Saṃyutta Nikāya
II. Nidāna Vagga
12. Nidāna Saṃyutta
4. Kaḷara-Khattiya Vagga
The Connected Discourses of the Buddha
Part II.
The Book of Causation Nidāna-Vagga
12. Connected Discourses on Causation
4. The Kaḷāra Khathiya
Sutta 35
Paṭhama Avijjā-Paccayā Desanā Suttaṃ
With Ignorance as Condition 1
Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi
Copyright Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (Wisdom Publications, 2000)
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[1][pts][than][wrrn] At Sāvatthī.
"Bhikkhus, with ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness. ...
Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering."
When he had said this, a certain bhikkhu said to the Blessed One:
"Venerable sir, what now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One replied.
[61] "Bhikkhu, whether one says,
'What now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?'
or whether one says,
'Aging-and-death is one thing, the one for whom there is this aging-and-death is another'
— both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing.
If there is the view,
'The soul and the body are the same,'
there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view,
'The soul is one thing, the body is another,'
there is no living of the holy life.
Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle:
'With birth as condition, aging-and-death."
"Venerable sir, what now is birth, and for whom is there this birth?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One replied.
"Bhikkhu, whether one says,
'What now is birth, and for whom is there this birth?'
or whether one says,
'Birth is one thing, the one for whom there is this birth is another'
— both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing. ...
Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle:
'With existence as condition, birth."
"Venerable sir, what now is existence, and for whom is there this existence?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One replied.
"Bhikkhu, whether one says,
'What now is existence, and for whom is there this existence?'
or whether one says,
'Existence is one thing, the one for whom there is this existence is another'
— both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing. ...
Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle:
'With clinging as condition, existence. ...
With craving as condition, clinging. ...
With feeling as condition, craving. ...
With contact as condition, feeling. ...
With the six sense bases as condition, contact. ...
With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases. ...
[62] With consciousness as condition, name-and-form. ...
With volitional formations as condition, consciousness."
"Venerable sir, what now are volitional formations, and for whom are there these volitional formations?"
"Not a valid question," the Blessed One replied.
"Bhikkhu, whether one says,
'What now are volitional formations, and for whom are there these volitional formations?'
or whether one says,
'Volitional formations are one thing, the one for whom there are these volitional formations is another'
— both these assertions are identical in meaning; they differ only in the phrasing.
If there is the view,
'The soul and the body are the same,'
there is no living of the holy life; and if there is the view,
'The soul is one thing, the body is another,'
there is no living of the holy life.
Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma by the middle:
'With ignorance as condition, volitional formations.'
"But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance, whatever kinds of contortions, manoeuvres, and vacillations there may be —
'What now is aging-and-death, and for whom is there this aging-and-death?'
or
'Aging-and-death is one thing, the one for whom there is this aging-and-death is another,'
or
'The soul and the body are the same,'
or
'The soul is one thing, the body is another'
— all these are abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising.
"With the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance, whatever kinds of contortions, manoeuvres, and vacillations there may be —
'What now is birth, and for whom is there this birth?'
... [63] ...
'What now are volitional formations, and for whom are there these volitional formations?'
or
'Volitional formations are one thing, the one for whom there are these volitional formations is another,'
or
'The soul and the body are the same,'
or
'The soul is one thing, the body is another'
— all these are abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, obliterated so that they are no more subject to future arising."
