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ART. I.—*Schools of Buddhist Belief.* By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

I HAVE received several interesting communications on my article, published in our Journal for last July, on the Sects of the Buddhists. The Rev. J. E. Carpenter has given me additional figures in Yuan Tshang which had escaped my notice. These numbers bring up the totals given by the Chinese author of the adherents of the different schools, as summarized on p. 420, to 200,000 instead of 182,000. But they leave the conclusion, which was drawn from those numbers, as it stood.

Professor Bühler writes, that besides the references given on p. 410 to inscriptions mentioning one or other of the schools, there are a few other references known to him in inscriptions as yet unpublished. On a consequent application from me he has been kind enough to send a second letter in which the details are given, and it is here printed in full.

Mr. Bouverie-Pusey, who takes much interest in the question, has pointed out to me a possible explanation of Yuan Tshang's mistake in assigning the Sthavira school to the Mahāyanists. When his informants, as stated in the 'Vie de Hiouen Tshang,' p. 192, were questioned by him, they may have been willing to leave on his mind the impression that they belonged to the same school as he himself did.

Mr. Bouverie-Pusey also suggests that use might be made of Wassilief's translation of the Tibetan version of the tract assigned to Vasumitra—more especially as he has translated it in full with copious notes. I have accordingly read it through again to see what could be made out of

it, and am obliged to say that I still think Rockhill's summary of the Tibetan notices of the Buddhist schools is the more intelligible of the two. But the fact is that short tracts like those attributed to Vasumitra and Bhavya and Vinīta Deva are really of very little use without a larger knowledge which would supersede them except as guides to the memory. Even the Kathā Vatthu, which is some centuries older, and nearer, therefore, to the time when these discussions raged: which is also most probably written either in the very language, or at least in a dialect closely allied to the dialects, in which they were conducted; and which besides, being more than twenty times as long, is able to devote more space to making the questions at issue clear,—is hard enough to understand. It is easy therefore to realize why it is that these translations of translations of earlier and shorter treatises should be so much more difficult to use to any profit. What we want is not short summaries of the opinions of all the various schools, but substantial works expounding the views of individual schools at length, and in their own words. When the magnificent edition of the standard book of the Lokuttara-vādins, which we owe to the self-denying scholarship and industry of M. Senart, shall be completed, all these works, the Kathā Vatthu itself not excepted, will be superseded on that point. We shall go to the Mahāvastu to find out what the Lokuttara-vādins thought.

And so let us hope that before the Pāli Text Society shall have been able to complete its important task of placing in the hands of scholars a complete edition of the Buddhist Piṭakas, together with the interpretation put upon them by the oldest and sole surviving school (which has also kept most closely to them)—by that time let us hope we shall be able to compare with that interpretation the divergent ones of other now extinct Hīnāyana schools in equally complete editions of their works too.

As I mentioned on p. 413 of the former article, the Mahāvastu is the only work we have available in a critical edition that purports to belong to any special school. It

is true that a much discussed passage¹ of a Chinese author (whose name is restored by Bunyiu Nanjio² to Jñāna-gupta, and by Beal³ to Jnāna-kuta *sic*), the Lalita Vistara is apparently stated to be a book of the Sabbatthivādins. But that book calls itself (see the last page of the Calcutta edition) a Mahāyāna work! How is this to be reconciled? The passage referred to occurs in the colophon to the *Fo-pan-hin-tsi-chin*, of which work Beal's book, strangely entitled "The Romantic Legend of Sakya Buddha," is a kind of abstract. The Chinese title is restored by Mr. Bunyiu Nanjio (*loc. cit.*) to Buddha-pūrvacaryā-saṅgraha-sūtra, and he adds below Abhinishkramaṇa-sūtra, which is the only restoration used by Beal. The colophon says in Beal's version, "It may be asked: 'By what title is this book to be called?' to which we reply the Mahāsaṅghikas call it *Ta-ssē* (Mahāvastu). The Sarvastavadas (*sic*) call it *Ta-chong-yen* (Lalita Vistara). The Kasyāpiyas (*sic*) call it *Fo-wong-yin-un* (former history of Buddhism). The Dharmaguptas call it, etc., etc." And Wassilief's translation (*loc. cit.*) is practically the same.

From this Wassilief draws the conclusion that "under different names they understood the same book." If that be so, it is certainly not the Lalita Vistara, for the analysis given by Beal is quite different from that work. But Foucaux draws the conclusion that the passage refers to different books, and regards it as a proof that they all existed towards the second century after the death of the Buddha (!).

Now the Chinese title which Wassilief (and following him also Beal) restores here to Lalita Vistara is entirely different from the Chinese titles so restored by Bunyiu Nanjio in his Catalogues Nos. 159 and 160. It is therefore, to say the least, most doubtful whether it is the Lalita Vistara at all

¹ See Foucaux, "Lalita Vistara" (the Guimet edition), pp. vii, viii. Wassilief, "Buddhismus," p. 123. Beal, "Legend of Sakya Buddha," p. v; and Senart, "Mahāvastu," vol. i. p. iii. M. Senart refers to "des autorités chinoises." but the two passages he gives in the note refer to the same authority.

² Catalogue of Chinese Books, No. 680.

³ *loc. cit.* p. 1.

which is here referred to. Even if it were, it would be entirely unwarranted to conclude that because a Chinese writer of 587 A.D. thought it belonged to the Sabbatthivādins that it did certainly so belong; much less than because it did, it must have been written, as M. Foucaux thinks this passage proves, at the time when that school first arose (that is to say, in the second century after the Buddha's death). Surely it is better to leave so uncertain, and so late, a statement in its own obscurity, and to trust rather to the published text of the *Lalita Vistara* itself, and regard it therefore as a *Mahāyāna* book.

We cannot, therefore, refer to any work emanating from any school differing from the *Sthaviras*, save only to the one book of the *Lokuttara-vādins*. Meanwhile—until we have such works—the three Tibetan tracts and the Pāli treatise are of use for showing us the kind of thing we ought to look for. I have spent some days in trying to piece together the various statements the Tibetans make as to the *Sabbatthi-vādins*, hoping that this would serve as a specimen of what might be reaped from them in the way of positive information. But the results are too unsatisfactory—contradictory, as it seems to me, on some points and simply unintelligible, even with the help of the *Kathā Vatthu*, on others—to be fit for publication.

But I have put together a table of their statements as to the names and interdependence of the *Hīnayāna* schools, without attempting to harmonize their divergent and contradictory data. I have simply added in brackets the number of each corresponding name in the *Theravāda* list given in my last article.

As the matter seems to be of interest, I have added also a complete synopsis of the questions discussed in the *Kathā Vatthu*. This I had prepared for my own use only, as an assistance in writing the introduction to the second volume of my *Milinda* (in which some of the questions are discussed), and had not intended it for publication, except eventually as part of an edition of the whole text. It is drawn up from a MS. in my own collection, a very faulty

one, I am sorry to say. One or two points may already be noticed. Those questions dealt with in chapters one and two are discussed at so much length that the two chapters make up about one-third of the book. Incidentally to the principal theses a number of other questions, subsidiary to the main issue, are put and settled. Including these, the number of questions put in the *Kathā Vatthu* is about a thousand. In one or two cases (II. 2 and XXII. 5) these questions are mentioned in the titles of the main thesis, and are included therefore in my synopsis. For the interpretation of the real meaning of the question put, which is often by no means certain from the words employed, much help has been derived from the commentary, as published by the late Prof. Minayeff for the Pāli Text Society.

TABLE I.

THE HĪNA-YĀNA SECTS ACCORDING TO TIBETAN TRANSLATIONS.

Vasumitra.

1. Thera-vādino (Hemavattikā) (1 and 19).
2. Hetu-vādino (32).
3. Sabbatthi-vādino (8).
 4. Vajjiputtakā (2).
 5. Dhammuttarikā (4).
 6. Bhaddayānikā (5).
 7. Sammittiyā (7).
 8. Channāgarikā (6).
 9. Mahiṅsāsakā (3).
 10. Dhammaguttikā (9).
 11. Kassapikā (Sovassikā) (10).
 12. Saṅkantikā (Suttantavādino) (11 and 12).
13. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
 14. Ekavyohārikā (15).
 15. Lokottaravādino,
 16. Kukkutikā (14).
 17. Bahussutikā (16).

18. Paññatti-vādino (17).
19. Cetiya-vādino (18).
20. Pubbaselikā (Uttaraselikā) (22).
21. Aparaselikā (23).

Bhavya.

1. Hemavatikā=Therā (1 and 19).
2. Sabbatthivādino (8).
3. Vibhajja-vādino (29).
4. Hetu-vādino (27).
5. Muruntakā.
6. Vajjiputtakā (2).
7. Dhammuttarikā (4).
8. Bhaddayānikā (5).
9. Sammittiyā (7).
10. Avantikā.
11. Kurukulakā (Gokulikā) (14).
12. Makipāsākā (3).
13. Dhammaguttikā (9).
14. Suvassikā.
15. Kassapikā (10).
16. Uttariyā.
17. Saṅkāntikā (11).

-
18. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
 19. Ekavohārikā (15).
 20. Lokuttara-vādino.
 21. Bahussutikā (16).
 22. Paññatti-vādino (17).
 23. Cetiya-vādino (18).
 24. Pubbaselikā (22).
 25. Aparaselikā (23).

Bhavya's 'others say.'

1. Therā (1).
2. Sabbatthi-vādino (8).
4. Mūla-sabb°.
5. Suttantikā (11).

3. Vajjiputtakā (2).
 6. Dhammottariyā (4).
 7. Bhaddāyaniyā (5).
 8. Sammitiyā (7).
 9. Chan-nāgarikā (6).
10. Vibhajja-vadino (29).
 11. Mahiṅsāsakā (3).
 12. Kassapiyā (10).
 13. Dhammaguttikā (9).
 14. Tāmraṣāṭiyā.
15. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
 16. Pubba-selikā (22).
 17. Uttara-selikā (23).
 18. Rājagiriya (20 and 24).
 19. Hemavatā (19).
 20. Cetiya-vādino (18).
 21. Saṅkānti-vadino (?).
 22. Gokulikā (14).

Bhavya's 'again others say.'

1. Therā = Hemavatā (1).
2. Sabbatthi-vādino.
3. Vajjiputtakā (2).
 4. Sammitiyā (7).
 5. Dhammuttariyā (4) } = Mahāgiriya.
 6. Bhaddayāniyā (5) }
 7. Channāgarikā (6).
8. Vibhajja vādino.
 9. Mahiṅsāsaka (3).
 10. Dhammaguttikā (9).
 11. Tāmraṣāṭiyā.
 12. Kassapiyā (10).
13. Mahāsaṅghikā (13).
 14. Ekavyohārikā (15).
 15. Gokulikā (14).
 17. Bahussutikā (17).
 16. Paññatti-vadino (16).
 18. Cetiya-vādino (18).

The questions put.

- 1 = I. 1. Puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthena parama-
tthenāti ?
- 2 2. Parihāyati Arahā arabattā ti ?
- 3 3. Natthi devesu brahmacariyavāso ti ?
- 4 4. Odhiso kilesaṇ jahatīti ?
- 5 5. Jahati puthujjano kāmarāga-vyāpādan ti ?
- 6 6. Sabbam atthīti ?
- 7 7. Atītaṇ khandhā ti ?
- 8 8. Atītaṇ atthīti ?
- 9 9. Sabbe dhammā satipaṭṭhānā ti ?
- 10 10. Atītaṇ atthīti ?
- 11 = II. 1. Atthi Arahato asuci-sukka-visaṭṭhīti ?
- 12 (Atthi Arahato parūpahāro ti ?)¹
- 13 2. Atthi Arahato aññāṇan ti ?
- 14 Atthi Arahato kaṅkhā ti ?
- 15 Atthi Arahato parivīṭaraṇā ti ?
- 16 3. Samāpannassa atthi vacībhedo ti ?

¹ This question comes at the end of the other, and is included in it, but it has apparently nothing to do with the argument. The whole section is called (not after the principal subject, but after this subsidiary point) the Parūpahāra-kathā.

Kathā Vatthu.

- I. 1. Is there in the truest and highest sense a soul?
No.
Opponents Sammitiyā, Vajjiputtakā (Mil. I. 40-45, 48, 86, II. 85).
2. Can an Arahāt fall from Arahātship? No.
Contra Sammitiyā, Vajjiputtakā, Sabbatthi-vādino and some of the Mahāsaṅghikā.
3. Can a god enter the Path or the Order? No.
Contra Sammitiyā.
4. Can a converted man get rid of evil without going through the four stages of the Path? (Relying on Dh. 289.)
Contra Sammitiyā and others.
5. Can an unconverted man get rid of all lust and ill will? No.
Contra Sammitiyā.
6. Does everything exist? No. (There is nothing that is not transient. Everything becomes.)
Contra Sabbatthi-vādino (hence their name).
7. Did the Skandhas exist in the past? No.
8. Did anything (as it now is) exist in the past? No.
Contra 'some did and some did not' say the Kassapikā.
9. Do all qualities rest on memory? No.
Contra the four subdivisions of the Andhakā (Compare Mil. I. 122).
10. Have all things now existing existed the same in the past? No.
Contra the Andhakā.
- II. 1. Can an Arahāt be guilty (unwittingly and through the action of the Māras) of indecency? No.
Contra the Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā (Comp. XXIII. 2).
2. Can the Arahats have ignorance, doubt and error? No (relying on M. V. I. 1, etc.).
Contra the Pubbaseliyā (Mil. II. 98).
3. Does a converted man on attaining the first Jhāna burst out into the exclamation "All is sorrow"? No (relying on S. VI. 2-4 = Th. I. 256-7 = Divy. 300, 569 = Mil. II. 60).
Contra the Pubbaseliyā (See XI. 4).

10

QUESTIONS DISCUSSED IN THE

17

4. Dukkāhāro maggaṅgaṃ magga-pariyāpanno
ti ?

18

5. Ekaṃ cittaṃ divasaṃ tiṭṭhatī ?

19

6. Sabbe saṅkhārā anodhikatvā kukkulā ti ?

20

7. Anupubbābhisamayo ti ?

21

8. Buddhassa bhagavato vohāro lokuttaro ti ?

22

9. Dve nirodhā ti ?

23 = III.

1. Tathāgata-balaṃ sāvaka-sādhāraṇaṃ ti ?

24

2. Tānāthāne yathābhūtaṃ nāṇaṃ Tathāgata-
balaṃ ariyaṃ ti.

25

3. Sarāgaṃ cittaṃ vimuccatī ?

26

4. Vimuttaṃ vimuccamānaṃ ti ?

27

5. Aṭṭhamakassa puggalassa diṭṭhi-pariyuṭṭhānaṃ
pahīnaṃ ti ?

28

6. Aṭṭhamakassa puggalassa natthi saddhindri-
yaṃ ti ?

29

7. Maṅsa-cakkhuṃ dhammupatthaddhaṃ dibba-
cakkhuṃ hotīti ?

30

8. Maṅsa-sotaṃ dhammupatthaddhaṃ dibba-sotaṃ
hotīti ?

31

9. Yathākammūpagaṃ nāṇaṃ dibba-cakkhuṃ ti ?

32

10. Atthi devesu saṃvaro ti ?



4. Is the perception of sorrow that follows on such an exclamation part and parcel of the Excellent Way? No.
Contra Pubbaseliya.
 5. Can one thought last a day (That is, is thought exempt from the law of impermanence)? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 6. Are the Confections all as ashes? No (relying on Mahāvagga I. 21).
Contra Gokulikā.
 7. Is insight attained to in a certain specified order? No (relying on Cullav. IX. 1-4).
 8. Was the Buddha extra-ordinary as regards the ordinary affairs of Life? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 9. Are there two sorts of Nirvāna? No.
Contra Mahiṣāsakā and Andhakā.
- III.
1. Are the ten powers of the Tathāgata common also to his hearers? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 2. Are the nine last of them (as well as the first) part of the Excellent Way? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 3. Can one whose heart is lustful be set free? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 4. Can a man set free by Jhāna be afterwards set free by the Path? No (relying on D. 2. 97).
 5. Does a man get rid, by the mere entry on the Path, of doubt and wrong views? No.
Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā.
 6. Is a converted man at once in possession of the five moral organs (Indriyāni)? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 7. Can the eye of flesh, through strength of Dhamma, become the Heavenly Eye (which perceives the rebirths of others)? No.
Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā (Mil. I. 179-185).
 8. The same of the ear of flesh.
 9. Is the Divine Eye nothing more than the knowledge of other people's rebirths? No. (It sees the moral cause) (relying on Th. I. 996, 7).
 10. Is there moral restraint among the gods (in the heavens above that of the thirty-three)? No.



- 33 11. Asañña-sattesu saññā atthīti ?
- 34 12. Nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatane na vattabban saññā
atthīti ?
- 35 = IV. 1. Gihi 'ssa Arahā ti ?
- 36 2. Sahā uppattiyā Arahā ti ?
- 37 3. Arahato sabbe dhammā anāsavā ti ?
- 38 4. Arahā catuhi phalehi samannāgato ti ?
- 39 5. Arahā chahi upekhāhi samannāgato ti ?
- 40 6. Bodhiyā buddho ti ?
- 41 7. Lakkhaṇa-sammannāgato Bodhisatto ti ?
- 42 8. Bodhisatto Kassapassa bhagavato pāvane
okkanta-niyāmo carita-brahmacariyo ti ?
- 43 9. Arahanta-sacchikiriyāya patipanno puggalo
tihi phalehi samannāgato ti ?
- 44 10. Sabba-saññojana-pahānaṃ Arahattan ti ?

11. Have the so-called Unconscious Gods consciousness? No.
Contra Andhakā.
12. The same of the gods in the Nevasaññā-nāsaññā world.
- IV. 1. Can a layman be an Arahāt? No. (He can become, but cannot remain, one.)
Contra Uttarāpathakā (see Mil. 2. 57-59, 96-98).
2. Is there any one who is born as an Arahāt (in the Heavens of Pure Abode)? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
3. Are all the qualities of an Arahāt free from the Āsavas? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
4. Is the Arahāt gifted with the fruits of all four stages of the Path at once? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā (see IV. 9).
5. Has the Arahāt six forms of equanimity (one for each of the five senses and one for the mind)? No, it is the same for all.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.¹
6. Does Bodhi (wisdom, insight) lead to Buddhahood? Not necessarily. There is a kind of Bodhi which leads to Arahātship.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
7. Is every one endowed with the 32 marks a Bodisat? No (quoting D. 30).
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
8. Did the Bodisat (that is, Jotipāla, M. 81) adopt the method and conduct necessary for Buddhahood at the command of Kassapa the Buddha? No (quoting Mahāvagga, I. 6. 7, 8, and I. 6. 23-26).
Contra Andhakā.
9. Does the realization of Arahātship include the fruits of the three lower stages of the Path? No.
Contra Andhakā (compare IV. 4).
10. Is the breaking of all the Fetters at once the same thing as Arahātship? No (they must be broken gradually).
Contra Andhakā.

¹ That this is their view follows from the opening words of the Commentary on IV. 7.

- 45 = V. 1. Vimutti-ñāṇaṃ vimuttan ti ?
- 46 2. Sekhassa asekha-ñāṇaṃ atthīti ?
- 47 3. Pathavi-kasiṇa-samāpatti-samāpannassa vipa-
rīte ñāṇan ti ?
- 48 4. Aniyatassa niyāma-gamanāya atthi ñāṇan ti ?
- 49 5. Sabbhaṃ ñāṇaṃ patisambhidā ti ?
- 50 6. Na vattabhaṃ sammuti-ñāṇaṃ saccārammaṇaṃ
yeva na aññārammaṇan ti ?
- 51 7. Ceto-pariyāye ñāṇaṃ attārammaṇena annāram-
maṇan ti ?
- 52 8. Anāgate ñāṇaṃ atthīti ?
- 53 9. Paccuppanne ñāṇaṃ atthīti ?
- 54 10. Sāvakassa phale ñāṇaṃ atthīti ?
- 55 = VI. 1. Niyāmo asaṅkhato ti ?
- 56 2. Paticca-samuppādo asaṅkhato ti ?
- 57 3. Cattāri saccāni asaṅkhatanīti ?
- 58 4. Ākāsañcāyatanāṃ asaṅkhatan ti ?
- 59 5. Nirodha-samāpatti asaṅkhatā ti ?

- V. 1. Is a man who has the knowledge of emancipation an Arahat? No (there are emancipations the knowledge of which has not that result).
Contra Andhakā.
2. Can an Asekha (one who is not yet an Arahat) have the knowledge of an Arahat? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
3. Can he who has successfully accomplished the Meditation on the Earth be said to have a false view? No.
Contra Andhakā.
4. Is an unconverted man, when good, capable of entering the career of a Bodisat? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
5. Is every kind of knowledge (*ñāṇa*) the same as analysis (*Paṭisambhidā*)? No.
Contra Andhakā.
6. Are there two kinds of truth (*sacca*) or only one? Two.
Contra Andhakā.
7. Is the knowledge of other people's thoughts to be attained by meditation? No.
Contra Andhakā.
8. Is there such a thing as knowledge of the future? Of the immediate future yes, but not otherwise (quoting M.P.S. I. 28 = Mahāv. V. 28).
Contra Andhakā.
9. Is there such a thing as knowledge of the present? No (the moment anything is known it is already past).
Contra Andhakā.
10. Have disciples as well as Buddha the power of knowing who will be converted? No.
Contra Andhakā.
- VI. 1. Is the Noble Path self-existent? No.
Contra Andhaka (relying on A. 3. 22).
2. Is the Chain of Causation self-existent? No.
Contra Pubbaseliya and Mahiṅsāsakā (relying on S. XII. 20).
3. Are the Four Truths self-existent? No.
4. Is the Realm of the Infinity of space self-existent? No.
5. Is the Attainment of Cessation self-existent? No.
Contra Andhakā and Uttarāpathakā.

- 60 6. Ākāso asañkhato ti ?
- 61 7. Ākāso sanidassano ti ?
- 62 8. Paṭhavi-dhātu sanidassano ti ?
- 63 = VII. 1. Natthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi saṅga-
hītā ti ?
- 64 2. Natthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi sampa-
yuttā ti ?
- 65 3. Natthi cetasiko dhammo ti ?
- 66 4. Cetasiko dhammo dānan ti ?
- 67 5. Paribhogamayaṅ puññaṅ saṅvaḍḍhatīti ?
- 68 6. Ito dinnena tattha yāpentīti ?
- 69 7. Paṭhavi kamma-vipāko ti ?
- 70 8. Jarāmaṇo vipāko ti ?
- 71 9. Natthi ariya-dhamma-vipāko ti ?
- 72 10. Vipāko vipākadhamma-dhammo ti ?
- 73 = VIII. 1. Cha gatiyo ti ?
- 74 2. Atthi antarā-bhavo ti ?

6. Is space self-existent? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā and Mahīnsāsakā
(compare Mil. 2. 103, foll.).
7. Is space visible? No.
Contra Andhakā.
8. Is the Earth-element visible? No.
Contra Andhakā.
- VII. 1. Are there not some qualities included in other
qualities? Yes.
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.
2. Are there not some qualities united with other
qualities? Yes.
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.
3. Are there not mental qualities? Yes (quoting
D. X.).
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.
4. Is it only mental giving (charity) that is a
real gift? No.
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthikā.
5. Does the merit which arises out of the en-
joyment of a gift by the donors tend to
increase? Yes (relying on S. I. 7. 5 and
A. IV. 51).
Contra Rājagirikā, Siddhatthika and Sam-
mitiyā.
6. Do the dead benefit by gifts given in the
world? No.
Contra Rājagirika and Siddhatthikā.
7. Is the Earth a result of Karma? No.
Contra Andhakā.
8. Are old age and death results of Karma? No.
Contra Andhakā.
9. Is there no result of the Excellent Way save
the putting away of evil? Yes (there is
the acquisition of moral qualities, positive
good as well as negative).
Contra Andhakā.
10. Does one result of Karma produce another?
No.
Contra Andhakā.
- VIII. 1. Are there six future states? No, only five.
Contra Andhakā and Uttarāpathakā.
2. Is there an Intermediate Realm (where beings
await rebirth)? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Sammitiyā.

18

QUESTIONS DISCUSSED IN THE

75

3. Pañc' eva kāma-guṇā kāma-dhatū ti ?

76

4. Pañc' ev' āyatanā kāmā ti ?

77

5. Rūpino dhammā rūpa-dhātū ti ?

78

6. Arūpino dhammā arūpa-dhātū ti ?

79

7. Saḷāyatanako attabhāvo rūpa-dhātuyā ti ?

80

8. Atthi rūpaṅ arūpesūti ?

81

9. Kusalena cittena samuṭṭhitāṅ kāya-kammaṅ
rūpaṅ kasalan ti ?

82

10. Natthi rūpa-jīvitindriyan ti ?

83

11. Kammahetu Arahā arahattā parihāyatīti ?

84 = IX.

1. Ānisaṅsa-dassāvissa saññojanaṅ pahānan ti ?

85

2. Amatārammaṅ saññojanan ti ?

86

3. Rūpaṅ sārammaṅan ti ?

87

4. Anusayā anārammaṅā ti ?

88

5. Ñāṅaṅ anārammaṅan ti ?

89

6. Atitārammaṅaṅ cittaṅ anārammaṅan ti ?

3. Are the five constituents of lust also elements of lust? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
 4. Have lusts five realms? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
 5. Are those qualities which have form also elements of form? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 6. The same of qualities which have no form.
 7. Is every being with the six senses dependent on the element of form? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 8. Have the beings in the Formless Worlds a form? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 9. Is a bodily act due to a virtuous thought necessarily beautiful in form? No.
Contra Mahiṅsāsaka and Sammitiyā.
 10. Is there vitality in form? Yes.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Sammitiyā (see Mil. 1. 89).
 11. Will an Arahat fall from Arahatship through the result of an evil deed, such as abuse of an Arahat, committed in a previous birth? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Sammitiyā (compare I. 2 and Mil. 2. 20-22).
- IX. 1. Can a man, by insight into the advantages of Arahatship, but without insight into the dangers attendant on the Saṅkhāras, put away the Fetters? No.
Contra Andhakā.
2. Is the meditation on the ambrosia (of Arahatship) a Fetter? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
 3. Has form a basis? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
 4. Are the seven evil inclinations (*anisaya*) without basis? No.
Contra Andhakā and some Uttarāpathakā (see XI. 1).
 5. Has knowledge no basis? It has.
Contra Andhakā.
 6. Is a thought which has its basis in past events therefore without a basis? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.

- 90 7. Sabbaj cittaṃ vitakkānupatitan ti ?
- 91 8. Sabbaso vitakkayato vicarayato vitakka-vip-phāro saddo ti ?
- 92 9. Na yathā vitakkassa vācā ti ?
- 93 10. Na yathā vitakkassa kāyakamman ti ?
- 94 11. Atītena samannāgato ti ?
- 95 = X. 1. Uppatte siye pañcakkhandhe aniruddhe kiriya-pañcakkhandho uppajjati ?
- 96 2. Magga-samaggissa rūpaṃ maggo ti ?
- 97 3. Pañca - viññāṇa - samaggissa atthi magga-bhāvanā ti ?
- 98 4. Pañca viññāṇā kusalā pi akusalā pīti ?
- 99 5. Pañca viññāṇā sābhogā ti ?
- 100 6. Magga-samaggī dvīhi sīlehi samannāgato ti ?
- 101 7. Silaṃ acetasikaṃ ti ?
- 102 8. Silaṃ na cittānuparivattati ?
- 103 9. Samādāna-hetu silaṃ vaḍḍhatīti ?
- 104 10. Viññatti silaṃ ti ?
- 105 11. Aviññatti dussīlyan ti ?
- 106 = XI. 1. Anusayā avyākataṃ ahetukā citta-vippayuttā ti ?

7. Is every thought followed by reasoning? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
8. Does every reasoning and argument diffuse itself in speech? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
9. Does every speech correspond to a previous thought (train of reasoning)? Yes.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
10. The same of every act.
11. Is a man now in possession of what he once had, or eventually will have? No.
Contra Andhakā.
- X. 1. Can five Skandhas arise when the five already arisen have not ceased? No.
Contra Andhakā.
2. Is the Path the outward form of him who walks therein? No.
Contra Mahiṅsāsakā Sammitiyā and Mahāsaṅghikā.
3. Is there attainment of the Path to him who has the five Viññānas? No (quoting D. 2. 64).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (see XII. 1).
4. Are the five Viññānas both good and bad? No.
5. Are they accompanied by reflection? No.
6. Has he who has the Path two different moralities? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (relying on ' Virtues the base,' etc.; Mil. 1. 53).
7. Is morality independent of thought? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
8. Is not morality consequent on thought? Yes.
9. Does that morality which is the result of acquirement tend to increase? No (relying on S. I. 5. 7 and A. 4. 47).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
10. Is Intimation (Viññatti) a moral action? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
11. Is not to practise Intimation a wrong action? No (relying on A. 4. 47).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (see Mil. 2. 33-37).
- XI. 1. *a* Are the seven evil inclinations (*Anusayā*) immoral (neither good nor bad)? No.
β or do they arise without a cause? No.
γ or are they independent of thought? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā and Sammitiyā (see IX. 4).



- 107 2. Aññāṇe vigate nāṇa-vippayutte citte vattamāne
na vattabbaṃ nāṇīti ?
- 108 3. Nāṇaṃ citta-vippayuttan ti ?
- 109 4. Idaṃ dukkhan ti vācaṃ bhāsato idaṃ dukkhan
ti nāṇaṃ pavattatīti ?
- 110 5. Iddhi-balena samannāgato kappāṃ tiṭṭheyāti ?
- 111 6. Citta-santati samādhīti ?
- 112 7. Dhamma-ṭṭhitatā parinipphannā ti ?
- 113 8. Aniccataṃ parinipphannā ti ?
- 114=XII. 1. Kāyindriya-saṅvaro kamman ti ?
- 115 2. Sabbaṃ kammaṃ savipākaṃ ti ?
- 116 3. Saddo vipāko ti ?
- 117 4. Saḷāyatanāni vipākā ti ?
- 118 5. Sattakkhattuparamo puggalo sattakkhattupara-
matā niyato hotīti ?
- 119 6. Na vattabbaṃ kolo puggalo kolaṅkolatā ni-
yato ti ?
Na vattabbaṃ bijī puggalo ekabijatā niyato ti ?
- 120 7. Diṭṭhi-sampanno puggalo sañcicca pāṇā jīvītā
voropeyyāti ?

2. Is he whose ignorance has been dispelled by the knowledge of the Path not to be called wise? Yes.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 3. Is knowledge independent of thought? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 4. Does the knowledge that 'all is sorrow' follow on an exclamation to that effect? No.
Contra Andhakā (see II. 3 and IX. 8).
 5. Can every one who has the power of Iddhi live for a Kalpa? No (relying on M.P.S. III. 54 and A. 4. 182).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 6. Is a continuation of thought Samādhi? No.
Contra Sabbatthivādā and Uttarāpathakā.
 7. Is the persistence of qualities (in S. 12. 20) produced? ¹ No.
Contra Andhakā.
 8. Is the transitoriness of all things something that is, like the things themselves, produced? No.
Contra Andhakā.
- XII.
1. Is restraint of the bodily organs an act of Karma? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā (misunderstanding D. 2. 64).
 2. Has every Karma a result? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 3. Is speech a result (of Karma)? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 4. Are the six organs of sense a result (of Karma)? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 5. Is a converted man restrained (from evil) by the inherent nature of his condition? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
 6. The same of the Kolaṅkolo and the Ekabijī. (These are the stages immediately after conversion. See A. 3. 86. 2.)
 7. Would a person who holds wrong views also commit murder? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.

¹ There is a difference of reading here. The Commentary has *parinippahannā* and *parinippannā*. My MS. of the text has *parinabbānā* (sic) and *parinubbattā*.

- 121 8. Diṭṭhi-sampannessa puggalassa pahīnā duggatīti ?
- 122 9. Na vattabbaṃ sattamakassa puggalassa pahīnā duggatīti ?
- 123 = XIII. 1. Kappaṭṭho kappañ tiṭṭheyyāti ?
- 124 2. Kappaṭṭho kusalaṃ cittaṃ na paṭilabbheyyāti.
- 125 3. Anantarā-payutto puggalo sammatta-niyāmo okkameyyāti ?
- 126 4. Niyato niyāmaṃ¹ okkamati ?
- 127 5. Nivuto nīvaraṇaṃ jahatīti ?
- 128 6. Sammukhībhūto saññoyajanaṃ jahatīti ?
- 129 7. Sampanno assādeti jhāna-nikanti jhānarammanā ti ?
- 130 8. Atthi asāta-rāgo ti ?
- 131 9. Dhamma-taṇhā avyakatā ti ?
- 132 10. Dhamma-taṇhā na dukkha-samudayo ti ?
- 133 = XIV. 1. Akusala-mūlaṃ patisandahati kusala-mūlan ti ?
- 134 2. Saḷāyatanaṃ apubbaṃ acchimaṃ mātu kucchimiy saṅghātīti ?

¹ The Commentary reads *niyama* throughout.

8. Can a man holding wrong views be sure of escape from rebirth in states of woe? No.
Contra Uttarāpathaka.
9. Has not a converted man escaped it?
- XIII. 1. Does a Kappaṭṭho remain for the whole Kalpa in the same condition? No.
Contra Rājagirikā.
2. Can a man in purgatory do good? Yes.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
3. Is it impossible for a man who has once committed a mortal sin to enter the Path? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
4. Can a Niyato enter the Path? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā.¹
5. Can any one when still entangled by the obstacles be rid of them? No (quoting D. 2. 97).
Con. Uttarāpathakā (by a play on the word).
6. Can a man bound by the Fetters be rid of them? No (relying on A. 4. 47, and D. 2. 97).
7. Can a man practising Jhāna be rightly said to enjoy it? and is his desire to attain it the same as making it the object of his thought? No.
Contra Andhakā.
8. Is there such a thing as desire for the distasteful? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā (misunderstanding passages where the Arahāt is said to find a pleasure even in pain).
9. Is craving after qualities not to be condemned as immoral? No, it should be (relying on M. V. I. 6. 20).
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
10. Is craving after qualities not the cause of sorrow? No (quoting M. V. I. 6. 20).
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
- XIV. 1. Does nature transmigrate into vice? No.
Contra Mahasaṅghikā.
2. Has a new being all its six senses at the moment of conception? No (relying on S. X. 1).
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā (see XXII. 6).

¹ This is really a dispute on the meaning of Niyato.

- 135 3. Cakkhu-viññāṇassa anantarā sota-viññāṇan
uppajjati ti ?
- 136 4. Ariya-rūpaṅ mahābhūtānaṅ upādayāti ?
- 137 5. Añño kamarāgānusayo añño kamarāga -
pariyuṭṭhānaṅ ti ?
- 138 6. Pariyuṭṭhānaṅ citta-vippayuttan ti ?
- 139 7. Rūpa-rāgo rūpa-dhātuṅ anuseti rupa-dhātu-
pariyāpanno ti ?
- 140 8. Ditṭhi-gataṅ avyākatan ti ?
- 141 9. Ditṭhi-gataṅ apariyāpannan ti ?
- 142 = XV. 1. Paccayatā vavatthitā ti ?
- 143 2. Avijjā - paccayā saṅkhārā na vattabbaṅ
saṅkhāra-paccayā pi avijjā ti ?
- 144 3. Addhā parinipphanno ti ?
- 145 4. Khano parinipphanno layo parinipphanno
muhuttaṅ parinipphannaṅ ti ?
- 146 5. Cattaro āsavā anāsavā ti ?
- 147 6. Lokuttarānaṅ dhammānaṅ jarā lokuttarā ti ?
- 148 7. Saññā - vedayita - nirodha - samāpatti loku-
ttarā ti ?

3. Does the sensation of sound arise simultaneously with the sensation of sight? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
 4. Is the outward form of an Arahāt caused by the four elements? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
 5. Is inclination to lust a different thing from being under the power of lust? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 6. Is the being possessed (by lust, etc.) something independent of the mind? No.
Contra Andhakā.
 7. Does the desire for future life in the worlds of form follow on, (and is it contained in) the habit of dwelling in thought upon form? No.
Contra Andhakā (see XVI. 10).
 8. Is the wrong view that the world is eternal rightly called *avyākata* (undefined)? No (relying on M. 63).
Contra Andhakā and Uttarāpathakā.
 9. Is he who has attained to Jhāna free from wrong views? No.
- XV. 1. Is the quality of being due to a cause a fixed one? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
2. Is it right to say that though Ignorance is the cause of the Saṅkhāras, the Saṅkhāras are not the cause also of Ignorance? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 3. Is time diffused? No (relying on A. 3. 67). (See Mil. I. 77. 78.) (The question apparently means, is it the same time that is past, present and future?)
 4. Are the moments, minutes, etc. (subdivisions of time) diffused? No.
 5. Are the four Great Evils (*āsava*) free from evil? No.
Contra Hetuvādā (on the ground that there being only four, there are none left over for them to be implicated with).
 6. Are the decay and death of transcendental qualities themselves transcendental? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
 7. Is the attainment of coma an extraordinary affair? No.
Contra Hetuvādā.

- 149 8. Saññā-vedayita-nirodha-samāpatti lokiyā ti ?
- 150 9. Saññā - vedayita - nirodha - samāpanno kālaṅ
kareyyāti ?
- 151 10. Saññā-vedayita-nirodha-samāpatti asanna-
sattūpikā ti ?
- 152 11. Aññaṅ kammaṅ añño kammūpacayo ti ?
- 153 = XVI. 1. Paro parassa cittaṅ niggaṇḥātīti ?
- 154 2. Paro parassa cittaṅ paggaṇḥātīti ?
- 155 3. Paro parassa sukhaṅ anuppadetīti ?
- 156 4. Adhigayha manasi karotīti ?
- 157 5. Rūpaṅ hetūti ?
- 158 6. Rūpaṅ sahetukan ti ?
- 159 7. Rūpaṅ kusalan ti ?
- 160 8. Rūpaṅ vipāko ti ?
- 161 9. Atthi rūpaṅ rūpāvaccaran ti ?
- 162 10. Rūpa-rāgo rūpa-dhātu-pariyāpanno ti ?
- 163 = XVII. 1. Atthi Arahato puññūpacayo ti ?
- 164 2. Natthi Arahato akāla-maccūti ?
- 165 3. Sabbam idaṅ kammato ti ?
- 166 4. Indriya-baddhaṅ yeva dukkhan ti ?
- 167 5. Ṭhapetvā ariya-maggaṅ avasesā saṅkhārā
dukkā ti ?

8. Is the same an ordinary matter? No.
Contra Hetuvādā.
9. Will a person who has attained to it die in the ordinary way? No.
Contra Rājagirikā.
10. Does the attainment of it involve rebirth in the Realm of Unconsciousness? No.
Contra Hetuvādā.
11. Is Karma something different from the accumulation thereof? No.
Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā.
- XVI. 1. Can a man subdue another's mind? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
2. Can a man exert another's mind? No.
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
3. Can a man insure another's bliss? No.
Contra Hetuvādā.
4. Does attention act through comprehension? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā.
5. Is form a cause? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
6. Does form go with its cause? No.
Contra same.
7. Is form good? is it bad? Neither.
Contra Mahāṅgāsakā and Sammitiyā.
8. Is form a result (of Karma)? No.
Contra Andhakā and Sammitiyā.
9. Does form belong to the Realm of Form? No.
Contra Andhakā.
10. Is the desire for life in the Realm of form included in the element of form? No.
Contra Andhakā (see XIV. 7).
- XVII. 1. Does an Arahāt lay up merit? No.
Contra Andhakā.
2. Can an Arahāt die before he has worked out the Karma of his previous actions? Yes.
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthakā.
3. Is Karma itself the result of previous Karma? No.
Contra Rājagirikā and Siddhatthakā.
4. Is all pain connected with the organs of sense? No.
Contra Hetuvādā.
5. Is the Excellent Way to be excepted from the saying, 'All Saṅkhāras involve sorrow'? No.
Contra Hetuvādā.

- 168 6. Na vattabbaṅ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṅ patiggaṅ-
hātīti ?
- 169 7. Na vattabbaṅ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṅ visodhetīti ?
- 170 8. Na vattabbaṅ saṅgho bhūñjati pivati khādati
sāyatīti ?
- 171 9. Na vattabbaṅ saṅghassa dinnāṅ mahap-
phalaṅ ti ?
- 172 10. Na vattabbaṅ Buddhassa dinnāṅ mahap-
phalaṅ ti ?
- 173 11. Dāyako va dānaṅ visujjhati no paṭiggā-
hako ti ?
- 174=XVIII.1. Na vattabbaṅ Buddho bhagavā manussa-
loke atṭhasīti ?
- 175 2. Na vattabbaṅ Buddhena bhagavatā dhammo
desito ti ?
- 176 3. Natthi Buddhassa bhagavato karuṇā ti ?
- 177 4. Buddhassa bhagavato uccāra-passāvo ativiya
aññe gandha-jāte adhigaṇhātīti ?
- 178 5. Ekena ariya-maggena cattāri sāmāññaphalāni
sacchi-karotīti ?
- 179 6. Jhānā jhāna-samaṅgī ti ?
- 180 7. Atthi jhānantarikā ti ?
- 181 8. Samāpanno saddaṅ suṇatīti ?

6. Can it be rightly said that the Saṅgha receives no gift? No (relying on A. 34 and A. 52).

Contra Mahāsuññata-vādā and Vetulyakā.

7. Or that the Saṅgha purifies a gift? Yes.

Contra the same.

8. Or that the Saṅgha has food given? Yes (relying on Mahavagga, VI. 35. 6).

Contra the same.

9. Or that a gift to the Saṅgha is of great avail? Yes (relying on S. XI. 2. 6=Vin. V. 34. 23-27).

Contra the same.

10. Or that a gift to the Buddha is of great avail? Yes.

Contra the same.

11. Is a gift purified by the giver, not the receiver? No (relying on A. 4. 78).

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

XVIII. 1. Was not the Buddha really born in the world of men? Yes.

Contra Vetulyakā (He remained in the Tusita heaven and sent only a phantom of himself to the world!)

2. Did not the Buddha himself preach the Dhamma? Yes.

Contra Vetulyakā (Ānanda preached it!)

3. Had the Buddha no mercy? Yes (comp. Mil. I. 162-170).

Contra Uttarāpathakā.

4. Were the Buddha's excretions of exceeding sweet savour? No.

Contra some Andhakā and the Uttarāpathā.

5. Did the Buddha realize the fruits of all the stages of the Path at once? No.

Contra the same.

6. Does each (of the four) Jhānas arise out of the previous one? No.

Contra Mahiṅsāsakā and some Andhakā.

7. Is there an intermediate Jhāna or a breach in Jhāna (between the first and second)? No.

Contra Sammitiyā and some Andhakā.

8. Can he who has attained to the first Jhāna hear sounds? No.

Contra Pubbaseliyā.

- 182 9. Cakkhunā rūpaṃ passatīti ?
- 183=XIX. 1. Atīte kilese jahatīti ?
- 184 2. Suññatā saṅkhārakkhandha-pariyāpannā ti ?
- 185 3. Sāmañña-phalaṃ asaṅkhatan ti ?
- 186 4. Patti asaṅkhatā ti ?
- 187 5. Sabba-dhamma-tiṭṭhatā asaṅkhatā ti ?
- 188 6. Nibbāna-dhātu kusalā ti ?
- 189 7. Atthi puthujjanassa accanta-niyāmatā ti ?
- 190 8. Natthi lokiyaṃ saddhindriyaṃ ti ?
- 191=XX. 1. Asañcicca māraṃ jīvitaṃ voropitvā ananta
riko hotīti ?
- 192 2. Natthi puthujjanassa nāṇaṃ ti ?
- 193 3. Natthi nirayesu niraya-pālā ti ?
- 194 4. Atthi devesu tiracchāna-gatā ti ?
- 195 5. Pañcaṅgiko maggo ti ?
- 196 6. Dvādasa-vatthukaṃ nāṇaṃ lokuttaraṃ ti ?

9. Does the eye see forms? No (it is the mind that sees them through the eye).
Contra Mahāsaṅghikā.
- XIX. 1. Is there no such thing as the putting away of evil dispositions but only of past evil? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.
2. Is Suññatā (Emptiness) predicable of the Skandhas? If emptiness of soul be meant, yes. If emptiness of the three fires be meant (in which sense Emptiness is an epithet of Nirvāna), no.
Contra the Andhakā.
3. Is the fruit of Samaṇaship unmade? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
4. Is Attainment unmade? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā.
5. Is the state of qualities unmade? No.
Contra Uttarāpathakā.
6. Is Nirvāna virtuous? No.
Contra Andhakā.
7. Is an unconverted man walking in the Path? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.
8. Is there a faith (etc., the question is asked of each of the Moral Organs) which is of the world? Yes.
Contra Hetuvādā and Mahiṅsāsakā.
- XX. 1. Is an involuntary offence a Deadly Sin? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.
2. Has an unconverted man no knowledge? He may have.
Contra Hetuvādā.
3. Are there no warders in Purgatory? There are.
Contra Andhakā.
4. Are there animals in heaven? No (animals go to heaven, but become gods. Whether they like to use animal forms or not makes no difference).
Contra Andhakā.
5. Is the Excellent Way five-fold? No, eight-fold.
Contra Mahiṅsāsakā.
6. Is the twelve-fold knowledge (of the Four Truths—see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 150–152) extraordinary? No.
Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā.

- 197=XXI. 1. Sāsanaja nava-katan ti ?
- 198 2. Puthujano tedhātukehi dhammehi avivitto ti ?
- 199 3. Atthi kiñci saññojanaṇ apahāya Arahattapattiti ?
- 200 4. Atthi adhippāya-iddhi Buddhānaṇ vā sāvakānaṇ vā ti ?
- 201 5. Atthi Buddhānaṇ Buddhēhi hīnātirekatā ti ?
- 202 6. Sabbā disā Buddhā ti ?
- 203 7. Sabbe dhammā niyatā ti ?
- 204 8. Sabbe kammāni niyatūnīti ?
- 205=XXII. 1. Atthi kiñci saññojanaṇ appahāya parinibbānaṇ ti ?
- 206 2. Arahā kusala-citto parinibbāyutīti ?
- 207 3. Arahā ānaḷje ṭhilo parinibbāyatīti ?
- 208 4. Atthi gabbha-seyyāya dhammābhisamayo ti ?
- 209 5. Atthi gabbha-seyyāya Arahattappattiti ?
- 210 Atthi supina-gatassa dhammābhisamayo ti ?
- 211 Atthi supina-gatassa Arahattappattiti ?
- 212 6. Sabbajaṇ supina-gatassa cittaṇ avyākatan ti ?
- 213 7. Natthi kāci āsevena-paccayatā ti ?

- XXI. 1. Was the doctrine altered, or made afresh, at the Councils? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.
2. Cannot the unconverted man separate himself at the same time from the qualities belonging to the three Dhātus? Yes.
Contra the same.
3. Can Arahatsip be attained without breaking the ten Fetters? No.
Contra Mahāsanghikā (see 22. 1).
4. Have the Buddhas or their disciples intentional Iddhi? No.
Contra Andhakā.
5. Do some Buddhas surpass others? No.
Contra Andhakā.
6. Are Buddhas born in all quarters of the Universe? No.
Contra Mahāsanghikā.
7. Are all qualities abiding? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā.
8. Is Karma always certain? No.
Contra the same.
- XXII. 1. When an Arahatsip dies, is there any Fetter he has not broken? No.
Contra Andhakā.
2. Has an Arahatsip at the moment of his death such good thoughts as will produce a result in Karma? No.
Contra Andhakā.
3. Is the Arahatsip at the moment of his death in the fourth stage of the Vimokhas? No.
Contra some Andhakā.
4. Can a child in the womb be converted? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā (compare XIV. 2).
5. *a.* Can a child in the womb become an Arahatsip?
β. Can a man be converted in a dream?
γ. Can a man become an Arahatsip in a dream? No.
Contra the same.
6. Are all the thoughts of a dreamer indifferent (neither good nor bad)? No.
Contra the same.
7. Does habit never become a cause? It does (Mil. I. 90).
Contra the same.

- 214 8. Eka-citta-kkhanikā sabbe dhammā ti ?
- 215=XXIII.1. Ekādhippayo methuno dhammo patisevitabbo ti ?
- 216 2. Arahanta-vanṇena amanussa methunaṃ dhammaṃ patisevantīti ?
- 217 3. Bodhisatto issariya-kāma-karikā-hetu vini-pātaṃ gacchatīti ?
- 218 4. Atthi narāgo raga-patirūpako ti ?
- 219 5. Rūpaṃ aparinipphanna¹ ti ?

¹ See the note above on p. 23.

Note.—Professor Bühler's letter, referred to on page 1, must appear in the next issue.

8. Are all qualities only momentary in thought?
No (relying on M. 1. 190).

Contra Pubbaseliyā and Aparaseliyā (comp. XI. 6).

- XXIII. 1. Is sexual intercourse allowable on the ground that it is right to be of one mind? No.
Contra Andhakā and Vetulyakā.
2. Can beings not human have sexual intercourse under the outward form of Arahats? No.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā (compare II. 1).
3. Can a Bodisat by reason of desire for sovereignty be reborn in realms of woe, or believe in heresy, or practise asceticism, or follow a wrong teacher? No.
Contra Andhakā.
4. Is there such a thing as an absence of lust that is lust, or an absence of ill will that is ill will, or an absence of folly that is folly? No.
Contra Andhakā.
5. Is form not diffused? It is.
Contra some Uttarāpathakā and Hetuvādā (see XI. 7, 8, and XV. 3. 4).
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