Majjhima Nikāya
III. Upari Paṇṇāsa
1. Devadaha Vagga
Sutta 101
Devadaha Suttaṃ
The Devadaha Sutta
The Knack of Burning off Old Bad Kamma
Paraphrased for meaning
by
Michael M. Olds
Introduction
This sutta is particularly difficult to understand in the translation of Ms. Horner. One should definitely compare with the Bhikkhus Nanamoli/Body translation, but even there it is a tad on the murky side. I hope this summary helps to make the meaning more apparent. There are, in it, several helpful similes.
This sutta adds to the picture concerning reliance on authority, and to our understanding of how, exactly it is, in this system, that one overcomes or escapes from kamma[1] (see the discussion on escaping kamma at: Subha Sutta ).
This sutta deals with the refutation of a method for the destruction of pain, dukkha, based on the view (proposition) that all dukkha is a consequence of past deeds. This point of view is pointedly not dealt with in this sutta (it is dealt with as a matter of "if this is the case, then; if not, then," see below) other than by way of statements indicating the difficulty of knowing what, exactly, one has done in the past, or even of being able to know that one existed in the past at all. Further, given statements in other suttas that the ultimate beginning of things cannot even be seen by the Buddhas, I think it is not an unreasonable statement to say that one cannot know all of what one may have done in the distant past. The idea is that to base one's strategy to escape kamma on such imperfect information is not a good idea.
The method for the destruction of dukkha that is being refuted is this:
By severe penances,[2] past deeds are annihilated.
By strict moral observance, no new action is begun.
By the annihilation of past deeds and the doing of no new deeds, no consequences are able to occur in the future.
With no consequences able to occur in the future, kamma is destroyed.
With kamma destroyed, dukkha is destroyed.
With dukkha destroyed, sensation is destroyed.
With the destruction of sensation, all future dukkha is ended.
First put out of the way is the idea that one should make or rely on such a claim without being able to see the past or one's past deeds or even that one existed in the past, or, alternatively, without knowing, one's self, how in the present to let go of unskillful states or to acquire skillful states. Then the idea that one can reasonably rely on the claim of another that such things are known by him is dealt with by way of understanding why authority is not to be relied upon and how one may reasonably develop faith (for more on this see: Canki Sutta).
I am just going to paraphrase, and only the first part of this sutta. Our academic translators, rightly restricted to the Pāḷi are placed in the position in this sutta of a construction which is very difficult to follow, and comes off almost backwards ... (for example, the "Thus say the Niganthas ..," etc, seeming to apply to the following paragraphs as opposed to the preceding paragraphs).
[1][chlm][pts][than][upal] I Hear Tell:
Once upon a time The Lucky Man, Sakkya-land, a market town of theirs name-a Devadaha, came a revisiting. There, to the Beggars gathered round he said:
"Beggars! There are some shaman and Brahman who say:
'All of one's sense experiences,
whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant,[3]
are a consequence of past action by the individual.[4]
By burning up and destroying past deeds
and by not doing new deeds,
there is the prevention of kammic consequence in the future.
With no consequences able to occur in the future,
kamma is destroyed.
With kamma destroyed,
dukkha is destroyed.
With dukkha destroyed,
sensation is destroyed.
It is with the destruction of sensation
that dukkha is prevented
from manifestation in the future.'
To those shaman and brahman of such views I say:
'But do you know for a fact
that you existed in the past?
Do you know for a fact
that you did such and such a bad deed in the past?
Do you know for a fact
that you did not do such and such a bad deed in the past?
Do you know now
that such and such amount of your bad kamma
has been burnt off by your practices?
Or that such and such an amount of your bad kamma
remains to be burnt off?
Or that when such and such an amount of bad kamma
has been burnt off,
all your bad kamma
will have been burnt off?
Do you know, here and now,
how to get rid of unskilled states of mind
and acquire skilled states of mind?"
And to all these question the reply is 'No.'
So I say:
It is not proper, that answering 'No' to all these questions one should put forth the absolute statement:
'All of one's sense experiences, whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither unpleasant nor pleasant,
are a consequence of past action by the individual.
By burning up and destroying past deeds and by not doing new deeds,
there is the prevention of kammic consequence in the future.
With no consequences able to occur in the future,
kamma is destroyed.
With kamma destroyed,
dukkha is destroyed.
With dukkha destroyed,
sensation is destroyed.
It is with the destruction of sensation
that dukkha is prevented from manifestation in the future.
In the same way as a man who has been shot by a poisoned arrow,
who has been able to find a doctor,
and that doctor were to cause him pain by his surgery,
removal of the arrow,
treatment for the poison,
and medication of the wound,
would know, when he was well and able to think clearly:
'I experienced pain
as a consequence of being shot by a poisoned arrow.
That pain I experienced
in the healing process
was that which resulted
as a secondary condition
of the skillful action needed to effect a cure;
that secondary pain
was not the cure.
In the same way
if one were to have personal experience of the matter,
or if one were to have one's self,
the knowledge and skills
to actually solve the problem of kammic consequences,
it would be proper to make such a statement as this;
but not having the personal experience,
it is not proper to make such statements.'
Then the response I get is that
'Our teacher is all-knowing,
all-seeing.
It is because he says this
that we believe it.'
To this I respond:
'These five things
prove to be an unreliable basis for judgment
concerning what one should hold to be the truth
because they can be shown
to have two wrong outcomes
before you even start.
What five?
Faith,
Approval,
Oral Tradition,
Arriving at by thinking about, and
acceptance of a well known theory.
What two wrong outcomes? ...'"
Not elaborated in the sutta, but making the argument:
Something in which one has faith,
of which one approves,
that is oral tradition,
that is arrived at by thought,
that is an accepted theory
may be wrong;
and something in which one has no faith,
of which one does not approve,
that is not oral tradition,
that has not been thought about,
that is not an accepted theory
may be correct.
"So I ask, going no further than believing in a teacher:
'Having examined this teacher
with the idea of determining
his vulnerability to the likelihood
that his perception has been distorted
by lust, hate, and stupidity;
having asked
'Does this person possess such states
of lust, hate and stupidity
that although he did not "know and see"
he would say "I know and see"?
Or would he,
because of lust, hate or stupidity,
teach the sort of doctrine
that would lead one who followed
to regret it?
... based on what faith
that such and such is the Truth,
based on what appeal,
based on what oral tradition,
based on what reasoning,
based on what accepted theory,
do you place such belief
in this teacher of yours?"
But I hear no reasonable response.
So then I ask:
'Is it the case
that when you make a strong effort
you experience painful sensations,
intensely painful sensations,
acutely intense painful sensations;
but that when you do not make a strong effort
you do not experience painful sensations,
intensely painful sensations,
acutely intense painful sensations?'
And the answer is that
that is the case.
And I suggest that:
'If that were the case,
then it would be proper to deduce that
all of one's sense experiences,
whether pleasant
or unpleasant
or neither pleasant nor unpleasant,
are a consequence of past action by the individual.
By burning up and destroying past deeds
and by not doing new deeds,
there is the prevention of kammic consequence in the future.
But since it can be shown
that painful sensations,
intensely painful sensations,
acutely intense painful sensations
can occur both when one is making an effort
and when one is making no effort,
then it is not proper to make such a deduction.
You are simply deceiving yourselves.'
And again, I hear no reasonable rebuttal.
So then I say:
'Is it possible to say:
"By this severe penance,
let[5] that kamma
which is due now
be postponed to the future?"
Or,
"By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was to be experienced as pleasant
be experienced as unpleasant?"
Or,
"By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was to be experienced as unpleasant
be experienced as pleasant?"
Or,
"By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was to be experienced conclusively
be experienced only partially?"
Or,
"By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was to be experienced only partially
be experienced conclusively?"
Or,
'By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was to be experienced intensely
be experienced only lightly?"
Or,
"By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was to be experienced only lightly
be experienced intensely?"
Or,
"By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was to be experienced,
not be experienced?"
Or,
"By this severe penance,
let that kamma
which was not to be experienced,
be one that is experienced?'[6]
And to all these questions I receive the answer:
'No, it is not possible.'
So then I say:
'Then by your own admission here
your severe penances are useless.'
About those who, through severe penances, experience intensely painful sensations, he states:
"If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to previous kamma,
then these individuals were doers of deeds that were badly done.
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to a creator,
then they were created by an evil creator.
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is just a consequence
of that which that individual needs to experience
(the way we try to make the best of a bad circumstance by saying that we needed to experience this in order to teach us such and such; or the way the "all-seeing" teacher weasels out of the predicament when asked, if he was all knowing, why he experiences unpleasant experiences),
then these individuals need to experience some hard lessons.
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is a consequence of their
(class, position, cast)
then they are of a low
(class, position, cast).
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is a consequence of their efforts in the here and now,
then they are of evil effort
in the here and now.
And, additionally,
whether that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is or is not caused by any of these five cases,
the painful sensations experienced by those practicing severe penances
are reasonable grounds
for considering their behavior irrational."
At this point the case is turned completely upside down and the Bhikkhus are shown how to develop skillful states in the here and now:
"By enduring the painful consequences
of past badly done kamma
without reaction,
fighting only the urge
to react by flight
into sense pleasure
(the creation of new actions with the intent of causing pleasure),
one 'Masters the self through Pain.'
This effort
(at indifference toward the pain)
is, itself, one step removed from
(detached from)
direct experience of the consequences of kamma.
Thus in two ways
is their progress in a
'benevolent cycle':
in the effort to control reaction
to the situation itself
indifference results,
and in the experience of the indifference
comes liberation from painful experience
through that indifference
and as a consequence of that
the indifference grows.
In the same way
as if there were a man
who was passionately in love,
painfully in love,
acutely painfully in love
with the most beautiful lass in the land.
If he were to see her laughing,
singing,
dancing
with some other man;
what do you think?
Would he grieve and lament,
feel pain and misery
and despair?
But supposing he were to reflect:
"I am passionately in love with this woman,
painfully in love,
acutely painfully in love,
and because of this
when I see her laughing,
singing,
and dancing
with some other man
I experience grief and lamentation,
pain and misery
and despair.
Suppose I were to let go
of my desire and lust for this woman?
And that is what he does.
(Just like that! Snap fingers!)
Then, at a later time
he might see that woman
laughing,
singing,
and dancing
with some other man.
What do you think?
Would he grieve and lament
and feel pain and misery
and despair
because of that?
Of course not!
How come?
Because he has let go
of his desire and lust for this woman,
that's how come.
Reflecting on this he thinks:
'Uncontrolled,
unskillful conditions increase
and skillful conditions decrease;
making an effort to master the self through pain;
in this way,
skillful conditions increase
and unskillful conditions decrease."
And he makes effort in this way,
and In This Way,
soon enough,
dukkha is burned off,
and, further, after a time
there is no need to master the self through pain
in this way.
How come?
Because the self
has mastered the self
through pain.
In the same way
as the fletcher,
or the fletcher's skillful apprentice,
when he Wishes to make his shaft straight
and ... serviceable ...
heats that shaft
by thrusting it back and forth
in a blazing fire
until it is straight and serviceable.
But when that shaft is straight and serviceable
he no longer thrusts that shaft back and forth
in that blazing fire.
How come?
Because the purpose
of thrusting that shaft back and forth
in the blazing fire
has been accomplished,
that's how come!"[7]
Up past here
this sutta describes a standard course to the final goal:
A Buddha arises,
one hears of sucha one,
one approaches,
sits down and listens,
puts the system into practice,
gets rid of the hindrances,
attains the jhānas,
attains knowledge of former habitations,
knowledge of the outcome of deeds,
and the destruction of the āsavas,
sees freedom as freedom
and knows he is free,
and has attained arahantship.
And the sutta concludes with a recasting of the statements concerning the cause of pleasure or pain:
"If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to previous kamma,
then the Tathāgata is a doer of deeds that were well done.
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is due to a creator,
then the Tathāgata was created by a benevolent creator.
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is just a consequence
of that which that individual needs to experience,
then the Tathāgata needed to experience some pleasant lessons.
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is a consequence of their
(class, position, cast)
then the Tathāgata is of a high
(class, position, cast).
If that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is a consequence of their efforts in the here and now,
then the Tathāgata is of skillful effort in the here and now.
And, additionally,
whether that pleasure and pain which a person experiences
is or is not caused by any of these five cases,
the pleasant sensations
(above the āsavas)
experienced by the Tathāgata are reasonable grounds for considering his behavior rational.
[1] By the way, in case it is not absolutely clear: "escaping kamma" and "ending dukkha" are two ways of saying the same thing.
[2] There is a long, often repeated list of these severe austerities, properly categorized in this system as "Self-Torture". Some of these include walking around completely naked, pulling out the hair, always standing, never accepting an invitation for food, eating extremely small amounts of food at lengthy intervals, and many others (many of which the Buddha himself did in the period of intense striving before his awakening to the real method).
[3] Note that this is not saying: Whatever one "sees", "hears", etc. What is being spoken of as the consequence of kamma is the subjective "feeling" or "sensation" upon the seeing or hearing. It is this that is the kammic consequence, the result of one's intent when doing a deed.
[4] This absolutist position should be compared to the statement: "...he sees that beings are the inheritors of their deeds, they are well-going, or poorly going, wealthy or poor, beautiful or ugly, wise or foolish as a consequence of their past actions." which is not the same thing. The case of the second case allows for unpleasant experiences based on the changes of seasons, and other external events (even, the pain that results from withdrawing from a bad habit).
[5] This (or using "May") is the very mathematical way "Wishing" or "cursing" or otherwise conjuring magical events is to be formulated; the meaning is not "Let it be such and such" as is commonly heard, but "Make it be".
[6] If any of you out there have actually tried making a case such as this you will appreciate the fact that in the Buddha's time debaters were much more reasonable than today. Today each of these questions would be answered in the affirmative and require recycling through the previous arguments before they could be dismissed ... and long before even the first case had been through this process the debate would have ended with either a declaration of blind faith ('I don't care what you say, this is what I believe. This is what that book says. etc.' or an angry retort.
The conclusion of the defeat of this proposition deals with its basis in the idea that "All of one's sense experiences, whether pleasant or unpleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant, is a consequence of past action by the individual."
[7] Man, anyone who does not think this stuff is sometimes very funny, and sometimes even raunchy, just isn't seeing what is in front of their eyes!
References:
See also:
MN 101
