

Pali Text Society

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PALI TEXT SOCIETY

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REPORT OF THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY FOR 1915.

IN an interim Report for 1914 issued last year to our subscribers, mention was made of a forthcoming first edition of that canonical commentary on a great part of the Sutta-Nipāta, entitled the Niddesa. Of this we publish this year the first half of the main division, or Mahā-Niddesa, edited jointly by Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin and Mr. E. J. Thomas, of the Cambridge University Library. The remainder is ready for press, as is also Dr. W. Stede's edition of the sequel, or Culla-Niddesa, prepared on a special system. The basis of both editions was a transcript made some years ago by Miss G. Noakes from the Siamese printed edition, and collated with Singhalese and Burmese MSS. by the Misses Dibben and Mrs. Powell Brown. The issue of this venerable exegesis coincides, as it happens, with that of the medieval commentary on the Sutta-Nipāta, edited by Mr. Helmer Smith, and forming a continuation of the commentary on the Khuddaka-pāṭha, published by us last year.

Of other works referred to in our last Report, we publish three, two of them in this JOURNAL. The former is a first edition of one of those nine medieval compendia of Abhidhamma, enumerated in the Editor's Preface to "A Compendium of Philosophy," and entitled in Burma, *Let-than*, little finger manuals, the last-named being the most famous of the nine. This makes the fifth that we have published, the other three having appeared, one in the

JOURNAL for 1913-14, and two independently last year. The Editor, a young bhikkhu of Ceylon, has also sent us an edition of a sixth manual—the “*Sacca-sankhepa*,” by Dhammapāla the Less, author of the “*Visuddhi-Magga Tikā*.” For these we offer him our grateful acknowledgment.

We would also testify to our gratitude for three letters on “*Paccaya-naya*,” the Buddhist theory of Relations, or mutually-conditioned *dharmas*, received from Ledi Sadaw, revealing interesting points of connection with modern European thought existing in the early traditions of Abhidhamma. These letters, forming a more or less connected treatise, have been translated by the kindness of Mr. S. Z. Aung, and should usefully prepare the student of Abhidhamma for the forthcoming editions of the Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna, and the first division of that work, the *Tika-paṭṭhāna*.

This year’s publications also include, as the sixth in the Translation Series, Mr. F. L. Woodward’s rendering, from Pali and Singhalese, of the curious little work, edited twenty years ago by Rhys Davids, and entitled by him “*A Yogāvacara’s Manual*.” A contribution towards the expenses of publication was offered by H.H. the late Rajarshi Raja of Bhinga, and confirmed by the Rani Sahiba, hence the priority of position given to this unique and unclassified palm-leaf MS. over more classical works that need translation.

Many other editions and translations are either ready for press or well advanced in preparation. Dr. Stede is devoting himself entirely to the work of the Dictionary. In Burma, Professor Maung Tin, M.A., successor to Professor C. Duroiselle at the College, Rangoon, now represents the Society in Burma, and is preparing an edition of the Commentary on the Paṭisambhidā-magga.

Among our issues in the near future we announce the first part of an edition of the Commentary on the Anguttara-Nikāya, by the late Edmund Hardy. The MS. of this was returned to us late in July, 1914, by Dr. M. Walleser, to

whose editing we had entrusted a portion of Hardy's unfinished work, and who recommended that this first part, marked by Hardy himself as ready for press, should be published independently as edited by Hardy alone.

The Society has now entered on the testing stage of its power to stay during the present cataclysm, and so far is staying valiantly. Unsolicited donations have arrived, and although there is a falling off under the head of subscriptions for the current and past issues, this is not because there have been fewer subscribers—the reverse being true—but because, during 1915, we had not the good fortune to be asked for a single complete set—an event that usually happens once or twice during a twelvemonth. A subscription for our output of thirty-five years is equal to as many annual subscriptions. With the recent inflation in prices, notably of paper, we are as yet by no means out of the wood, but we have reason to be hopeful.

THE EDITORS.

ti Sāsanavaṅsādīsu dissate. Marammaratṭhe panāyaṅ *Khemappakaraṇa-nāmen'* eva vohariyate; "Nāmarūpasamāso" ti nāmaṅ tattha apākaṭabhāvaṅ patto. Tad-eva kāraṇaṅ pamāṇaṅ imassa Khemācariya-viracitabhāvassa jānane. Ye pana Abidhammasaṅgahaganthā Marammaratṭhe *Lakkhaṇaganthā* ti vohariyante, tesu ayaṅ Nāmarūpasamāso pi antogadho; vuttaṅ hi Sāsanavaṅse: '. . . *Saccasankhepaṅ Dhammapālathero, Khemaṅ Khemathero, te ca sankhepato sayvaṇṇitattā sukhena ca lakkhaṇiyattā "Lakkhaṇaganthā" ti vuccanti'* iti (Mrs. Bode's ed., p. 34).

Khemācariyassa pana nāmaṅ Sāsanavaṅsādīsu c' eva Nikāyasaṅgraha - Saddharmaratnākārādī - Sihalapotthakesu ca ganthakārācariyānaṅ nāmāvaliyaṅ dissate; taṅ eva pamāṇaṅ imass' ācariyassa pandiccajānane ca imassa ganthassa garubhāva-jānane ca. Tasmā mayaṅ tadatthāya papañcaṅ na karoma.

Great Britain Mahārajje "Pāli Text Society" nāmāya samitiyā kiccādhikāriṇiyā Mrs. Rhys Davids nāmāya mahāsaya-manti puttiyā ajjesito panāhaṅ Sihalakkharehi ceva Marammakharehi muddita-potthakāni ṭikāya samānetvā yathā-sattiyā parisodhetvā Roman-akkharehi likhitvā niṭṭhapesiṅ. Imasiṅ pana parisodhane Aggārā-mavāsī bhadanta-Buddhadatta-Bhikkhu ṭikāya anuppadānena ca upadesappadānena ca bahūpakārako ahoṣi. Tasmā tassa c' eva Baṭapolaḡāme Dhammapālatherassa ca nāmāni bahumānapubbaṅgamaṅ anussarāmi.

Likhitaṅ idaṅ Galle-nagare Paramavicitrānandārāmādhipatino siri Ariyavaṅsa-mahātherassa ceva Gintotaḡāme Ariyavijjālayādhipatino Ācariya-Medhan-kara-mahātherassa ca sissabhūtena Brahmacola¹-gāmajena Dhammārāmena bhikkhunā.

July 11, 1915.

¹ Bambaredda ca Bambarcenda Laṅkāyaṅ Rohaṇe patiṭṭhito po - thakesu āgato porā aka-gāmo.

NĀMARŪPASAMĀSA

NAMO TASSA BHAGAVATO ARAHATO SAMMĀ SAMBUDDHASSA

1. Gambhīraṃ nipuṇaṃ dhammaṃ, marūnaṃ¹ yo pakāsayī,
Sahassakkhassa uyyāne, vasaṃ vassaṃ narāsabho ;
2. namassitvāna taṃ Nāthaṃ, Dhammaṃ Saṅghaṃ ca
sādhukaṃ
Samāsaṃ nāmarūpassa, bhaññamānaṃ suṇātha me.

Tattha *samāsato* ekūnanavuti cittāni.

Tāni catubbidhāni honti. Kathaṃ? Kusalākusala-vipāka-kiriyaḥhedena, tesu ekavīsati kusalacittāni, dvādasa akusalacittāni, chattiya vipākacittāni, vīsati kiriyaḥcittāni.

Catubbidhāni kusalāni, kāma-rūpārūpa-lokuttara-bhūmiḥhedena, aṭṭha kāmāvacarāni, pañca rūpāvacarāni, cattāri arūpāvacarāni, cattāri lokuttarāni ceti.

Tattha somanassasahagataṃ ñāṇasampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, saṅkhārikam ekaṃ ; somanassasahagataṃ ñāṇavippayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, saṅkhārikam ekaṃ ; upekkhāsahagataṃ ñāṇasampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ ; upekkhāsahagataṃ ñāṇavippayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, saṅkhārikam ekaṃ ti imāni aṭṭha *kāmāvacarakusalacittāni*.

Vitakka-vicāra-pīti-sukha-cittekaggatāsampayuttaṃ pañcaṅgikaṃ pathamajjhānaṃ. Vicāra-pīti-sukha-cittekaggatāsampayuttaṃ caturaṅgikaṃ dutiyajjhānaṃ. Pīti-sukha-cittekaggatāsampayuttaṃ tivaṅgikaṃ tatiyajjhānaṃ. Sukhacittekaggatāsampayuttaṃ duvaṅgikaṃ catutthajjhānaṃ.

¹ B. madhuraṃ.

Upekkhācittēkaggaṭṭā sampayuttaṃ duvaṅgikaṃ pañca-majjhānaṃ ti imāni pañca rūpāvacarakusalacittāni.

Ākāsañācāyatanaṃ, viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ, ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ, nevaśāññānaśāññāyatanaṃ ti imāni cattāri arūpāvacarakusalacittāni.

Sakkāyaditṭhi - vicikicchā - silabbataparāmāsātidosaṃpāhānakaraṃ¹ sotāpattimaggacittaṃ. Kāmarāgabyāpādānaṃ, tanuttakaraṃ sakadāgāmimaggacittaṃ. Kāmarāgabyāpādānaṃ niravasesapahānakaraṃ anāgāmimaggacittaṃ. Rūparāga-arūparāga-māna-uddhacca-avijjānaṃ anavasesapahānakaraṃ arahattamaggacittaṃ ti imāni cattāri lokuttarakusalacittāni.

Imāni ekavīsati² kusalacittāni.

Akusalacittāni tividhāni, aṭṭha lobhasahagatacittāni, dve paṭighasampayuttacittāni,³ dve ekahetukacittāni.

Tattha somanassasahagataṃ ditṭhigata - sampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ; somanassasahagataṃ ditṭhigatavippayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ; upekkhā - sahagataṃ ditṭhigata - sampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ; upekkhāsahagataṃ ditṭhigatavippayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ ti imāni aṭṭha lobhasahagatacittāni. Domanassasahagataṃ paṭighasampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ ti imāni dve paṭighasampayuttacittāni. Vicikicchāsahagataṃ ekaṃ, uddhaccasahagatam ekaṃ ti imāni dve ekahetukacittāni.

Imāni dvādāsa akusalacittāni.

Vipākacittāni catubbidhāni, kāma-rūpārūpa-lokuttarabhūmivasena, tevīsati kāmāvacaravipākacittāni, tāni duvidhāni honti: kusalavipākāni akusalavipākāni ceti. Kusalavipākāni soḷasa, akusalavipākāni satta; kusalavipākāni duvidhāni ahētukāni sahetukāni ceti. Ahētukāni aṭṭha, sahetukāni aṭṭha.

¹ B. °paramā:ā li° (duppāṭhā).

² S. omits.

³ S. °yuttāni cittāni.

Tattha upekkhāsahagataṃ kusalavipākaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tathā sotaviññāṇaṃ, ghāṇaviññāṇaṃ, jivhāviññāṇaṃ, sukhasahagataṃ kāyaviññāṇaṃ, kusalavipākāhetukamanodhātu-upekkhāsahagataṃ sampaticchanaṃ, kusalavipākāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu-somanassasahagataṃ santiraṇaṃ, kusalavipākāhetuka-manoviññāṇadhātu-upekkhāsahagataṃ santiraṇaṃ ti: imāni aṭṭha *ahetuka-kusalavipākacittāni*.

[Somanassasahagataṃ ñāṇasampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ; somanassasahagataṃ ñāṇavippayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ; upekkhāsahagataṃ ñāṇasampayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ; upekkhāsahagataṃ ñāṇavippayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikam ekaṃ, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṃ ti imāni aṭṭha sahetuka-kusalavipākacittāni.¹] Aṭṭha *sahetuka-kusalavipākacittāni* kusalasadisāni yeva uppajjanti. Kin tu? vipākacittānīti ti nānākaṇaṃ.

Upekkhāsahagataṃ akusalavipākaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tathā sotaviññāṇaṃ, ghāṇaviññāṇaṃ, jivhāviññāṇaṃ, dukkhasahagataṃ kāyaviññāṇaṃ, akusalavipākāhetukamanodhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ sampaticchanaṃ, akusalavipākāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ santiraṇaṃ ti imāni satta *akusalavipākāhetukacittāni*.

Pañca *rūpāvacaravipākacittāni* kusalasadisāni yeva uppajjanti.

Cattāri *arūpāvacaravipākacittāni* kusalasadisāni yeva uppajjanti.

Cattāri lokuttaravipākacittāni: Sotāpattiphalacittaṃ, sakadāgāmiphalacittaṃ, anāgāmiphalacittaṃ, arahattaphalacittaṃ ceti: imāni cattāri *lokuttaraphalacittāni*.

Imāni chattiṃsa vipākacittāni.

Kiriyaṇcittāni bhūmivasena tividhāni honti, kāmāvacarāni, rūpāvacarāni, arūpāvacarāni ceti. Ekādasa kāmāvacarāni, pañca rūpāvacarāni, cattāri arūpāvacarāni. Kāmāvacarāni duvidhāni, ahētukāni sahetukāni ceti, ahētukāni tīni, sahetukāni aṭṭha.

¹ B. omits.

Tattha kiriyāhetukamanodhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ pañcadvārāvajjanaṃ, kiriyāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu somanasasahagataṃ hasituppādacittaṃ, kiriyāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ votthapanañ ceti imāni tīni *ahetukakiriyacittāni*.

Aṭṭha *sahetukakiriyacittāni* kāmāvacarakusalasadisāni yeva arahato uppajjanti. Kin tu? kiriyācittānīti nānākaranaṃ. Pañca *rūpāvacarakiriyācittāni* kusalasadisāni yeva arahato uppajjanti. Cattāri *arūpāvacarakiriyācittāni* kusalasadisāni yeva arahato uppajjanti.

Imāni visati kiriyācittāni.

Evay samāsato ekūnanavuti cittāni honti.

Tesu dve āvajjanacittāni, dve dassanacittāni, dve savanacittāni, dve ghāyanacittāni, dve sāyanacittāni, dve phusanacittāni, dve sampañicchanacittāni, tīni santīraṇacittāni, ekaṃ votthapanaṃ. Dve dviṭṭhānikāni, nava tiṭṭhānikāni, aṭṭha catuṭṭhānikāni, dve pañcatṭhānikāni. Ekūnavīsati paṭisandhicittāni, ekūnavīsati bhavaṅgacittāni, ekūnavīsati cuticittāni, ekādasa tadārammaṇacittāni, terasa hasanacittāni.

Battiṃsa cittāni rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpentī, iriyāpathaṃ sannāmenti, viññattī janayanti. Chabbīsati cittāni rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpentī, iriyāpathaṃ sannāmenti, viññattī na janayanti. Ekūnavīsati cittāni rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpentī, iriyāpathaṃ na sannāmenti, viññattī na janayanti. Solasa cittāni rūpaṃ na samuṭṭhāpentī, iriyāpathaṃ na sannāmenti, viññattī na janayanti.

Catupaññāsa kāmāvacaracittāni, pañcadāsa rūpāvacaracittāni, dvādāsa arūpāvacaracittāni, aṭṭha lokuttaracittāni, Aṭṭhārasa ahetikāni, dve ekahetikāni, bāvīsa duhetukāni, sattacattālīsa tihetikāni, pañcapaññāsa javanacittānīti.

Tattha kiriyāhetukamanodhātu pañcadvāre āvajjanaṃ karoti. Kiriyāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ manodvāre āvajjanaṃ karoti. Imāni dve āvajjanacittāni.

Kusalavipākaṃ cakkhuvīññāṇaṃ akusalavipākaṃ cakkhuvīññāṇaṃ ti imāni dve dassanacittāni; evam eva dve

savanacittāni, dve ghāyanacittāni, dve sāyanacittāni, dve phusanacittāniti veditabbāni.

Kusalavipākāhetukamanodhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ sam-
paṭicchana-cittaṃ, akusalavipākāhetukamanodhātu upek-
khāsahagataṃ sampaṭicchana-cittaṃ ceti imāni dve pi
sampaṭicchana-cittāni. Kusalavipākāhetukamanoviññāṇa-
dhātu somanāssasahagataṃ santīraṇaṃ, kusalavipākāhetu-
kamanoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ santīraṇaṃ, akusa-
lavipākāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ santi-
raṇaṃ ti imāni tīṇi santīraṇa-cittāni.

Kiriyaḥetukamanoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ, idam
ekaṃ votthapanacittaṃ pañcadvāre votthapanāṃ manodvāre
āvajjanaṃ ca karoti. Kusalavipākāhetukamanoviññāṇa-
dhātu somanāssasahagataṃ pañcadvāre santīraṇaṃ chadvāre
tadārammaṇaṃ ca karoti. Imāni dve dviṭṭhānikāni.

Pañca rūpāvaca-ravipākacittāni cattāri arūpāvaca-ravipā-
kacittāni brahmaloke paṭisandhi bhavaṅgaṃ cuti ca honti.
Imāni nava tiṭṭhānikāni.

Attha kāmāvacaramahāvipākacittāni devamanussesu
paṭisandhi bhavaṅgaṃ chadvāre tadārammaṇaṃ cuti ca
honti. Imāni attha catuṭṭhānikāni. Kusalavipākāhetuka-
manoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ manussesu jaccan-
dhajātibadhirādinaṃ paṭisandhi bhavaṅgaṃ pañcadvāre
santīraṇaṃ chadvāre tadārammaṇaṃ cuti ca hoti. Aku-
salavipākāhetuka - manoviññāṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ
catusu apāyesu paṭisandhi bhavaṅgaṃ, pañcadvāre santi-
raṇaṃ chadvāre tadārammaṇaṃ cuti ca hoti. Imāni dve
pañcatṭhānikāni.

Attha kāmāvacara-vipākacittāni dve upekkhāsahagata-
vipākāhetuka-manoviññāṇadhātuyo ca kāmāvacara-kam-
maṅ¹ vā kammanimittaṃ vā gatinimittaṃ vā gahetvā paṭi-
sandhi honti. Pañca rūpāvaca-ravipākacittāni cattāri
arūpāvaca-ravipākacittāni² yassa yassa kulassa jhānassa
yaṃ yaṃ ārammaṇaṃ, taṃ taṃ ārammaṇaṃ gahetvā brahma-
loke paṭisandhi honti, imāni ekūnavīsati paṭisandhi cittāni
honti. Etāni yeva pavattikkhaṇe bhavaṅgāni cutikkhaṇe
cuti ca honti.

¹ S. °vacare kammaṃ.

² B. inserts ca.

Aṭṭha kāmāvacaravipākacittāni tisso vipākāhetuka-mano-viññānadhātuyo ca javanacittānaṃ anantarā tadārammaṇāni hutvā kāmāvacara-sattānam eva jāyanti; imāni ekādasa tadārammaṇacittāni. Kāmāvacarakusalāni cattāri somanassasahagatāni, akusalāni cattāri somanassasahagatāni, pañca kiriyacittāni somanassasahagatānīti imāni terasa hasanacittāni; tesu puthujjanānaṃ aṭṭhasu kusalākusalesu hasanaṃ uppajjati; sekhānaṃ dve diṭṭhigatāni apanetvā chasu hasanaṃ uppajjati; arahantānaṃ pana pañcasu kiriyacittesu hasanaṃ uppajjati.

Aṭṭhakāmāvacara-kusalacittāni, dvādasa akusalacittāni, dasa kiriyacittāni, khīṇāsavassa abhiññācittaṃ, sekhaputhujjanānaṃ abhiññācittaṃ ceti imāni dvattiṃsa cittāni rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpenti, iriyāpathaṃ sannāmenti, viññattī janayanti. Pañca rūpāvacarakusalāni, pañca kiriyacittāni, cattāri arūpāvacarakusalāni, cattāri kiriyāni, cattāri maggacittāni, cattāri phalacittānīti imāni chabbisaticittāni rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpenti, iriyāpathaṃ sannāmenti, viññattī na janayanti. Ekādasa kāmāvacara-kusalavipākāni dve akusalavipākāni, kiriyāhetukamanodhātu-āvajjanaṃ, pañca rūpāvacara-vipākacittānīti imāni ekūnavisati cittāni rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpenti, iriyāpathaṃ na sannāmenti, viññattī na janayanti. Kusalākusala-vipākāni dvipañcaviññāṇāni, cattāri arūpāvacara-vipākāni, khīṇāsavassa cuticittaṃ, sabbasattānaṃ paṭisandhicittaṃ ceti imāni solasa cittāni rūpaṃ na samuṭṭhāpenti, iriyāpathaṃ na sannāmenti, viññattī na janayanti.

Aṭṭha kāmāvacara-kusalāni, dvādasa akusalāni, aṭṭha mahāvipākāni, aṭṭha parittakusalavipākāni, satta akusalavipākāni, aṭṭha mahākiriyaṇi, tiṇi parittakiriyaṇīti imāni catupaññāsa kāmāvacaracittāni. Pañca rūpāvacarakusalāni, pañca vipākāni, pañca kiriyānīti imāni pañcadasa rūpāvacaracittāni. Cattāri arūpāvacarakusalāni, cattāri vipākāni, cattāri kiriyānīti imāni dvādasa arūpāvacaracittāni. Cattāri maggacittāni, cattāri phalacittānīti imāni aṭṭha lokuttaracittāni.

Dvipañcaviññāṇāni, tisso manodhātuyo, pañca ahetuka-manoviññānadhātuyo cāti imāni aṭṭhārasa ahetukacittāni.

Vicikicchāsaḥagatam ekaṃ, uddhaccasaḥagatam ekaṃ ti imāni dve ekahetukāni. Dve dosamahetukāni, aṭṭha lobhamahetukāni, dvādasa alobhādosahetukāni imāni bhāvisati duhetukāni. Tihetukāni sesāni sattacattālīsa cittāni. Kusalākusalāni tettiṃsa, cattāri lokuttaravipākāni, āvajjanaṃ, votthapanaṃ ca vajjetvā sesāni aṭṭhārāsa kiriyācittāni imāni pañcapanñāsa javanacittāni.

Pakiṇṇakaṃ nīṭṭhitāṃ.

CITTA-CETASIKA-KATHĀ.

Katame dhammā kusalā¹? Yasmiṃ samaye kāmāvacaraṃ kusalaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ hoti somanassasaḥagataṃ ṇāpasamāpayuttaṃ asaṅkhārikaṃ rūpārammaṇaṃ vā saddārammaṇaṃ vā gandhārammaṇaṃ vā rasārammaṇaṃ vā phoṭṭhabbārammaṇaṃ vā dhammārammaṇaṃ vā, yaṃ yaṃ vā paṇḍarabbha; tasmīṃ samaye phasso hoti, vedanā hoti, saññā hoti, cetanā hoti, cittaṃ hoti: *phassapañcakarāsi*. Vitakko hoti, vicāro hoti, pīti hoti, sukhaṃ hoti, cittass' ekaggatā hoti: *jhānapañcakarāsi*. Saddhindriyaṃ hoti, viriyindriyaṃ hoti, satindriyaṃ hoti, samādhindriyaṃ hoti, paññindriyaṃ hoti, manindriyaṃ hoti, somanassindriyaṃ hoti, jīvitindriyaṃ hoti: *indriyatṭhakarāsi*. Sammādiṭṭhi hoti, sammāsaṅkappo hoti, sammāvāyāmo hoti, sammāsati hoti, sammāsamādhi hoti: *maggapañcakarāsi*. Saddhābalaṃ hoti, viriyabalaṃ hoti, satibalaṃ hoti, samādhibalaṃ hoti, paññābalaṃ hoti, hiribalaṃ hoti, ottappabalaṃ hoti: *balasattakarāsi*. Alobo hoti, adoso hoti, amoho hoti: *hetuttikarāsi*. Anabhijjhā hoti, avyāpādo hoti, sammādiṭṭhi hoti: *kammaṭṭhakarāsi*. Hiri hoti, ottappaṃ hoti: *lokapāladukarāsi*. Kāyapassaddhi hoti, cittaṃpassaddhi hoti, kāyalahutā hoti, cittalāhutā hoti, kāyamudutā hoti, cittāmmudutā hoti, kāyakammaññatā hoti, cittakammaññatā hoti, kāyapāguññatā hoti, cittaṃpāguññatā hoti, kāyujjukatā hoti, cittujjukatā hoti: *chayugaladukarāsi*. Sati hoti, sampajaññaṃ hoti: *upakāradukarāsi*. Samatho

¹ B. omits. Cf. *Dhammasaṅgāsi*, § 1.

hoti, vipassanā hoti : *yuganandhadukarāsi*. Paggāho hoti, avikkhepo hoti : *viriyasamathadukarāsi*. Ye vā pana tasmiṃ samaye aññe pi atthi paṭiccasamuppannā arūpino dhamma¹: ime dhammā kusalā.

Padavibhāgato chappaññāsa padāni honti, *niyatayevāpanakehi* saha samasaṭṭhi padāni honti. Tattha *niyatayevāpanakā* nāma : chando adhimokkho tattramajjhataṭṭa manasikāro ti. Yadā pana *aniyatayevāpanakehi* saha uppajjanti, tadā ekasaṭṭhi padāni honti. Tattha *aniyatayevāpanakā* nāma : karuṇā muditā sammāvācā sammā-kammanto sammā-ājīvo ti.

Dukavaggādīsu yasmā, saṅghaṅ ca na yantīti ;
cittassa ca puthubhavaṃ, dīpetuṅ ca apaṇṇakaṃ,
tasmā yevāpanā dhammā, Munindena pakāsītā ti.

Rāsito sattarasa rāsī honti : phassapañcakarāsi, jhānapañcakarāsi, indriyaṭṭhakarāsi, maggapancakarāsi, balasattakarāsi, hetuttikarāsi, kammapathattikarāsi, lokapāladukarāsi, chayugaladukarāsi, upakāradukarāsi, yuganandhadukarāsi, viriyasamathadukarāsi ceti.

Yevāpanakehi vinā pāṭhe āgatā asambhinnā tiṅsa dhammā honti, yathā : phasso vedanā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro pīti cittass'ekaggatā saddhā viriyaṃ sati paññā jīvitindriyaṃ hiri ottappaṃ alobho adoso kāyapassaddhādayo dvādasa² dhammā ceti ime tiṅsadhammā *asambhinnā* honti. Avibhattika-savibhattikavasena duvidhā honti, aṭṭhārasa *avibhattikā*, dvādasa *savibhattikā*, yathā : phasso saññā cetanā vicāro pīti jīvitindriyaṃ kāyapassaddhādayo dvādasa dhammā ceti ime aṭṭhārasa dhammā *avibhattikā*, vedanā cittaṃ vitakko cittassekaggatā saddhā viriyaṃ sati paññā hiri ottappaṃ alobho adoso ti ime dvādasadhammā *savibhattikā*.

Tattha *cittaṃ* phassapañcake cittaṃ, indriyaṭṭhake manindriyaṃ. *Vitakko* jhānapañcake vitakko, maggapañcake sammāsaṅkappo. *Saddhā* indriyaṭṭhake saddhindriyaṃ, balasattake saddhābalaṃ. *Hiri* balasattake hiribalaṃ,

¹ *Dhs.*, § 1.

² B. °saddhi-cittapassaddhādayo.

lokapāladuke hiri. *Ottappaṇ* balasattake ottappabalaṇ, lokapāladuke ottappaṇ. *Alobho* hetuttike alobho, kamma-pathattike anabhijjhā. *Adoso* hetuttike adoso, kamma-pathattike abyāpādo. *Vedanā* phassapañcake vedanā, jhānapañcake sukhaṇ, indriyaṭṭhake somanassindriyaṇ. *Viriyaṇ* indriyaṭṭhake viriyaṇ, maggapañcake sammāvāyāmo, balasattake viriyabalaṇ, viriyasamathaduke paggāho. *Sati* indriyaṭṭhake satindriyaṇ, maggapañcake sammāsati, balasattake satibalaṇ, upakāraduke sati. *Samādhi* jhānapañcake cittass' ekaggaṭā, indriyaṭṭhake samādhindriyaṇ, maggapañcake sammāsamādhi, balasattake samādhibalaṇ, yuganandhaduke samatho, viriyasamathaduke avikkhepo. *Paññā* indriyaṭṭhake paññindriyaṇ, maggapañcake sammādiṭṭhi, balasattake paññābalaṇ, hetuttike amoho, kamma-pathattike sammādiṭṭhi, upakāraduke sampajaññaṇ, yuganandhaduke vipassanā ti.

Cittaṇ vitakko saddhā ca, hirottappaṇ duhetuyo,
ime dviṭṭhānikā satta, tiṭṭhānikā ca vedanā,
viriyaṇ sati catuṭṭhānā, chaṭṭhān'ekaggaṭā pi ca
sattaṭṭhānā mati vuttā, bhinnā dvādasadhā ime ti.

Paṭhamacittaṇ nitṭhitay.

Dutiye "sasaṅkhārikan" ti visese. *Tatiye* somanassa-sahagate ñāṇavippayutte asaṅkhārike padavibhāgato ekūnapaññāsa-padāni honti; asambhinna-padāni ekūnatiṅsā honti; tesu avibhattikāni atṭhārasa, savibhattikāni ekādasa; sattatṭhānikā paññā parihīnā; ettakaṇ nānākaraṇaṇ. *Catutthe* "sasaṅkhārikan" ti visese. *Pañcame* upekkhā-sahagate ñāṇasampayutte asaṅkhārike pañcapanñāsa padāni honti, yathā: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṇ vitakko vicāro upekkhā cittass'ekaggaṭā saddhā viriyaṇ sati samādhi paññā manindriyaṇ upekkhindriyaṇ jīvitindriyaṇ sammādiṭṭhīti evam ādayo paṭhamacittasadisā. Jhānapañcake pītiparihinattā caturaṅgikaṇ jhānaṇ hoti.¹ Asambhinnapadāni ekūnatiṅsā honti, avibhattikāni satta-

¹ B. Pītiparihinā tathā caturaṅgajhānaṇ hoti, parihīnā tathā caturaṅga sambhinnapadāni.

rasa, savibhattikāni dvādasa, ettakaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ. *Chatṭhe* “sasaṅkhārikan” ti vireso. *Sattame* upekkhā-sahagata nānavippayutte asaṅkhārike aṭṭhacattālīsa padāni honti, asambhinnapadāni aṭṭhavīsati honti; pītiyā ca nānassa ca parihīnattā avibhattikāni sattarasa savibhattikāni ekādasa. *Atṭhame* “sasaṅkhārikan” ti vireso.

Kāmāvacara-cittakathā niṭṭhitā.

Rūpāvacara-paṭhamajjhānaṃ kāmāvacara-kusalacitta-sadisāṃ.

Dutiyaajjhāne catupaññāsa padāni honti. Dviṭṭhānikassa vitakkassa parihīnattā caturaṅgikaṃ jhānaṃ hoti. Caturaṅgiko maggo hoti, *asambhinnapadāni* ekūnatiṃsā honti; *avibhattikāni* aṭṭhārasa; *savibhattikāni* ekādasa.

Tatiyaajjhāne tepaṅñāsa padāni honti. Vitakka-vicāra-parihīnattā tivaṅgikaṃ jhānaṃ hoti. *Asambhinnapadāni* aṭṭhavīsati honti; *avibhattikāni* sattarasa, *savibhattikāni* ekādasa.

Catutthajjhāne dvepaññāsa padāni honti. Pītiyā ca parihīnattā duvaṅgikaṃ jhānaṃ hoti. *Asambhinnapadāni* sattavīsati honti; *avibhattikāni* soḷasa, *savibhattikāni* ekādasa.

Imesu catusu jhānesu cattāro *niyatayevāpanakā* sabbadā uppajjanti; karuṇā muditā *aniyatayevāpanakā* appamaññābhāvanākāle nānā uppajjanti.

Pañcamajjhāne dvepaññāsa padāni honti, vedanā jhānaṅgesu upekkhā hoti, indriyesu upekkhindriyaṃ hoti; asambhinnapadāni sattavīsati honti, avibhattikāni soḷasa, savibhattikāni ekādasa, *niyatayevāpanakā* cattāro yeva sabbadā uppajjanti.

Rūpāvacara-kusalacetāsikā niṭṭhitā.

Arūpāvacarāni cattāri jhānāni¹ rūpāvacara-pañcakajjhānasadisacetāsikāni; ārammaṇam eva ākāsādi tesāṃ nānākaraṇaṃ.

Sotāpattimaggacittena sahaajātadharmā samasaṭṭhipā-

¹ Ādāsapothake : Rūpāvacarāni pañcakajjhānasadisāni cetāsikāni.

dāni honti. *Rāsito* sattarasarāsī honti. Cattāro dhammā adhikā uppajjanti, sammāvācā sammākammanto sammā-ājīvo anaññātaññassāmītindriyañ ca. Kasmā vā maggo atṭhaṅgiko maggo hoti? Navindriyā honti? asambhinna-padāni tettiṅsā honti? Sammāvācādīnaṃ pavitṭhattā *avibhattikāni* ekavīsati, *savibhattikāni* dvādasa. Sakadā-gāmi-anāgāmi-arahattamaggā pi sotāpattimaggasadisā va. Indriyesu aññindriyaṃ hoti, ettakaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ. Etesu catusu maggesu chandādayo cattāro *niyatayevāpanakā* uppajjanti.

Kusalacetāsikā nittḥitā.

Somanassasahagata diṭṭhigatasampayutte asaṅkhārike dvattiṅsa dhammā honti, yathā: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro pīti sukhaṃ cittsekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ samādhindriyaṃ manindriyaṃ somanassindriyaṃ (jīvitindriyaṃ) micchādīṭṭhi micchāsāṅkappo micchāvāyāmo micchāsamādhī viriyabalaṃ samādhibalāṃ ahirikabalaṃ anottappabalaṃ lobho moho abhijjhā micchādīṭṭhi ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ samatho paggāho avikkhepo ceti.

Rāsito navarāsī honti: phassapañcakarāsī jhānapañcakarāsī indriyapañcakarāsī maggacatukkarāsī balacatukkarāsī hetudukarāsī kammaṭṭhadukarāsī kaṇhadukarāsī piṭṭhittikarāsī ceti. Soḷasa *asambhinna-padāni* honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro pīti cittassekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ micchādīṭṭhi ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ lobho moho ceti. Tesu *avibhattikāni* satta, *savibhattikāni* nava: phasso saññā cetanā vicāro pīti jīvitindriyaṃ moho ceti ime satta *avibhattikā* dhammā; vedanā cittaṃ vitakko cittassekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ micchādīṭṭhi ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ lobho ceti ime nava *savibhattikā* nāma.

Tattha *cittaṃ* phassapañcake cittaṃ, indriyapañcake manindriyaṃ. *Vitakko* jhānapañcake vitakko, maggacatukke micchāsāṅkappo. *Micchādīṭṭhi* maggacatukke micchādīṭṭhi, kammaṭṭhaduke micchādīṭṭhi. *Ahirikaṃ* balacatukke ahirikabalaṃ, kaṇhaduke ahirikaṃ. *Anottap-*

paṇḍalacatukke anottappabalaṇ, kaṇhaduke anottappaṇ. Lobho hetuduke lobho kammaṭṭhaduke abhijjhā. Vedanā phassapañcake vedanā, jhānapañcake sukhaṇ, indriyapañcake somanassindriyaṇ. Viriyaṇ indriyapañcake viriyindriyaṇ, maggacatukke micchāvāyāmo, balacatukke viriyabalaṇ, piṭṭhittike paggāho. Samādhi jhānapañcake cittekaggatā, indriyapañcake samādhindriyaṇ, maggacatukke micchāsamādhi, balacatukke samādhibalaṇ, piṭṭhittike samatho avikkhepo ceti.

Cittaṇ vitakko diṭṭhi ahirikaṇ anottappaṇ lobho ceti ime cha dviṭṭhānikā, vedanā tiṭṭhānikā, [viriyaṇ catuṭṭhānikaṇ, ekaggatā pañcaṭṭhānikā,]¹ dutiye “sasaṅkhārikaṇ” ti viseso.²

Somanassasahagatesu dvīsu diṭṭhigata - vippayuttesu dviṭṭhānikā diṭṭhi parihīnā tiṇṇapadāni honti, paṇḍarasa asamhinnapadāni honti, avibhattikāni satta, savibhattikāni aṭṭha, phasso saññā cetanā vicāro pīti jīvitindriyaṇ moho ceti ime satta avibhattikā dhammā; vedanā cittaṇ vitakko ekaggatā viriyindriyaṇ ahirikaṇ anottappaṇ lobho ceti ime aṭṭha savibhattikā dhammā.

Upekkhāsahagatesu dvīsu diṭṭhigatasampayuttesu pīti parihīnā ekatiṇṇa padāni honti. Vedanā jhānaṅge upekkhā hoti, indriyesu upekkhindriyaṇ hoti. Paṇḍarasa asamhinnapadāni honti, cha avibhattikāni, nava savibhattikāni upekkhāsahagatesu dvīsu diṭṭhigata-vippayuttesu diṭṭhiparihīnā ekūnatiṇṇa padāni honti.

Dvīsu domanassasahagatesu ekūnatiṇṇa padāni honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṇ vitakko vicāro dukkhaṇ cittaṇ ekaggatā viriyindriyaṇ samādhindriyaṇ manindriyaṇ domanassindriyaṇ jīvitindriyaṇ micchāsaṅkappo micchāvāyāmo micchāsamādhi viriyabalaṇ samādhibalaṇ ahirikaṇ abalaṇ anottappabalaṇ doso moho byāpādo ahirikaṇ anottappaṇ samatho paggāho avikkhepo ceti. Cuddasa

¹ Ādāsapotthake : Catuṭṭhānekaggatā. Ādāsapotthake : sampayuttesu.

² B. adds the verse :

Viriyaṇ catuṭṭhānikaṇ, chaṭṭhān' ekaggatā pi ca,
nava dhammā ime vuttā, sambhinrā hi Mahesinā ti.

asambhinnapadāni honti, yathā: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro cittass'ekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ doso moho ceti. Cha *avibhattikā*, aṭṭha *savibhattikā* ca, yathā: phasso saññā cetanā vicāro jīvitindriyaṃ moho ti ime cha avibhattikā dhammā. Vedanā cittaṃ vitakko citass'ekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ doso: ime aṭṭha savibhattikā dhammā.

Vicikicchāsahagate tevīsati padāni honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro upekkhā cittass'ekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ manindriyaṃ¹ upekkhindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ micchāsaṅkappo micchāvāyāmo² viriyabalaṃ ahirikabalaṃ anottappabalaṃ vicikicchā moho ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ paggāho ceti. Cuddasa *asambhinnapadāni* honti, yathā: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro cittass'ekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ vicikicchā moho ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ ceti. Aṭṭha *avibhattikāni*, cha *savibhattikāni*: phasso saññā cetanā vicāro cittekaggatā jīvitindriyaṃ vicikicchā moho: ime aṭṭha avibhattikā dhammā. Vedanā cittaṃ vitakko viriyindriyaṃ ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ: ime cha savibhattikā dhammā. Cittekaggatā ṭhitimattam eva hoti; samādhindriyādīni pañcaṭṭhānāni parihāyanti.

Uddhaccasahagate aṭṭhavīsati padāni honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro upekkhā cittekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ samādhindriyaṃ manindriyaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ micchāsaṅkappo micchāvāyāmo micchāsamādhī viriyabalaṃ samādhibalaṃ ahirikabalaṃ anottappabalaṃ uddhaccaṃ moho ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ samatho paggāho avikkhepo ceti. Cuddasa *asambhinnapadāni* honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro cittassekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ uddhaccaṃ moho ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ ceti; satta *avibhattikāni*, satta *savibhattikāni*. Phasso saññā cetanā vicāro jīvitindriyaṃ uddhaccaṃ moho ceti ime satta avibhattikā dhammā; vedanā cittaṃ vitakko ekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ ceti ime satta savibhattikā dhammā.

Chando adhimokkho uddhaccaṃ manasikāro issā mac-

¹ B. omits.

² P. adds micchāsamā lhi.

chariyaṃ māno thīnaṃ middhaṃ kukkucaṅ ceti ime dasa akusalā yevāpanakā. Chando adhimokkho uddhaccaṃ manasikāro thīnaṃ middhaṅ ceti ime cha yevāpanakā pañcasu sasaṅkhārikesu akusalesu uppajjanti. Asaṅkhārikesu pañcasu thīnaṃ middhaṃ apantvā sesā cattāro honti. Catusu diṭṭhigatavippayuttesu lobhasahagatesu māno uppajjati, issā macchariyaṃ kukkucaṅ ceti ime tayo dvisu domanassasahagatacittesu mānā hutvā uppajjanti. Uddhaccasahagate adhimokkho manasikāro ca dve uppajjanti.

Akusalacetāsikā nitṭhitā.

Kusalavipāke cakkhuvīññāṇe dasadhammā honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā upekkhā citta-kaggatā manindriyaṃ upekkhindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ manasikāro ceti. Tayo rāsī honti: phassapañcekarāsi, jhānadukarāsi, indriyatikarāsi ceti. Satta *asambhinnapadāni* honti, phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ ekaggatā jīvitindriyaṅ ceti. Pañca *avibhattikāni*: phasso saññā ekaggatā jīvitindriyaṃ ti. Dve *savibhattikāni*: vedanā cittaṅ ceti. Sota-ghāna-jivhā-viññāṇāni cakkhuvīññāṇasadisāni. Kusalavipāke kāyaviññāṇe sukhā vedanā hoti, sukhindriyaṃ hoti, ettakaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ. Kusalavipāke manodhātu-sampaṭicchana-citte vitakka-vicārehi saha dvādasa dhammā honti, sesaṃ cakkhuvīññāṇasadisāṃ. Kusalavipākāhetuka-manoviññāṇadhātu-somanassasahagata-citte pītiyā saha terasa dhammā honti, sukhavedanā hoti, somanassindriyaṃ hoti, ettakaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ. Kusalavipākāhetuka-manoviññāṇadhātu-upekkhāsahagate manodhātusadisā¹ ti. Aṭṭha mahāvīpākā-cittāni kāmāvacara-kusalasadisāni. Rūpāvacaravīpākāni

Akusalavipākāni cakkhu - sota - ghāṇa - jivhāviññāṇāni kusalavipākāsadisāni, idha aṇiṭṭhārammaṇe yeva uppajjanti, idaṃ tesam nānākaraṇaṃ. Akusalavipāke kāya-viññāṇe dukkhā vedanā hoti, dukkhindriyaṃ hoti, ettakaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ. Sampaticchanā santīraṇāni dve pi kusalavipāka-sadisāni.

Akusalavipākacetāsikā niṭṭhitā.

Kiriyāhetuka-manodhātu sampaticchanasadisā. Kiriyāhetuka-manoviññāṇadhātu-somanassasahagate citte pañcadasa dhammā honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro pīti sukhaṃ cित्तेकaggatā viriyindriyaṃ samādhindriyaṃ manindriyaṃ somanassindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ ceti. Tayo *rāsi* honti: phassapañcakarāsi, jhānapañcakarāsi, indriyapañcakarāsi ceti. Ekādasa *asambhinnapadāni* honti: phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ vitakko vicāro pīti cittass'ekaggatā viriyindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ ceti. Aṭṭha *avibhattikāni*: phasso saññā cetanā vitakko vicāro pīti viriyindriyaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ ceti. Tini *savibhattikāni*: vedanā cittaṃ ekaggatā ceti, ime tayo savibhattikā dhammā. Cित्तेकaggatā *tittḥānikā*, vedanā *tittḥānikā*. Kiriyāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu - upekkhāsahagatā imeh' eva sadisā pītiparihīnā uppajjati. Avasesāni kiriyācittāni sabhūmika-kusalasadisāni yeva uppajjanti. Dvipañcaviññāṇesu manasikāro eko yevāpanako uppajjati. Sesusu parittavipākakiriyesu ca adhimokkho manasikāro jāyanti. Aṭṭhamahāvīpākesu aṭṭhamahākiriyesu ca mahaggata-vipākakiriyācittesu ca virativajjā sesā kusalasadisā yeva uppajjantīti. Kāmāvacaravīpākesu¹ mahākiriyesu ca tisso viratiyo na uppajjanti, ekantakusalattā; appamaññāyo ca² kāmāvacara-mahāvīpākesu na uppajjanti, ekantaparittārammaṇattā. Catūsu upekkhāsahagatesu mahākiriyesu karuṇā muditā na dissantīti vadanti. Lokuttaravīpācittesu kusalasadisā yeva uppajjanti.

*Kiriyacetāsikā niṭṭhitā.*³

¹ B. °mahāvīpākesu.

² S. B. cha.

³ Tikāyaṃ : Cittacetāsikakattā niṭṭhitā.

1. Paṭhav' āpo tejo ca, vāyodhātu tath' eva ca,
mahābhūtāni etāni cattārīti pavuccare.
2. Cakkhu sotañ ca ghāṇañ ca, jivhā kāyo tath' eva ca,
vaṇṇo saddo raso gandho itthipurisindriyaṇ tathā,
3. jīvitaṇ ceva viññatti ākāso lahutā pi ca
mudu kammaññatā ceva upacayo santatī jarā.
4. aniccata ca oja ca, vatthurūpaṇ tath' eva ca,
catuvisati etāni upādā ti pavuccare.
5. Balā sambhavā jāti ca, rogarūpañ ca yaṇ mataṇ¹
vāyo-vāri-dvaya²-bhedehi saṅgahitāni yathākkamaṇ.
6. Rūpaṇ saddo gandharasā, paṭhavī ca tath' eva ca,
tejo vāyo ca etāni pañca cakkhādikāni ca ;
7. sappatighāni vuccanti, tathā olārikāni ca ;
solasa avasesāni sukhumāppatighāni ca.
8. Cakkhādikāni pañc' eva ajjhattikāni vuccare,
tevisat' avasesāni³ bahiddhān' eva honti hi.
9. Rūpaṇ sanidassanaṇ vuttaṇ, avasesā nidassanaṇ,
sattavīsa vidhaṇ hoti, taṇ sabbaṇ paripiṇḍitaṇ.
10. Aṭṭh' indriyāni vatthuñ ca kammen' eva bhavanti hi,
viññattiyo tathā dve pi citten' eva bhavanti hi.
11. Saddo utuñ ca cittañ ca upādā jāyate hi so ;
lahutā ceva mudutā, kammaññatā tath' eva ca.
utuṇ cittañ ca āhāraṇ, upādā pabhavanti hi ;
12. Vaṇṇo gandho raso ceva paṭhavī tejo ca, māluto,
upacayo santatī āpo oj' ākāsaṇ catūhi tu.
13. Cittayaṇ cittajarūpānaṇ uppāde hoti paccayo ;
cittassa tikkhāṇe kammaṇ utu oja ṭhitikkhāṇe.
14. Kammena visatī honti, cittena dasa satta ca ;
paṇṇarasa utunā ca, āhārena catuddasa ;
Jarataniccata ceva na kehici bhavanti hi.
15. Yāni kammena cittena, arūpeh' etāni⁴ honti hi ;
Āhārajā⁵ utujāni rūpehi tu bhavanti hi,
na sambhonti rūpārūpehi⁶ jarataniccata pi ca.
16. Olārikāni vatthuñ ca oja tīnindriyāni ca,
āpodhātu ca etāni rūpārūpan ti vuccare ;

¹ Tikāyaṇ : sammatayaṇ. Ujā āya bhavanti hi. ² B. caya.

³ B. tevisa avasesāni. ⁴ S. B. arūpe tāni (na yujjati).

⁵ B. ā āja.

⁶ S. B. rūj arūpe (na yujjati).

17. Viññattiyo duve ceva lahutā kammaññatā pi ca,
mudutā upacayo ceva santatī ca tathā puna ;
vikārarūpān' etāni satt' eva tu bhavanti hi.
18. Jaratāniccatā ceva lakkhaṇarūpan ti vuccare.
Paricchedarūpam ākāsaṇ ekaṇ yeva tu dīpitaṇ.
19. Catudhā honti kāmānaṇ,¹ rūpīnañ ca tidhā pana,
asaññīnaṇ tathā dvīhi bahiddhā utu neva tu.
20. Samatiṇṣāti rūpāni jāyanti paṭisandhiyā,
ṭhitikkhaṇe ca bhede² ca tiṇsa tiṇs' eva honti hi ;
21. Kāyadasakaṇ bhāvadasakaṇ vatthudasakam eva ca
evaṇ navutī rūpāni kammajān' eva sandhiyā
22. Yathā paṭicca bījāni jāyate aṅkuro paro,
tathā paṭicca sukkādiṇ kalalā jāyare ime.
23. Sandhicittassa dutiyaṇ bhavaṅgan ti pavuccati,
ten' aṭṭharūpā jāyanti utu oḷā hi soḷasa.
24. Kammajā navutī ceva, evaṇ jāyati ācayo
sabhattāhāraṇ nissāya, mātujjāhatanissitaṇ,
eka-dvīhaṇ atikkamma aṭṭha rūpāni jāyare,
vatthudasakaṇ³ kāyadasakaṇ bhāvadasakam eva ca.
25. Cakkhumhi kammajā honti sambhārā catuvīsati,
catupaññāsa sabbāni piṇḍitāni bhavanti hi.
26. Tato⁴ sote ca ghāṇe ca, jivhāvatthumhi jāyare,
Kāyamhi tu dve dasakā tisambhārāni honti hi ;
Catucattālīsa sabbāni piṇḍitāni bhavanti hi.
27. Cakkhādikāni cattāri, vatthurūpaṇ tath' eva ca,
Ekattāhānikarūpāni pañc' eva tu bhavanti hi ;
28. Kāyo itthipumattañ ca, jīvitindriyam eva ca
sabbattāhānikarūpāni imāni tu bhavanti hi.

Nāmarūpasamāso samatto.

¹ B. and Ṭika : kāmīnaṇ.

² B. bhaṅge.

³ B. cakkhudasakaṇ.

⁴ B. and Ṭikā : tatḷā.

NOTE.—Pages 9, 14 *nn.*: Ādāsapotthake ti Sīhalakkharehi mud-
dāpīte Nāmarūpasamāse atthi Abhidhammapakaraṇ āgata - potthake-
sūti maññe.

II

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

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TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH AND ANNOTATED BY S. Z. AUNG.¹

EDITED BY MRS. RHYS DAVIDS.

I.

We understand from S. Z. Aung's letter that the Hon. B. Russell in his philosophy attaches the greatest importance to relations. These in his view are neither physical nor mental, but more ultimate than either. Hence relations, in his view, are in some respects like Plato's "ideas" (or universals).² Relations (*paccayā*) are no less important in our philosophy. By "relations," with us, is meant that by which the connection between things—as between a cause and its effect—is marked. As marks (*lakkaṇā*) are but features which characterize things, we may say that these marks pertain to things themselves. In other words, we may consider them as objective.

There are several kinds of marks common to things in general (*sāmañña-lakkaṇā*), such as (1) marks of Impermanence, Ill or Unsubstantiality; (2) marks of conditioned things (*saṅkhata-lakkaṇā*); (3) marks of causation (*idapaccayatā-lakkaṇā*).

By marks of conditioned things the Buddha meant arisings and ceasings of things—*i.e.*, changes from one state to

¹ The translation of Part I. of this paper was begun by Maung Myo, B.A., and revised by me.—S. Z. A.

² See *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Home University Library), chap. ix.

another. "Bhikkhus!" said He, "there are three marks of conditioned things. Which three? Arising is apparent; ceasing is apparent; the other state of interval (between these two events) is apparent."¹ These happenings are, like impermanence, etc., common to all conditioned things. By marks of causation we mean the relation by which we are enabled to say, "On this existing, that must have been. On this happening, that must have arisen." These causal relations are important not only in philosophic thought, but also in popular and scientific knowledge. It is by them that scientists are enabled to infer cause from effect or *vice versa*. Again, we know that abundant rainfalls produce a prosperous harvest, while scanty rainfalls result in the failure of crops. If the harvest be successful, prosperity would accrue to the people; but if it fail, poverty and starvation stare them in the face. Plenty of food is conducive to a healthy and happy life, but privation of food causes suffering and distress. Even lower animals may be accredited with the power of discerning some of these causal relations, as when they apprehend danger from a threatening attitude adopted by men. Our knowledge of relations may be scientific or unscientific. The causes of the diseases and the effects of medical treatment are best known to physicians. Astronomical relations are best known to those versed in astronomy, and chemical relations to chemists. This knowledge of relation is either superficial or profound, according as we know little or much of the different sciences. All kinds of relations in the universe of existence are treated of in the Great Book of Paṭṭhāna. But as the Buddha expounded them in terms of philosophical language, it is not easy to express them in popular language.

Buddhism has expounded relations by two methods :

(1) The law of happening through a cause (*Paṭiccasamuppāda-naya*) ;

(2) The system of correlation (*Paṭṭhāna-naya*). Such a statement of causal relations, as "Because of ignorance, volitions arise," and "Because of (past) volitions, arises

¹ *Anguttara*, i. 152.

(future) consciousness," illustrates the former method. It is simply stating that B happens, because A happens. But when we say that A as "condition," "object," etc., relates itself to B, we get an illustration of the latter method.

A thorough understanding of the causal relation by the law of happening through a cause is sufficient for the purposes of our salvation—*i.e.*, for the attainment of the "fruit" and Nibbāna by, and through, the intuition or penetration of the Path into reality. But the system of correlation was enunciated by the Buddha with the sole intention of exercising his omniscience in order to spread knowledge. It is useful to disciples in developing their analytic insight, and it puts ordinary folk in the way of acquiring such insight in future.

Now, in any relation, a thing, A, which, as a causal term (*paccaya*), relates itself to another, B (*paccayuppanna*), must be one or other of these four: (1) a mental fact; (2) a physical fact; (3) a concept (*paññatti*); or (4) Nibbāna. But B is either physical or mental; concept and Nibbāna, which are absolutely exempt from becoming (or *jāti*), being excluded from the latter category. If a mental fact, A, relates itself to its correlate, B, its relation to B may be said to be mental, because it is principally derived from the influence of the mental A. Take the case of a notoriously ill-tempered man hated by the rest of the villagers. His illwill, A, relates itself to the hatred, B, of the villagers. Here he has not actually injured his fellow-villagers by hurt or abuse. But the influence of his illwill pervades the whole village and evokes a widespread reaction. The relations set up by illwill are decidedly mental. So are the relations of goodwill, in the same way as light and heat are necessarily included under the concept of Sun. Similarly the relations of physical things are physical; those of concepts, conceptual; and those of Nibbāna, Nibbānic. As the universe is without an apparent beginning, so it is not possible to say which of the two factors of existence—mind and matter—is more ultimate

than the other, still less to say so of their respective relations.

Now, we gather from S. Z. Aung's letter that Plato's "ideas" correspond to our *Atthapaññatti*, while what are called "universals" correspond to *Saddapaññatti*. I might just as well explain what we mean and understand by these two terms. *Saddapaññatti* is the name of a thing, as expressed in a word, or represented by a sign. *Atthapaññatti* is the idea or notion of that thing, as signified by that word or sign. For example, when clay is shaped by a potter's hand into a vessel, the peculiar form, figure, or shape gives rise to our idea of it as "jar," and we attach the name "jar" to it. This name will adhere to it so long as it retains that shape. But as soon as the jar is broken up into pieces we no longer call it a jar. In this example matter is one thing and form another. Clay is not made by the potter's hand. It is a component, constituent part of the earth. It is a natural product both before and after the potter's manual labour, and retains its nature through various stages of transformation. On the other hand, the form (*sañhāna*) of the jar is just a concept derived from a combination and arrangement of clay in a certain manner. It is not inherent in clay. It is artificial and is not a constant element. The name "jar," too, is applicable only when clay remains in that form. Inasmuch as the same clay may be made to assume different forms—*e.g.*, the form of a cup—all these forms are temporary phenomena, or mere appearances. The Buddha likened our consciousness to a professor of legerdemain, or, as moderns would say, to an expert hypnotist. A skilled professor can hypnotize his subject into an illusion that the void space, or an expanse of water, is *terra firma*, so that a false jump may result in a death either by a fall or drowning. The empty or void space here corresponds to our formal concepts. It is through the hallucination of our mind that we mistake the mere forms of animate and inanimate objects for realities. So much for our explana-

tion of concepts and names of mere forms. But as we cannot avoid the use of concepts and names even when dealing with realities (*paramattha-dhamma's*), we have recourse to such concepts and names to denote our mind and mentals (*cetasikā*, such as "contact," "feeling," etc.), matter and qualities (such as "extension," "cohesion," etc.). Now, the Real, with the sole exception of Nibbāna, is impermanent because it is subject to a ceaseless flux of change involved in becoming. But even as space is regarded as permanent, general concepts and ideas may be said to be also permanent, in the sense of exemption from the phenomena of becoming (*i.e.*, arising and ceasing). How? Although the name "jar" is no longer applicable to a particular jar when it is broken up into pieces, yet the general concepts or notion of jar still remains in our mind to denote other individual members of that class of vessels.

Relations, however, are not permanent, as are general concepts of relations.

In our illustrations of illwill and goodwill the particular relations cease with those mental dispositions, though in the cases of their relations as object, sufficing condition, and Karma, their after-effects may subsist long even after the influence of the causal correlates is withdrawn. So also the relations of concepts (not the concepts of relations) and those of Nibbāna continue in existence only as long as persons who conceive the former and realize the latter are existent.

We have pointed out that things which relate themselves to others are either physical, mental, conceptual or Nibbānic, and their relations partake of their nature. Confining ourselves to the conditioned, we have further shown that both correlates in a relation are themselves impermanent, and that they cannot possibly maintain a constant relation. Our conclusion, therefore, is that relations themselves are not permanent in the way that concepts of relations are permanent.

II.

We now propose to explain (1) the exact import of the two terms "*Paṭṭhāna*" and "*Paccaya*," (2) their mutual connection, and (3) their application to particular forms of existence.

1.

Thāna (lit. a station) may be defined as that thing in which, or that event by which, the "fruit" or effect is established.¹ Hence it comes to mean the cause by which an effect is occasioned.² The intensive prefix "*pa*" has the sense of "*padhānam*," meaning predominance or pre-eminence. The term *Paṭṭhāna* therefore means the principal or pre-eminent cause among causes. The reader of Pali is referred to our work, *Paṭṭhānuddesadīpanī*, in the concluding pages whereof we explain the same term. From the above definition of *Paṭṭhāna*, the "Great Book" called *Paṭṭhāna* (of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka) must be understood as treating of only principal causes.

Effects of such causes are either direct or indirect. The one well-defined sort of event which bears an indispensable relation to a given cause is said to be a direct effect. All other outcomes of this direct effect are indirect effects. Given the sole, adequate cause, its direct effect invariably happens. But the indirect effects may, or may not, take place. There is no necessary connection between a cause and these indirect effects. In the *Paṭṭhāna*, principal causes are shown as relating themselves to their direct effects only. Hence the *Paṭṭhāna* treatise is devoted only to principal relations between invariable causes and inevitable effects.

¹ *Thāna* is defined as *tiṭṭhati phalaṃ ettha, etenāti vā thānaṃ*.

² I have introduced the terms "cause" and "effect" in the sense used by the Hon. B. Russell: "A cause is an event or group of events, of some known *general* character, having a known *relation* to some other event, called the effect, the relation being of such a kind that only one, or at any rate only one well-defined sort of event, can have the relation to a given cause" (Bertrand Russell's *Lowell Lectures*, 1914, p. 226). The italics in the quotation are mine.—TR.

For example, greed (*lobha*) relates itself to its concomitant mental and coexistent physical properties by way of "special condition" (or *hetu*). Here these properties directly spring into being *along with* their *paṭṭhāna* or cause. That is, whenever greed occurs, they inevitably occur, or wherever greed is found as a cause, they are invariably found as effects.¹ But the matter does not always stop short there. Greed may give rise to a series of actions in deed, word, or thought, even after its stimulus is withdrawn. These sequences, then, are mere outcomes or results of direct effects.

We have not yet explained the term *Paccaya*. It may be defined as that event by which a fruit or effect derived from itself occurs.²

2.

Now, the difference between the two terms is that "*paṭṭhāna*" is limited to non-transitive relations to its direct effects, whereas "*paccaya*" covers not only non-transitive relations to direct effects, but also transitive relations to indirect effects. The relation of parents to their direct offspring represents the non-transitive relation of *paṭṭhāna*, while the relation of the same parents to their grandchildren represents the transitive relation of *paccaya*. The system of correlation treated of in the Great Book must therefore be interpreted, after its title *Paṭṭhāna*, as dealing with the non-transitive relations, and not with the transitive relations of *paccaya*'s.

Commentators paraphrase the word "*paccayo*" by "*upakārako*," meaning "rendering service." A mother renders service to her child by her function of conception, gestation, etc., and by her ministering to its wants. Here the mother, as a *paccaya*, relates herself to her child, as a

¹ Note that effects need not always be later than a cause. The relation between a cause and its effect may be one of succession, or coexistence. Compare Russell's *Lowell Lectures*, 1914, pp. 215, 216, 217, 220, 226.—Tr.

² *Attānam paṭicca phalaṃ ayati, pavattati etenāti paccayo.*

paccayuppanna, by way of conception, gestation, parturition, and ministrations. But when an adult filially-minded son supports his mother in her old age, he, now become a *paccaya*, relates himself to his mother, now become a *paccayuppanna*, by way of gratitude and support. The son's gratitude is conducive to the mother's comfort and happiness.

In common parlance, the phrase "to render service" means "to do some good to another." But in the language of the *Paṭṭhāna*, it includes bad service as well. Thus, when a wicked son causes a mother's suffering, he still relates himself to her by way of *paccaya*.

We have shown that both terms—*paṭṭhāna* and *paccaya*—imply the idea of a causal relation. Elsewhere¹ we have also shown that this relation between two variable terms cannot possibly be constant. That which is constant is the general concept of it. And because of this constancy, we are enabled to state the relation in a general proposition in the form of a causal law, called the *paccayanaya* ("naya" literally meaning a rule). This causal law receives a further epithet of *Ananta-naya*, because of its applicability to an "infinite" number of particular things (*attha*) as expressed by general terms (*sadda*).² It is not customary to call it *samantanaya*, or "universal law." But the Great Book itself is styled *Anantanaya-samanta-paṭṭhāna*, because in it all principal causes, drawn from "all

¹ Part I, *supra*. Russell maintains that the relation between two variable objects is constant in a causal law (*Lowell Lectures*, 1914, p. 214). What takes part in a causal law, which is but a general statement in the form of a proposition, is, however, not the inconstant, particular relation, which is as real, and at the same time as variable, as the objects themselves, but the mere concept of relation between two concepts as expressed by general terms. Also *cf.* p. 231, *ibid.*—Tr.

² *Cf.* "Moreover, since the causal law is *general*, and capable of applying to many cases, the given particular from which we infer must follow the inference in virtue of some *general* characteristic, not in virtue of its being just the particular that it is" (*Lowell Lectures*, p. 214).—Tr.

directions," meet in the form of causal laws of "infinite" applicability.¹

So much for our brief theoretic treatment of the causal law.

3.

We shall now attempt to show its importance in its application to particular facts of existence.

With the sole exception of Nibbāna, which is absolute, all factors of conscious or unconscious existence are relative—*i.e.*, are not independent of relations.

First take mind. Mind is simply the consciousness of an object. No mental properties, such as "contact," feeling, perception, etc., can possibly be independent of this simple fact of consciousness. This necessary dependence of the former on the latter is stated in the first verse of the *Dhammapada*. Consciousness, in turn, is correlated with the physical bases of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and "heart."² These subtle bases are so inseparably connected with the sentient that they are described as sensitive organs. Visual consciousness proceeds from the physical base of eye, without which there can be no sight, and so for the rest of the senses. The physical bases are, again, the products of the four primary qualities of body—*viz.*, extension, cohesion, heat and motion, all born of karma. In fact, they are but the specialized manifestations of these four essentials, or elements, for special functions.

The four essentials of matter depend for their sustenance and support upon the two material qualities of physical life and nutrition. The destruction of this vital force, or the non-assimilation of food, brings about the destruction of the essentials. Further, these essentials in a conscious being are never independent of his (reproductive) karma in a past existence.

Material qualities, born of mind, heat or food, are in

¹ Cf. "If the inference from cause to effect is to be indubitable, it seems that the cause can hardly stop short of the whole universe" (*Lowell Lectures*, p. 226 ; also cf. p. 221, *ibid.*).—Tr.

² On the heart-basis theory see *Compendium*, p. 277 f.

themselves not endowed with vitality, and therefore depend for their existence upon the karma-born material qualities which are so endowed, and which constitute the essential subjective organism. The former undergo different stages of decomposition so soon as the latter are destroyed.

But the vital force itself which preserves karma-born qualities from decay is but a derivative of the four essentials born also of karma. Therefore it is destroyed as soon as the latter are destroyed. No wonder that the Buddha likened life to a dewdrop on grass. In short, there is not a single mental or corporeal quality in a human being that is absolutely independent of relations to something—nay, not even in the Devas or Brahmās, who attain their respective status through the force of their past karma, but are still subject to birth and death, from which no being is exempt. Take the case of spiritual beings of the Arūpa plane of existence. One would think that their mind is independent of physical basis. But in reality it is not. Just as an arrow, shot from a bow, travels in its trajectory through the force applied to the bow-string, so is their mind, projected, as it were, from their previous physical constituents by the force of culture (*bhāvanā*) in the past existence, maintained in its course through the Arūpa plane, so long as that force has not spent itself.

Coming now to the consideration of inanimate physical objects—the earth, the sun, the moon, the planets and the stars—all are composed of the four essentials or elementals named above.

The element of extension is, so to speak, the substratum of matter, in which other elements inhere. Without it, bodies cannot occupy space. It gives rise to our idea of “hardness” or impenetrability of matter. Hardness implies softness and admits of various degrees. Even the soft rays of light possess this element of extension.

The element of cohesion pervades the entire mass of the hardest substance known. It gives rise to our idea of “body” by combining extended particles of matter. The smallest of these particles may be so minute and subtle

that we are compelled to describe them as a mere condition or mode (*ākāra*), action (*kiriyā*) or state (*bhāva*), or call them by any other names¹ in worldly technology (*loka-vohāra*). Thus atoms or corpuscles (*aṇumrū*), ions or electrons (*paramāṇumrū*), are possible only by reason of this element of cohesion. When solid bodies are melted, this element is even more pronounced in the resulting liquid.² When bodies are reduced to powder, the same element is still existent in the smallest particle. When cohesion ceases to exist, extension also disappears with it. The one cannot exist without the other. Cohesion and extension are therefore interdependent upon each other. Nothing that is subject to condition can independently exist by itself.

The element of heat means the temperature of bodies, of which there are various degrees. We call the lower degrees cold in ordinary parlance, but in philosophy or science cold (*sīta-tejo*) is not recognized as a separate power apart from heat. Both heat and cold, then, have the same function of maturing bodies. To mature is to sharpen the powers. That is to say, heat makes its coexistent elements more powerful.

Both heat and cold burn, the former swiftly and the latter slowly. Heat depends upon the element of extension as its combustible matter. But just as fuel is consumed by fire, so is the element of extension, along with its other coexistent element, consumed by heat.

Thus all material qualities of bodies first come into being, then develop or mature, and finally decay through the same element of heat. This same element, considered as one of the four causes of matter, is also called *utu*, from "*udati*," "to produce," because heat is capable of generating and regenerating material qualities in physical phenomena.

¹ *E.g.*, ether-whirls, ether-rings, ether-vortices, ether-twists or ether-strains.—Tr.

² According to scientists, cohesion is strongest in solids. But the Buddhist idea is that it is stronger in liquids, because their particles tend to coalesce even after separation, which is not the case in solids once broken up.—Tr.

If we closely observe a flame we may see its flickering ever renewing itself and presenting a continuous light. Movements that are imperceptible to the eye may be felt. Even the cold mass of a mountain is undergoing a process of unperceived regeneration.

All physical phenomena, such as evaporation, cloud, rain and vegetation, are due to heat.

Ordinarily we speak of vibration with reference to single object, as when we say that this or that body vibrates. But in scientific philosophy, each wave-motion¹ is considered as a separate, distinct phenomenon. A variety of motions gives rise to different phenomena. But if they occur in one and the same series, they give rise to a change from the old to the new. Thus when you see objects vibrating with energy, pulsating with life, you may be sure that they are undergoing momentary deaths.

So much for the influence of heat, or *utu*, on the physical order of things.

The element of motion is inseparably connected with heat. Motion is the force of heat. In this sense it is its offspring. But it also assists heat in determining its intensity.²

We have said that a variety of motions gives rise to various phenomena generated by the physical cause of *utu*. Motion and heat in the physical domain are respectively analogous to mind and karma in the spiritual. The Buddha said that the creative evolution of animate things by mind is marvellous. But the evolution of inanimate objects by the latter is no less wonderful.

Now, we have shown that the essentials of matter are mutually dependent upon one another, and that the secondary qualities of body are dependent upon the primaries. Thus neither mind nor matter can be independent of relation.

We shall now inquire whether relations are real or

¹ *Kiriyā*, in this compound, literally means action or activity, and includes motion.—Tr.

² It looks as if the Buddhists were feeling out for the vibratory theory of heat.—Tr.

merely conceptual, and then go on to indicate the points of resemblance and difference among the twenty-four modes of relation.

III.

In the foregoing we have explained the verbal import or logical definition of the term *paccaya* as a cause by which an effect comes to be. For example, the seed, the soil, the rain-water, the solar heat, and the air are all causes by which a tree is produced and is made to grow. Here the function of the seed is to germinate, and those of the remaining causes are to assist the process of germination of the plant and to favour the growth of the tree. But it is the seed that determines its specific type. Hence a mango tree cannot be produced out of a tamarind seed. From this example we can see that no conditioned things whatsoever can exist without their respective causes.

We have further explained the meaning intended to be conveyed by that term—namely, that the function of a cause consists in “rendering service” to its effect. For example, the seed does a service to the tree by the function or process of germination. The root draws water, which constitutes the principal food of plants from the soil sustaining it. Further, the plant requires a free access of light and air for its growth. The root, the water, the soil, the air, and the light all render services to the tree, each by its own function.

Cause, as defined above, implies some power, energy, or force (*satti*) through which its function (*hicca*) operates in a causal relation. And we have shown in our opening remarks on relations that this power, energy, or force is physical, mental, conceptual, or Nibbānic, according as the cause at work is matter, mind, concept, or Nibbāna. It is therefore obvious that the force itself is ultimately real (*paramatthadhamma*).¹

¹ The learned writer seems to infer the reality of the force from the reality of the causal terms. But he has omitted to explain why the force exerted by a concept, which is unreal, should be real. I therefore venture to offer my own explanation. A concept which enters into a

Now, there are twenty-four modes of principal causal relations treated of in Buddhist philosophy.

1. *Hetu*.

The first causal relation is one by way of "root"-conditions, or *hetu*'s. The term *hetu* denotes six mental factors—namely, greed, illwill, and ignorance, and their opposites. It connotes their function as root conditions. How? Just as a tree is firmly fixed to the ground by its root, so are certain correlated effects firmly established on objects by these root-conditions. Greed, for example, more or less, firmly fixes its coexistent mental or physical properties on an agreeable object coveted by it. Through its influence the whole self for the time being clings to the object which it grasps. For a time it cannot give it up. Greed, then, is the root-cause (*hetupaccaya*), A, which relates itself to B—*i.e.*, the rest of the mental factors and their coexistent physical actions—as its effects (*hetupaccayuppanna*). And so for other root-causes.

For details readers are referred to our *Paṭṭhānudesadīpanī*. But briefly put, illwill also more or less firmly establishes itself and its correlates on an object of hate by way of aversion or antipathy, and ignorance does no less so by way of lack of knowledge. The opposite of greed is apparent in renunciation and in Jhāna exercises; the opposite of illwill is apparent in good conduct or higher ethics (*brahmarāhita*); and the opposite of ignorance, in analytic philosophical knowledge (*Abhidhamma*) and in intuitive or penetrative knowledge of reality (*saccadhamma*).

We have already observed that these correspond to the root of a tree in their function. As the growth of a tree depends upon the condition of its root, so does the evolution of the whole universe depend on these six roots and on them alone. The functions of a root are various. It

causal relation is a particular, as Mr. Russell, too, would say. It is an idea actually conceived at the moment, and therefore possesses a kind of reality belonging to a sense-datum. Its force is therefore real. Cf. *Lowell Lectures*, 1914, p. 213.—Tr.

firmly establishes the tree on earth; it draws up from the soil the food for the plant; and it further enables the tree to stand against the forces of wind and water. As long as the root is in a sound condition, so long the tree can subsist, grow, and thrive. No other conditions will avail should the root fail. Hence the root is the principal condition of a tree's growth. The six mental factors named act like roots of the trees of human actions in this world. In fact, all our actions, in deed, word, or thought, proceed from these primary sources. Some of our bad acts proceed from greed, some from illwill, and some from ignorance. All our good acts are due to their absence.

The entire question of the Why and Wherefore of good and bad comes under this causal relation.

LITERATURE.—*Anguttara-Nikāya*; Tika-nipāta, Third Vagga, chap. iii. (vol. i., 134 f.); the Mūlayamaka of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka (*Yam. i.*, 1 f.).

2. *Ārammaṇa*.

The next relation is that of an *object to a subject*, mind, matter, Nibbāna, and concepts constituting the causal terms. In fact, there is nothing in the universe that cannot function as an object of consciousness. But the subject is restricted to mind alone. Matter, Nibbāna, or a concept, not being subjective, cannot enter into relation with an object.¹ Men seek wealth because they cannot get on in this world without it. Similarly mind seeks its objects, for it cannot exist without them.

There are six classes of objects: five of sense and one of thought. A present visible thing causally relates itself to visual consciousness by way of an object. And so for the rest of external senses. But all the six classes of objects can act on the inner sense or mind by entering into causal relations either in presentative or representative conscious-

¹ In other words, the relation of, say, matter, A, as object to mind, B, is asymmetrical; that is, B does not bear the same relation to A as A does to B. The relation of a mental object to a mental subject is merely non-symmetrical. I am indebted to Mr. Russell for the terms "asymmetrical" and "non-symmetrical."—Tr.

ness. And there are several classes of consciousness (as detailed in Part I. of the *Compendium*) to which an object can relate itself. Past and future objects can likewise act on present mind. There is no object but can relate itself to the omniscience of a Buddha.

3. *Adhipati*.

(a) *Sahaḥātādhīpati*.

In the causal relation of the dominant to the dominated, certain mental factors, namely, intention or desire-to-do (*chanda*), energy or effort (*virīya*), mind or will (*citta*),¹ and reason or intellect (*vīmaṅṣā*), may be dominant over their respective coexistent properties. By “dominant” we mean “peerless.” When any of these four has acquired such a sufficient force as to dominate the rest, nothing else can resist its influence, in the same way as no animals can withstand the power of the lion, king of beasts. These four factors form the bases of the accomplishment of great things. A sufficiently powerful intention will, sooner or later, achieve its object, however great, whether that be meritorious or otherwise. An equally supreme effort which surmounts all obstacles and difficulties in labour and hardship will certainly carry its object through. A sufficiently strong will is equally bound to effect its object. Intellectual reason which gets the upper hand cannot fail to accomplish its ends, either in the acquisition of knowledge or in the solution of intricate problems. Each of these four mentals, then, may causally relate itself to coexistent properties, mental or physical, by way of dominance.

(b) *Ārammaṇādhīpati*.

In this causal relation, certain objects of great regard may dominate the percipient mind, as when a person who

¹ *Citta* in this connection always refers to the *javana-cittuppāda*, or apperceptual state of consciousness, in which the will asserts itself over its coexistent properties; therefore the whole state may be said to dominate other things coexistent with it.

seeks gold is possessed and obsessed by the dominant idea of that precious metal. When so dominated, he cannot possibly give up or get rid of it, notwithstanding the troubles and hardships to which he is put by his desire to get gold. In fact, all agreeable objects may, more or less, dominate the mind in this way.

LITERATURE.—The Mahāvagga-Iddhipādā-Saṅyutta of the Suttanta (S. v., 254 f.), and the Iddhipādāvibhanga of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka (Vibh. 216 f.).

4. *Anantara.*

In the causal relation of one mental to another which is contiguous to it in time, each preceding state of consciousness causally relates itself to its immediate successor in a process of thought. For each individual the series is uninterrupted till existence is completed on finally passing away, as in the case of an Arahant. There is not a mere sequence or succession in time, without any causal connection between the two correlated terms. But it is the temporal relation which is necessarily taken account of by the causal law. In function, therefore, each predecessor towards its successor is like a parent towards its offspring. The only difference is that, whereas the parent lives when the child is born, the predecessor in the mental sequence expires before its successor appears. Just as an heir normally inherits the property of his deceased parent, so does a succeeding unit of consciousness inherit all the energy, all the functions, and all the impressions of the expired unit.

5. *Samanantara.*

But because the two states blend themselves in such a way as to present one continuous mind,¹ the same temporal relation is also spoken of as one of *immediate contiguity in time*. This continuity of members of the

¹ We may say one continuous spectrum of mind where one colour shades off into another, so that it is difficult to say where one ends and where the other begins.—Tr.

series has led to the theory of immortality being usually applied to mind, as soul, rather than to body.

22, 23. *Natthi ; Vigata.*

We have observed that a predecessor expires when its successor makes its appearance. For this reason, the same causal relation in mental sequence is also spoken of as one of absence (*Natthipaccaya*) and sometimes as one of abeyance (*Vigatapaccaya*).¹

12. *Āsevanā.*

The causal relation by way of habitual recurrence is a species of the foregoing. But it is limited to the sequence of similar states of consciousness during apperceptual moments in a process of thought. Mind is most active during these moments. All our moral and immoral acts proceed from these apperceptual states, as also all our movements in action and speech. Now, to make an habitual use of a thing (*āsevatī*) is to cultivate it, and to cultivate is to practise repeatedly for many times. If, for example, in reading a lesson many times, each new reading is more improved than the previous by repetition of the process, the improvement so effected is called proficiency.² Such proficiency is culture (*bhāvanā*), and culture is *āsevanā*, which is thus the recurrence of an improved state of affairs by habitual repetition of similar circumstances. Thus when each previous state has power to effect an improvement in its immediate successor of the same kind in this way, the former is said to relate itself causally to the latter by way of habituation. Apperceptual states of consciousness of the world of sense-desires can recur only seven times at the very outside in a process of thought. A

¹ *Vigata*: lit. gone away.

² An unconscious plagiarism of the following passage from Russell, *Lowell Lectures*, p. 280: "If, for example, I read a certain poem many times, my experience on each occasion is modified by the previous readings, and my emotions are never repeated exactly." *Pāguṇabhāva* is the same as *pāguṇñatā* of the *Compendium*.—Tr.

gradual improvement is effected up to the fourth moment in this series, when it begins to decline till the process of repetition ceases at the seventh moment.¹ This causal relation by way of habituation is apparent in the world as practice, and is useful in the acquisition of the knowledge of sciences and arts. We have observed that the power of improvement is appropriated by the apperceptual states in a process of thought. But the exercise of that power may be repeated in several thousands of similar processes in a single day. This process of repetition may be carried on for many days, months, years, or for many lives. Since practice makes a man perfect, the ten Perfections of the Bodhisats were brought about in this way. Some persons may have sufficient power to exert themselves so as to attain Jhāna, Super-knowledge, the Path and the Fruit in this very existence. *Āsevanā* is to be understood in such phrases as "to cultivate right views," etc. But in the Great Book, according to its title of *Paṭṭhāna*, the causal relation under discussion is restricted to one which obtains between two states of consciousness, during apperceptual moments in a process of thought, because it is the *principal* relation of the kind. It is to be understood that the first apperceptual state causally relates itself to the second but not to the third, and the second to the third but not to the fourth, and so on, by way of immediate contiguity in time. But we may add, that the first causally relates itself to the third, fourth, etc., by way of sufficing condition. Further, the two terms of this relation must be necessarily similar—*e.g.*, both must be appetitives or aversives. That is, an appetitive cannot causally relate itself to an aversive in this way.

LITERATURE.—The Mahāvagga Saṅyutta of the Suttanta Piṭaka (S. v.).

¹ The rise and fall of the power of thought may be represented by a wave of thought in which the fourth moment forms the crest. Cf. the translator's article on "The Forces of Character" in *Buddhism* (Rangoon, 1908).—TR.

6. *Sahajāta*.

We now come to the consideration of the causal relation of coexistence in time. Just as a flame is accompanied by heat and light, and sometimes by a peculiar odour of its own, certain things or events have the power of bringing about their effects simultaneously with them.

There are four different relations of this kind, namely the relation of—

- (a) A mental to a mental ;
- (b) A mental to a physical ;
- (c) A physical to a physical ; and
- (d) A physical to a mental.

All mentals coexistent in a state of consciousness, forming any one of the thirty-three modes of grouping dealt with in Part II. of the *Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha)*, are related to one another under (a). Here the relation is symmetrical. That is, the relation between the two terms A and B holds good as between B and A.

Under (b) we have (i.) the relation of reborn mentals to karma-born material qualities of body at the moment of conception ; (ii.) the correlation of mind with physical organism in life after conception. In the former case both the mentals and physicals spring into being simultaneously.

Under (c) any one of the four primary qualities of body causally relates itself to (i.) any one of the remaining three and (ii.) to their derivatives, in each of the twenty-one groups, or *kalāpa's*, dealt with in Part VI. of the *Compendium*. It must be remembered that the derivatives cannot attain the status of a cause or *paccaya*. That is, the relation between the primaries, A, and the secondaries, B, is asymmetrical. In other words, the relation of A to B cannot be reciprocally borne by B to A.

Under (d) may be instanced the correlation of the basis of "heart" to mentals at the moment of conception.

In Part II. of this paper we pointed out how material qualities give rise to our ideas of "bodies" from the tiniest particle to the biggest mass. But in the Great

Book, true to its title of *Paṭṭhāna*, only relations of material qualities within any one *kalāpa* are principally intended as illustrations of the causal law embodying the relations of physicals to physicals by way of coexistence.

This relation of (i.) coexistence includes the following varieties :

- (ii.) Dependence-in-coexistence (8a. *Sahajātanissaya*) ;
- (iii.) Co-presence (21a. *Sahajātatthi*) ; and
- (iv.) Inseparableness-in-coexistence (24a. *Sahajāta-avigata*).

Coexistence is not mere juxtaposition in space and time without any real connection between the two correlated terms A and B. A may serve as the basis of B, if the latter depends for its existence on the former, or A may be inseparably connected with B, if A be indispensable for B's coexistence. In either case, both terms must be co-present.

These four form the genus of the relation of coexistence. The following are its species :

- (v.) The relation of reciprocity (7. *Aññamaññapaccaya*) ;
- (vi.) The mutual relation of results-to-results in fruition (14. *Vipākapaccaya*) ;
- (vii.) The relation of association (19. *Sampayuttapaccaya*) ; and
- (viii.) The relation of dissociation (20. *Vippayuttapaccaya*).

We have seen that both terms, A and B, may be either physical or mental. If A and B be both mentals, or both primary qualities of body, or if A be the physical basis of mind, B, at the moment of conception,¹ then the relation of reciprocity obtains.

¹ When A and B are both mentals or primaries, the relation of reciprocity is symmetrical. The correlation of *heart* with mind at conception is a special case of reciprocity. Physical bases of mind at other times in life are dealt with under the relation of pre-existence, because they spring into being earlier than consciousness, which depends upon them for existence.—Tr.

We think a word of explanation is needed to show what is meant by the relation of fruition. Just as a ripe fruit is soft, so are the mature results of moral or immoral karmas. That is, these mental results are inactive and quiescent. Witness such results in the form of the vital continuum of a person who is either absent-minded or asleep. When we are free from cares and anxieties, all our physical comforts are due to the quieting qualities of results. In this relation A is always mental, but B may be either mental or physical.

We now pass on to the discussion of the relation of association. When waters flowing from different springs combine in a big river, they are no longer distinguishable by their sources. There is a thorough fusion. In the same way, when both A and B are mentals, their coalescence in coexistence is spoken of as the relation of association. But just as quicksilver refuses to mix with water, so a mental and a physical dissociate from each other in coexistence. In the relation of dissociation, then, A is mental when B is physical, or *vice versa*.

Now, if A be mental, it may be (ix.) a root-condition (*hetu*), (x.) a mental dominant factor, (xi.) a karma, (xii.) a mental food, (xiii.) a mental control, (xiv.) a Jhāna-constituent, or (xv.) a Path-constituent.

We have already explained root-conditions and mental dominants under (1) and (3) above. It only remains here to observe that the relations of root-condition and mental dominance are minor species of coexistence.

13a. *Kamma*.

We now come to the consideration of the Karmic relation of coexistence. Karma is ultimately reduced to the psychological factor of volition. And volition is the unique determination of will. Will-exercise is power over its coexistent mental properties and physical qualities. In fact, all our activities in deed, word, or thought are due to its influence. But here we are not concerned with the aspect

of will in its relation to effects in after-life. We will advert to it later.

There remain four other minor species of coexistence to be briefly discussed.

15. *Āhāra*.

Just as material food supports body, so do mental foods support mind. Mental "contact" or reaction nourishes concomitant properties, especially feeling; will serves its concomitant properties in the execution of deed, word, or thought; and consciousness also serves as the support of concomitant properties in thinking about an object. These three mental foods in nourishing the mind also affect the body. Strictly speaking, material food is to be excluded from consideration under this causal relation of coexistence, because it begins to act only when it reaches its own static stage of metabolic development. But since it bears the relation from that moment, it may be included under this head.

LITERATURE.—The Seventh Vagga of the Nidāna-Saṅyutta (*S.* ii., 94-128).

16. *Indriya*.

We pass on to the causal relation of control in coexistence. Psychic life, consciousness, feeling, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentrative power of thought, and intuition, are called Controls, because they exercise control over their coexistent mental and physical properties, in their respective departments. Life controls them in the matter of their prolongation by continuity; mind, in the matter of thinking about an object; pleasure, in causing comfort to body, and pain, in causing discomfort to it; joy, in happiness, and grief, in distress; and equanimity, in indifference. Faith controls its concomitants in religious convictions; energy, in supreme efforts; mindfulness, in contemplative exercises; concentrative power of thought, in the attainment of Jhāna; and intuition, in penetrating the real.

The difference between the relation of dominance and that of control is this: in the former the dominant factor is

supreme like an Emperor, whereas in the latter the controls have compeers, like Kings under the suzerain power, or ministers under a King. No two dominant factors, each exercising the paramount authority, can exist side by side, but many controls may co-operate with one another at the same time. Physical life does not exercise its influence over a karma-born group of material qualities till it reaches its own static stage of development. But it may be included under this relation, as in the case of material food.

Self-control practised by Bhikkhus is an instance of this relation.

LITERATURE.—The Indriya-Saṅgyutta of the Mahāvagga of the Suttanta (*S. v.*, 193 f.), and the Indriya-Yamaka of the Abhidhamma (*Yam. ii.*, 61 f.).

17. *Jhāna*.

Jhāna means a close observation and contemplation of an object. It is a straight and steady aim at the objective like that of a hunter with his arrow. *Vitakka*, or the initial application of the mind, is a factor of this process consisting in the direction of its concomitant properties towards the object; *Vicāra*, or the sustained application of the mind, is the hovering, so to speak, of its concomitants over the object; *Pīti*, or interest, is the satisfaction with it; *Sukha*, or happiness, is the experience of it; and *Ekaggatā*, or the individuality of the object to mind, is the steadiness of mind on object. It is through the influence of one or other of these factors in its causal relation to its coexistent properties that in all our actions we are enabled to carry out our object, to attain the end in view. Without this influence a hunter would not be able to take a steady aim at his game. Without it, we should not be able to observe any distinctions in forms. Without it, we should not be able to make or take even a single right step. A man may aim eastward, but he will swerve southward, and fall westward. During this wavering step, his mind may wander to another object and become forgetful of the first. In such a state of mental distraction, he would not be able to repeat even the easiest lesson. The

mind's movement from object to object is very rapid. In fact, the mind is like a wild bull-calf, and the Jhāna factor is like a tether by which it is roped to a stake. It acts on both mind and body. It is absent in the external senses—that is, at the moment of sensing in a process of presentative consciousness.

LITERATURE.—The Jhānavibhaṅga of the Abhidhamma (*Vibh.* 244 f.).

18. *Magga*.

Path-factors include (a) intuition (or *paññā*), (b) aim (*vitakka*), (c) right speech, (d) right act, (e) right life, (f) energy, (g) mindfulness, (h) individualizing power of mind (*ekaggatā*), and (i) opinion (*ditṭhi*).

Aim, energy, and individuality are common to both good and bad. But opinion (that is, erroneous view or *micchā-ditṭhi*) pertains to bad only, and the other five to good only.

Wrong speech, wrong act, wrong life, and wrong mindfulness are included under the term “immoral thought” (*akusala-citta*), and are therefore not distinctively set forth in Buddhist philosophy as factors of the wrong path.

Now, *Magga* or Path means a road. The advantages of roads as means of reaching different destinations in all directions from one's place are evident. Carts, boats, ships, carriages, etc., are factors of journey on a road. Erroneous view is a straight road to evil destiny, and wrong aim, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, and wrong concentration are like vehicles plying on that road. Intuition or penetrative understanding, which is but another name for right view, is, on the other hand, a main road leading to happy destiny, aye, to Nibbāna, and right aim, right speech, right act, right life, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration are vehicular means of journey on it. The remaining mental properties are like travellers, each on his own business. We may go further and say that all conscious beings are travellers.

These path-factors may act on both mind and body. This causal relation follows so closely on the wake of that

of root-condition that it is possible to find the former in seventy-one states of consciousness accompanied by root-conditions.

LITERATURE.—The Mahāvagga-Saṃyutta (*S. v.*), and the Aṭṭhaka-nipāta, as well as the Navanipāta of the *Anguttara-Nikāya* (*A. iv.*, 150 to end); the Maggavibhaṅga of the *Abhidhamma* (*Vibh.* 235 f.).

19. *Purejāta.*

The term “pre-existent” (*purejāta*) must not be understood to mean a wholly antecedent¹ state which has expired before a consequence arises, but a thing, event, or process which partly precedes, and partly overlaps with, a later event, or thing, or process to which the earlier causally relates itself. Such pre-existent things may be either physical bases or objects of consciousness. Both invariably take part in a process of external presentative consciousness. How? Just as a reverberation of notes takes place when a lyre-string is struck once, even so, when a pre-existent object strikes an equally pre-existent basis, the vibration of the continuum, set up by the impact, gives rise to a series of consciousness with the same object in a presentative process of thought.

This series terminates only when the object completes its life-cycle of seventeen mental moments. In a process of sight, the physical basis of eye partly precedes the visual consciousness to which it causally relates itself, and the object also partly precedes the series of consciousness to which it severally relates in turn.

So, too, for the other external senses.

In the case of the internal sense, each state of consciousness that takes part in a process of thought invariably depends upon the heart-basis, which springs into being at the next previous moment.

This causal relation is the function of only eighteen kinds of predetermined qualities of body, having a normal life-

¹ The terms “antecedent” and “consequent,” adopted in the *Compendium*, are somewhat misleading.—TR.

cycle of seventeen moments and overlapping with the present. In other words, pre-existent things must continue to be present if they were to enter into this causal relation. When the mind attends to past or future objects, concepts, Nibbāna, or material qualities other than the aforesaid eighteen, this causal relation does not obtain.

The relation of prior or pre-existing physical basis to mind is one of dependence (*Nissaya*), because the latter depends for its existence upon the former as its basis; or one of dissociation (*Vippayutta*), because mind and matter refuse to coalesce; or one of co-presence or inseparableness (*Atthi* or *Avigata*), because the physical basis is inseparably present along with the mind; or one of control (*Indriya*), because the five physical bases control the external senses.

Similarly, objects which partly precede consciousness are latterly co-present and inseparable from their respective subjects. If such objects be extremely desirable and much coveted, they may dominate the mind. In that case the relation of dominance also obtains. Or if they be sufficiently strong to act on the mind at any later time, the relation of sufficing condition would obtain.

LITERATURE.—The *Āyatana-Saṅgyutta* of the *Suttanta* (S. iv., 1 f.); the *Āyatanavibhaṅga* (*Vibh.* 70 f.); and the *Āyatana-Yamaka* of the *Abhidhamma* (*Yam.* i., 52 f.).

11. *Pacchājāta*.

The causal relation of post-existence (*pacchājāta*) may also be one of dissociation, co-presence, or inseparable connection by continuance (*avigata*).

All posterior mentals that spring into being after the moment of conception are said to be post-existent, because they are partly preceded by their physical correlates. That is, the former come into existence only when the latter reach the static stage of their own development.

Just as middle and final rains are beneficial to a crop grown at the beginning of the rains, so later mentals

render service to earlier corporeal qualities born of karma, mind, heat, or food. In this causal relation of mentals to physicals by way of post-existence, the terms, though co-present and inseparably connected by continuance, necessarily dissociate one from the other. Physical life which controls the body, animal temperature which is but the primary quality of blood-heat born of karma, and consciousness which is post-existent, constitute the tripod of conscious existence as treated of in the Mahāvedalla-Sutta of the Fifth Vagga of the Mūlapaññāsa in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (M. i., 292).

13b. *Kamma*.

We have hitherto discussed only one aspect of karma in its causal relation by way of coexistence under (6).

We have seen that karma is will, and that will determines itself. This determination first consists in causing its co-existent properties to perform their respective functions. The functioning of the entire mind through its influence produces (mental) "results," and karma-born qualities of body after it ceases to act. Therefore karma differs in time from its effects. Hence it is asynchronous. It may work them out, either in the very present existence, or in the immediate next rebirth, or in any one life of the subsequent series, until existence is completed. The act of volition at the first apperceptual moment, if sufficiently strong, is capable of effecting its results almost immediately in the same life; that at the seventh moment, its results in the next existence; and those at the five intermediate moments, in any life of the series from the third rebirth onward till Nibbāna is reached, as an opportunity for fruition presents itself. But should they fail to mature results within the time limit allotted to each kind for any reason or other, they become inoperative for ever by being time-barred.

This fact is very briefly dealt with in Part V. of the *Compendium*. Asynchronous karma is important in that the entire sentient evolution in different planes of

existence is directly, and that of the physical world is indirectly, due to it. Just as plants grow from their respective seeds, so beings evolve from their karmas. Those who deny this causal relation of asynchronous karma fall into all sorts of erroneous views.

LITERATURE.—The Sāleyyaka Sutta, the Verañjaka-Sutta, the Cūḷadharmasamādāna and Mahādhammasamādāna-Suttas of the Fifth Vagga in Mūlapaṇṇāsa, *Majjhima-Nikāya* (M. i., 285, 290, 305, 309); the Bālapaṇḍita-Sutta, Second Vagga, the Devadūta-Sutta, Third Vagga, the Cūḷakammavibhaṅga and Mahākammavibhaṅga-Suttas (M. iii., 163, 178, 202, 207); the Fourth Vagga in Uparipannāsa (M. ii., 243); the *Apādāna*, the *Vimānavatthu*, the *Petavatthu* of the Khuddaka Nikāya.

9. Upanissaya.

By Upanissaya or sufficing condition is meant a powerful thing or event on which an effect depends for existence. A dominant object, *i.e.*, an object of great interest, an immediately expired mental state or any other cause-in-nature, adequate to produce its own effect, may act as a sufficing condition.

We have explained the first two of these under (3) and (4) respectively. We said in our *Paṭṭhānuddesadīpanī* that all causes necessarily taken account of by (*pākato* : lit. means evident to) natural philosophers (*lokapākatiya paṇḍitā*) are sufficient or adequate to produce their own effects. In fact, all natural causes (both physical and spiritual) are adequate. A natural cause may be defined as thing, event, or action in nature on which its effect largely depends for existence. Suppose you treated a friend very kindly and hospitably when he visited you, he would be a *pākata* (or a person to whom) something was done in the past. As such, he may be well depended upon, when you return his visit, according to his means, position or status in life. Of course, the extent to which you may look to him for hospitality depends upon the degree of attention you paid to him.

If a man were to build a house well, it would be a *pākata* or a thing done well. It would afford protection to himself

and his successors. If a cultivator cleared land for cultivation, that land would be a *pākata*, and would be a means of subsistence for him and his posterity. A student learns his lessons thoroughly. His learning would stand him in good stead. All our higher karmas (sublime and spiritual) are instances of sufficing conditions. So also are our principal transgressions. By a sufficing condition is meant one that cannot be effaced—*e.g.*, the five serious crimes of matricide, parricide, etc.

This causal relation by way of sufficient condition may be classified into that of—

- (a) A present to a present ;
- (b) A past to a present ;
- (c) A future to a present ; and
- (d) A timeless to a present.

Association, environments, and all our physical surroundings may be instanced under (a). All our ancestors and all our past acts or karmas illustrate (b). All our expectations and anticipations, all our hopes and ideas, come under (c). No being is ever without these. In fact, all of us are, more or less, governed by our hopes. We are led onward by our ideals. We are stimulated to present efforts by them as our goals. We are regulated in all our actions by hopes of future reward or dread of future punishment. All our present efforts, when maturing their fruits in future, become past sufficing conditions, and the fruits themselves become the present effects, to which those past efforts causally relate themselves as sufficing conditions.

Now, why are Nibbāna and concepts described as timeless, or out of time (*kālavimutta*)? Because they are not subject to the two principal events of birth and death which occur in time. Nibbāna is a great sufficing condition for the wise to cultivate all good and perfections—*e.g.*, charity, virtue, etc., as well as all purities and factors of enlightenment. Even our relative exemption from all dangers in this world is longed for by us. Therefore Nibbāna-peace which we long for is a sufficient condition.

Again, just as space is a sufficient condition for birds to fly and for all other creatures to move about, so all our concepts are sufficient conditions for our intellects to move about and increase our knowledge.

Or we may classify this causal relation under that of—

- (a) A moral to a moral ;
- (b) A moral to an immoral ;
- (c) A moral to an unmoral ;
- (d) (e) and (f) An immoral to a moral, immoral, or unmoral ;
- (g) (h) and (i) An unmoral to a moral, immoral, or unmoral.

- (a) Faith, virtue, experience, etc., may lead to ethically good acts.
- (b) But they may also give rise to pride or conceit.
- (c) Men like our Bodhisats, in doing good acts, undergo a great deal of physical discomfort and trouble. Now, physical pain is a thing unmoral, and good acts are moral. Again, anyone who fears to undergo the ordeal and trial is far from achieving any good. But others reap the fruits of their labour or good acts according to the degree of exertion — *e.g.*, as Buddhas Supreme, Buddhas Special (*pacceka*), Disciples, and so forth. All our happy results so achieved are unmoral.
- (d) But just as patients seek medicine, or persons in dread of fire seek water, or nations desirous of immunity from attack by enemies seek armed peace, so persons who wish to get rid of bad seek its opposite. A murderer practises virtue, etc., through repentance. In this case murder is in causal relation to virtue. And so for other forms of evil.
- (e) Self-love and self-interest lead to commission of evil deeds of murder, theft, etc.
- (f) A wicked man sometimes gets on in this world. His corruptions stand in causal relation to his

prosperity, which is as unmoral as adversity he generally meets with.

- (g) (h) Our physical organs give rise to good and bad acts.
- (i) Our organs are means of enjoyment, or the reverse. Some are loved for good features and a sweet voice; others are hated for the opposites. Some animals are killed for flesh, some for plumage, some for skins, some for bones, and some for oil. Here flesh, plumage, etc., which are unmoral, are in causal relation to danger or death.

All our wealth, possession, and prosperity are unmorals, yielding happiness or misery, which are equally unmoral.

To sum up. All causes in nature, other than the remaining twenty-three causes or *paccayas*, specially treated of in the Great Book, with the exception of dominant objects, immediately expired mental states, and karmas capable of effecting results at some future time, are sufficing conditions.

RECAPITULATION.

A cause which implies some real power, energy, or force, is adequate to produce its effects. In short it is always (i.) a sufficing condition (*upanissayapaccaya*). It may be past, present, future, or out of time, *e.g.*, as (ii.) an object of consciousness (*ārammaṇa-paccaya*). This object is to the mind like early rains to certain reptiles hibernating in earthly burrows, or to certain amphibious animals confined to small collections of water. Now, the causal law which expresses the relation between two terms necessarily takes account of temporal relations of (iii.) coexistence (*sahajātā*) and succession.

Coexistent causes are always indispensably present (*atthi* and *avigata*). But (iv. and v.) some of them may have occurred earlier or later than their effects, with which they partly overlap (*pūrejāta* and *pacchājāta*).

In succession, causes need not always be earlier than their

effects. But expired mental states and (vi.) asynchronous karmas which wholly precede their effects are always past. Further (vii.), expired mental states are contiguous in time to their successors (*anantarapaccaya*).

But in Part VIII. of the *Compendium* a different classification of relations into six groups was adopted, according to the two terms of a relation, in the stanza beginning with the line: "Mind may to mind sixfold relation bear."¹

¹ *Compendium*, p. 192. In this summary the writer reduces the twenty-four relations to seven principal relations, instead of the classical four (*Compendium*, Section 12, p. 197). But in either case sufficing condition indicates the nature of a cause, and object is but a species of this cause. The rest are intended to show the temporal relations of coexistence, or simultaneity, and sequence, or succession. Cf. Russell generally on "The Notion of Cause" in *Lowell Lectures*, 1914.—TR.

III

AGGĀRĀMAYA,
AMBALANGODA,
July 9, 1914.

To the EDITOR JPTS.

SOTTHI BHAVATU,

Nāmarūpaparicchedassa Maramma-nissayo (athavā atthavaṇṇanā) mayā ito katipayadivasānam upari laddhā. Sā pi sabbaso na parisuddhā; tathāpi amhākaṇ potthake yāni asuddhapāṭhāni, tāni samoloketvā likhitvā iminā saha pesemi. Yadi sakkā suddhipattaṇ yojetuṇ, tathā karotu. Atha ca pana muddita-potthakena saṅsandetvā imaṇ paṇṇaṇ oloketabbaṇ . . .

tumhākaṇ viśāsiko,

A. P. BUDDHADATTA.

ERRATA IN NĀMARŪPAPARICCHEDA, JPTS 1913-14.

gāthā. pada.

- 41 . 2 for catudhammā read cha tu dhammā.
68 . 2 for sampattā read samattā.
68 . 4 read vohārābhoga-bheditā.
88 . 1 read asammosā sabbāvesu.
95 . 3 read aparipphandana-rasā.
120 . 1 for salakkhaṇaṇ read salakkhaṇe.
120 . 2 for lakkhaṇaṇ read kevalaṇ.
125 . 2 for vanassāsavaraso read vanassāvaraso B.
137 . 1 for °baddhāni read °bandhena B.
177 . 1 for °ucca° read °uddhacca°.
240 . 1 for nimitta° read nimittaṇ.
246 . 2 for °vatthukā read °vatthunā.
278 . 3 read sāsavā 'vajjapākāni.
299 . 3 for pañcadvāre read pañcavāre.

gāthā. pada.

- 333 . 2 for karādito read garādito.
 409 . 3 for bhāvanāphala° read bhāvanābala°.
 429 . 2 for kammajāti read kammajāni.
 432 . 2 for °no bhavā read °ko bhavo.
 479 . 1 for satthā yaṅ read yatthāyaṅ.
 543 . 4 for sadā read yadā.
 551 . 2 for purakkhattena read pūrakattena.
 581 . 1 for kamma° read kammaṅ.
 627 . 1 for parāmāsā read parāmatthā.
 628 . 2 for ca vipassiyā read cāvipassiyā.
 657 . 4 for kārakā read khādakā.
 658 . 1 for anattā c'ahitā read anattāhāvahitā.
 661 . 1 for citt'edaṅ read cintentaṅ.
 671 . 2 for °ka-pasādato read °kam asārato.
 700 . 3 for dhammāṅ read dhammesu.
 701 . 4 for durammukhā read rudammukhā.
 754 . 1 for vuttā yā read vuttāyaṅ.
 758 . 2 for °nupassitā read °nusayitā.
 768 . 1 for bhavopapatti° read sā vopapatti°.
 808 . 1 for javā-paṅṇa° read javā paṅṇa°.
 820 . 4 for nāmarūpānam read nāmaṅ rūpānam.
 859 . 4 read atthacchāyāvabhāsini.
 866 . 4 read rājaputto 'tujādikko.
 867 . 3 for 'vattā° read 'vatthā°.
 873 . 4 for jānaṅ read cetasaṅ.
 878 . 3 for ullopa° read ullāpa°.
 909 . 1 for dvāra° read dāru°.
 929 . 1 for ajjhittā read āvitthā.
 935 . 1 for jumbhanti read jumbhantā.
 992 . 2 for paraṅ read padaṅ.
 1107 . 3 for mariyādāya read mariyādo 'yam.
 1145 . 4 read sobhetti jinasāsaṅ (?).
 1155 . 4 read avaṅṅamala-vajjanaṅ.
 1220 . 1 for accantarāya° read bhāvantarāya (?).
 1283-1284 insert between these numbers :

1283a appaṅṅa' opacārena, tam evātha samādahaṅ,
 yogi samādahaṅ cittaṅ, sikkhatiti pavuccati.

gāthā. pada.

- 1313 . 2 for mando read anto.
 1325 . 2 for vipanna° read vipphanda°.
 1351 . 1 for vimosāya read vihesāya.
 1376 . 1 for sampanna° read pasanna°.
 1468 . 3 read kasiṇāpagamākāsaṇ.
 1485 . 1 read bahubhāvād'adhiṭṭhānaṇ.
 1502 . 1 for cetoparaṇ lakkhanaṇ read cetomalakkhālaṇaṇ.
 1565 . 3 for panā' hetu read alābhe tu.
 1587 . 2 for appavattānam read asamatthānam.
 1592 . 1 read janakappaccayānaṇ hi.
 1674 . 3 for tathābhāve read vātābhāve.
 1682 . 2 for kummagga° read kummaggā.
 1724 . 4 read dukkhāyūhana-tappaṇaṇ.
 1734 . 3 for cārakā read cāraka.
 1792 . 2 for karissati read kariyati.
 1812 . 1 for saddhāya read saddhā ca.
 1817 . 3 for saddhānubhāvāya read saddhānugā tassa.
 1845 . 3 for guṇe ṭhitattā read guṇoditattā.
 1848 . 1 for °paramatthā read °padatthā.

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