is used, though of course in huts the fireplace, though of the same kind, would be a more permanent structure. I have not traced the word in the Piṭakas. In the Gātaka Commentary I, 68 we find that smoke usually rises uddhanato. This it would not do from an oven. At Gātaka I, 33 and Dhammapada Commentary 176 uddhane āropetvā must mean 'lifted up on to' not 'put into.' At Gātaka I, 346 the speaker says he will take the uddhana-kapallāni, and the rice with ingredients for the curry, up on to the flat roof of the house, and there cook and eat them. These are the bits of brick to make, not an oven, but a fireplace of. At Gātaka II, 133 the husband wrings the neck of the parrot (the parrot of the Arabian Nights, chap. 2, I may add) and throws it uddhanantaresu 'into the space (between the bricks) of the fireplace.' At Gātaka III, 178 and Dhammapada Commentary 263 we hear of meat boiled on the uddhana. In the Rasavāhini (quoted in the 'Journal of the Pāli Text Society,' 1884, p. 53) the context shows that a fireplace or hearth, not an oven, is meant. Finally above (p. 118 of the Pāli) we hear of a cauldron being mounted on to an uddhana, and the fire being lighted under it.
The derivation is uncertain. The Sanskrit lexicographers give various forms of the word--always with the meaning 'oven'--uddhāna, udvāna, uddhmāna (this last probably influenced by a supposition that the word was connected with dham). The Siɱhalese is uduna, and though 'fireplace' is better than 'oven,' we have really no corresponding word in English. The gypsies, who are Indian in origin, should have a name for it. But I only find in their vocabularies yogongo-tan, which means simply aggithāna.
 Uttarati patarati. 'Itirenneya pœtirenneya' says the Siɱhalese.
 Uttarati patarati, the second of which the Siɱhalese (p. 368) omits here. See p. 117 of the Pāli.
 Ussakkitvā, 'continually pumping up,' says the Siɱhalese.
 Bheri-pokkharam, which the Siɱhalese renders bheri-mukha. Compare Vimāna Vatthu 18, 10, where pokkhara is a sort of drum.
 A similar analogy has been used above, vol. i, p. 48.
 Their names are given. On this belief see above, III, 7, 10 (vol. i, p. 130) and Kullavagga IX, 1, 3.
 Desāgato, 'based on the teaching of the Omniscient One,' says Hīnaṭi-kumburē, who therefore apparently read desanāgato.
 Dussika, a word only found, so far as I know, here and below at V, 4 (p. 331 of the Pāli), where see the note.
 Sakala-gana mano-mandanīyya-wū sri-saddharmā-dāsayehi shaṭwana vargaya nimiyeya, says the Siɱhalese.